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39

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction of this Court is conferred by UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(3)0).
ISSUES FOR REVIEW
Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment in favor of Admiral
Insurance Company ("Admiral"), and against Basic Research, LLC, Dynakor Pharmacal,
LLC, The Carter-Reed Company, LLC, Zoller Laboratories, LLC, Dennis Gay, Daniel B.
Mowrey and Mitchell K. Friedlander (collectively, "Basic Research") on the following
grounds:
1.

Did the district court err by ignoring the broad rules of construction for

insurance policies and, instead, interpreting the covered offense of "use of another's
advertising idea" narrowly to encompass only claims involving misappropriation or the
wrongful taking of another's advertising idea?
2.

Did the district court err when it concluded that the conduct of which the

plaintiffs in the underlying consumer lawsuits complain(ed) with respect to Basic
Research did not implicate a misappropriation or wrongful taking so that: (a) those
plaintiffs' claims do not potentially fall within one of the predicate offenses enumerated
in the Admiral policies, triggering Admiral's duty to defend Basic Research?
3.

Did the district court err when it concluded there must be a causal

connection between the underlying consumer plaintiffs' injuries and Basic Research's
advertising activities when the definition of "advertising injury" only requires "injury
arising out of.. . use of another's advertising idea in your 'advertisement,'" so that
misuse of another's advertising idea, as alleged here, potentially falls within the policy's
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

coverage?
4.

Did the district court err when it concluded that the policy term "of

another" could not be implicated where the conceded "advertising ideas" - "eat all you
want and still lose weight" - was on the FTC's "Red Flag" list and was trademarked by
other entities before Basic Research "used" this advertising idea?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF THE CASE AND COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is a coverage dispute about an Admiral policy provision insuring against

third-party claims for "personal and advertising injury." In 2007-2009, consumers sued
Basic Research in three separate class action lawsuits in Utah and California, alleging
that Basic Research had falsely advertised and otherwise violated various consumer fraud
statutes with respect to a diet product, Akavar 20/50." Basic Research tendered the
claims to Admiral, seeking coverage under the "personal and advertising injury"
provisions of two commercial general liability policies issued by Admiral to Basic
Research for the relevant time period. Admiral initially agreed to defend Basic Research
in one of those actions, but not in the other two. But Admiral ultimately failed to defend
Basic Research in all three of them, leaving Basic Research to pay more than $4 million
dollars in reasonable and necessary defense fees and expenses.
Basic Research initially sued Admiral for declaratory relief in the United States
District Court, District of Utah. After filing summary judgment cross-motions, by
agreement of the parties Basic Research dismissed the federal action and on January 14,
2011 re-filed it in the Utah District Court, Third Judicial District for Salt Lake County.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The parties them re-filed their summary judgment cross-motions with the state district
court.
Basic Research contended there was a potential for coverage because the
underlying Akavar lawsuits' consumer claimants alleged facts implicating Admiral's
"personal and advertising injury" policy offense of "injury arising out of... use of
another's advertising idea in [Basic Research's] advertisement" that had damaged the
claimants. Thus, Admiral owed a duty of defense. Admiral contended that the underlying
claims did not trigger a defense and that, even if it did, certain policy exclusions relieved
Admiral of the defense duty.
Oral argument was held on March 24, 2011 before the Honorable L.A. Devers.
On May 24, 2011, the district court denied Basic Research's motion for summary
judgment and granted Admiral's motion. The court narrowly interpreted the policy
offense — "use of another's advertising idea in your advertisement" - as if it were
limited to the meaning of an earlier "misappropriation of advertising ideas" policy
offense. Opinion, p. 14. Based on that understanding the district court held that the
underlying plaintiffs had not alleged a "misappropriation" claim, so that Admiral had no
duty to defend Basic Research. Opinion, pp. 14-15. Basic Research timely appealed the
district court's ruling by filing a notice of appeal on June 21, 2011.
II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

Admiral's Insurance Policies
1.

Two Consecutive Policy Periods Are Implicated

Admiral issued to Basic Research, LLC, as named insured, identical Commercial

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

General Liability insurance policies with successive terms from August 20, 2007 through
August 20, 2008, then August 20, 2008 through August 20, 2009. [3rd District Court
Record ("R") 29-30, 88-89] They provided continuous coverage with "general aggregate"
and "personal and advertising injury" limits of $5,000,000 each. Id.
2.

Appellants Are All Insureds

The policies provide coverage for Basic Research. [R 29, 88] A named insured
endorsement to each policy includes Covarix, LLC and its subsidiaries as named insureds
under the policies. [R 29-30, 54, 88-89, 124] Dynakor, Carter-Reed and Zoller Labs are
all subsidiaries of Covarix, LLC. [R 670] Covarix, LLC does business as Basic
Research, LLC. [R 29, 88] The policies also cover "any other person or organization
qualifying as a Named Insured under this policy." [R 33, 92] Such insured "persons or
organizations" include: (1) "members" of limited liability companies like Basic Research,
but only with respect to the conduct of your business;" (2) "managers" of any "insured
"with respect to their duties as managers;" and (3) "employees" of "insureds for "acts
within the scope of their employment by you or while performing duties related to the
conduct of your business." [R 40-41, 100-101] "Employee" is policy-defined to include
"leased worker" (defined in turn as a "person leased to [an insured] by a labor leasing
firm . . . to perform duties related to the conduct of your business." [R 45, 46, 105, 106]
Under Admiral's policies, each Appellant is an "insured:" Gay as a Basic
Research "manager," Mowrey and Friedlander as "leased workers" from non-party
Bydex Management, LLC to Basic Research; and Dynakor, Carter-Reed and Zoller as
Covarix, LLC subsidiaries. [R 669-670] The underlying lawsuits alleged that their
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alleged conduct occurred within the individuals' managerial duties and employment and,
as to all of them, within the scope of business. [R 630-31] Admiral has never disputed
these appellants' status as insureds.
3.

Policies' Relevant Coverage

The policies' "Insuring Agreement" requires Admiral to: "pay those sums that the
insured becomes legally obligated to pay as "damages because of 'personal and
advertising injury'" to which this insurance applies," and provides that Admiral has the
"right and duty to defend the insured against any 'suit' seeking those damages." [R 37,
97] "Personal and advertising injury" is defined to include: "injury . . . arising out of one
or more of the following offenses:... f. The use of another's advertising idea in your
'advertisement.'" "Advertisement" is defined:
1.

"Advertisement" means a notice that is broadcast or
published to the general public or specific market
segments about your goods, products or services for
the purpose of attracting customers or supporters. For
the purposes of this definition:
a.

4.

Notices that are published include material
placed on the Internet or on similar electronic
means of communications;. . . [R45, 105]

Policies' Relevant Exclusions

Admiral's policies exclude coverage for:
a.

Knowing Violation of Rights of Another
"Personal and advertising injury" caused by or
at the direction of the insured with the
knowledge that the act would violate the rights
of another and would inflict "personal and
advertising injury".

b.

Material Published With Knowledge of Falsity
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"Personal and advertising injury" arising out of
oral or written publication of material, if done
by or at the direction of the insured with
knowledge of its falsity.
g.

B.

Quality Or Performance of Goods — Failure to
Conform to Statements
"Personal and advertising injury" arising out of
the failure of goods, products or services to
conform with any statement of quality or
performance made in your "advertisement". [R
37-38, 97-98]

The Underlying Lawsuits
1.

The Miller Suit

On November 9, 2007, Pamela Miller, Randy Howard and Donna Patterson filed a
putative class action complaint against Basic Research, Dynakor, Gay, Mowrey and
Friedlander, among others, in a lawsuit styled as Pamela Miller, et al v. Basic Research,
LLC et al, United States District Court, District of Utah, Central Division, Case No.
2:07-CV-00871 ("the Miller suit"). On May 23, 2008, the Miller suit plaintiffs filed a
First Amended Complaint, alleging that the insureds ("Basic Research") violated Utah
state law by making misleading claims in its advertisements of Akavar 20/50, a diet
supplement ("Akavar") "through the U.S. mail, published in national magazines, posted
on the Internet, displayed in retail stores across the county ("point-of-purchase"), and
broadcast on television...." [R 822]
i

The Miller suit alleged that Basic Research made these claims to promote Akavar
as a product that enabled weight loss without diet or exercise, and that others (noted by
the FTC) have made similar claims for other allegedly "prototypical fraudulent weightloss produces]." [R 815] The Akavar advertisements were repeatedly alleged to include:
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"Eat All You Want And Still Lose Weight" and "And We Couldn't Say It in Print If It
Wasn't True." [R 804, 808, 826]
The Miller plaintiffs also alleged they purchased Akavar "based on this
advertising" and "these representations."
Based upon this advertising disseminated by Defendants, Ms.
Miller purchased a supply of Akavar through Defendants'
Internet website, www.AMvar.net. [R 803-804]
Based upon these representations made as part of Defendants'
in-store advertising materials, Plaintiff Howard purchased
two bottles of Akavar at the Wal-Mart store ... [R 804]
Based upon this advertising by Defendants, Ms. Patterson
purchased a supply of Akavar from a General Nutrition
Center store located in Arlington, Virginia ... [R 805]
The Miller plaintiffs also alleged they "purchased Akavar and have suffered injury
as a result." [R 828] They did not allege that they "suffered injury" because the product
did not work as advertised.
2.

The Tompkins Suit

On December 6, 2007, Mary Tompkins filed a putative class action complaint
against Basic Research, Dynakor, Gay, Mowrey and Friedlander and among others styled
as Mary Tompkins et al v. Basic Research, LLC et aL, Superior Court of California for
the County of Sacramento, Case No. 34-2007-00882581 ("the Tompkins suit"), later
removed to the United States District Court, Eastern District of California and then
transferred to the United States District Court, District of Utah, Central Division, where it
was consolidated with the Miller suit. [R 670] The Miller and Tompkins suits are being
litigated under the Miller suit case name and number ("Miller/Tompkins suits"). [R 670]
The Tompkins suit alleges that Basic Research made misleading weight loss
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claims in its advertisements as alleged in the Miller suit to promote sales of Akavar,
including the use of the slogans "Eat All You Want And Still Lose Weight" and "And
We Couldn't Say It in Print If It Wasn't True," that these misleading claims were made
to promote Akavar as a product that enables one to lose weight without diet or exercise,
and that such claims are a widespread problem as others have made similar claims to
advertise weight loss products. [R 909-10, 911, 914-16, 924-25]
The Tompkins plaintiffs alleged they purchased Akavar based on the misleading
claims made by Basic Research:
Based on Defendants' advertising, Ms. Tompkins purchased a
supply of Akavar through a California retailer. [R 911]
The Tompkins plaintiffs further allege that they "purchased Akavar and ha[ve]
suffered injury as a result," [R 919], and that they "suffered, and will continue to suffer,
harm and damages as a result of defendants1 unlawful and wrongful conduct." [R 921]
They did not allege that they "suffered injury" because the product did not work as
advertised.
The Miller and Tompkins cases were subsequently consolidated in the federal
District of Utah. [R 670] By order entered March 2, 2011,1 the Miller/Tompkins district
court certified the following nationwide class: "Persons who purchased Akavar after
seeing or hearing the marketing slogan "Eat all you want and still lose weight" during the
relevant damages period." The class is not restricted to persons who contended they lost
money because Akavar did not work as advertised. Only purchase of the product after
i

1

Miller v. Basic Research LLC, No. 2:07-CV-871 TS, 2011 WL 818150, at *2 (D.
Utah March 2, 2011).
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exposure to the advertising is required.
3.

The Forlenza Suit

On May 26, 2009, Nicole Forlenza and Shaiden Monroe filed a putative class
action complaint against Basic Research, Dynakor, Carter-Reed, Gay, Mowrey and
Friedlander, among others, in a lawsuit styled: Nicole Forlenza and Shaiden Monroe et
al v. Dynakor Pharmacol, LLC et al.9 United States District Court, Central District of
California, Case No. 2:09-CV-03730 ("the Forlenza suit"). [R 671] On June 11,
2009, the Forlenza suit plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint, adding Zoller
Laboratories, LLC as a defendant. [R671] Subsequent second, third and fourth
amended complaints were filed. [R 671] The suit was eventually dismissed without a
settlement. [R671]
The Forlenza suit alleged Basic Research used the same advertising tagline —
"Eat all you want and still lose weight. We couldn't say it in print if it wasn't true" - and
that Akavar enables one to lose weight without diet or exercise. [R 932, 1010-1013] The
Forlenza suit also alleged that others have made similar claims to advertise weight loss
products or "miracle pills," as the FDA confirmed, and that "Akavar is just one of those
'miracle pills' . . . . Defendants attempt to sell Akavar by convincing consumers that they
can avoid the only proven and safe weight-loss method recognized by the FDA." [R 936]
The Forlenza claimants further allege that they purchased Akavar because they

By Request for Judicial Notice, Basic Research called this Order to the district
court's attention five days after oral argument on March 28, 2011. [R 1466-77] The
district court neither ruled on the Request nor referred to the Miller/Tompkins class
certification order in its Opinion.
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believed and relied on the representations:
Plaintiffs.. .purchased Akavar products for their own personal
use. In so doing, Plaintiffs...believed and relied specifically
on the representations contained in the marketing materials
for the products, which they had viewed on television, on the
Internet, and in the premises of the Retailer Defendants where
they purchased the product... [R 1026-27, 1032-33, 1035-36]
The Forlenza claimants further allege that they sustained injury because they
purchased the product in reliance on the representations, and that they sustained injury for
reasons that included the advertisements' untruth:
Plaintiff Forlenza has thus suffered injury and damage
because she purchased a product based on false advertising
and because the product has not worked as advertised. [R
1014-15]...
C.

Additional Facts about Advertising Ideas in Akavar Advertisements

Before the suits, the slogans "Eat All You Want And Still Lose Weight" and "And
We Couldn't Say It in Print If It Wasn't True" were registered trademarks of Western
Holdings, LLC, a separate and distinct corporate entity from Basic Research which is not
a party to this coverage suit. [R 1207-12]
Persons and entities other than Basic Research used an almost identical slogan to
advertise weight loss products long before the facts pled in the Miller, Tompkins and
Forlenza suits are alleged to have commenced. For example, in 2004, the Federal Trade
Commission filed an action against Natural Products, LLC, All Natural 4 U, LLC, and
Ana M. Solkamans for using the slogan "Eat All You Want and Still Lose Weight (Pill
Does All the Work)" to advertise Bio Trim™, a weight loss product. FTC v. Natural
Products, LLC et al (CD. Cal. Case No. SACV 04-1279), Complaint for Permanent
i

Injunction and Other Equitable Relief (filed 11/3/2004), p. 5,112(d). [R 1208, 1222]
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The FTC also referred to this slogan in a press release on the above lawsuit. See FTC
Stops Bogus Ads for "Bio Trim" and Other Weight-Loss Products (FTC Press Release
November 7, 2005), ^[2. [R 1208, 1235-36] The FTC further identified this slogan as a
"Red Flag Claim" on its Red Flag | Bogus Weight Loss Claims Internet microsite. [R
1208, 1238] Extrinsic evidence of these facts was before the district court below. [R
1207-1212]
D.

Admiral's Acceptance, then Dishonor of its Defense Duties
1.

Miller/Tompkins suit defense duties denied

Basic Research gave written notice of the Miller/Tompkins suit to Admiral as early
as January 31, 2008. [R 671, 1094] Admiral denied a defense for the Miller/Tompkins
suit on June 6, 2008. [R 671, 1098]
2.

Forlenza suit defense duties accepted, then dishonored

Basic Research gave written notice of the Forlenza suit to Admiral on or about
June 4, 2009 and, on or about July 15, 2009, supplemental written notice of the Forlenza
suit to Admiral including a copy of its First Amended Complaint. [R 671, 672, 1144] By
letters dated June 25, 2009 and July 6, 2009, Admiral acknowledged receipt and agreed
to defend Basic Research in the Forlenza suit subject to a reservation of rights under the
second Admiral policy. [R 671-72, 1127, 1135]
On November 19, 2009, Basic Research e-mailed Admiral to express concern over
Admiral's ongoing failure to actually defend it or to communicate with Basic Research.
[R 1191, 1195] Admiral apologized, stating invoices for the incurred defense costs were
being reviewed by counsel. [R 1191, 1196] On December 8, 2009, Basic Research again
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e-mailed Admiral to request that it pay defense expenses. [R 1191, 1199] Admiral
confirmed that it had accepted the defense under a reservation of rights and was still
having the invoices reviewed by counsel. [R 1191, 1200]
By letter dated January 11, 2010, Admiral suddenly advised Basic Research that it
had appointed "an associated counsel" for Basic Research who would also serve as
"panel counsel" for Admiral. [R 1191, 1203] However, the appointed counsel never
participated in the Forlenza suit defense. [R 1192]
On April 7, 2010, Admiral filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings in the
coverage action, arguing for the first time that it had no duty to defend the Forlenza suit.
[R 640] Admiral never previously asserted that the Forlenza suit allegations do not
establish a potential for coverage under the second Admiral policy.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Admiral owes a duty to defend Basic Research in the underlying consumer
lawsuits. Admiral's policies provide coverage for "personal and advertising injury"
implicated by claims for "damages because of ['injury arising out o f ] . . . use of another's
advertising idea in [Basic Research] 'advertisement.'" An "advertisement" includes
"notice published . . . to specific market segments about your goods, products or services
for the purpose of attracting customers or supporters."
Contrary to the district court conclusion in its May 24, 2011 Ruling, while "use"
may include "misappropriation" or "wrongful taking" it is not limited to those
definitions. Utah courts have deemed "use" to have a much broader meaning. As rules
of insurance policy construction in coverage disputes require courts to construe policy
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terms liberally and in favor of the insured, it was error for the district court to adopt a
narrow interpretation of the term "use" that includes only "misappropriation/wrongful
taking." No policy exclusion relieves Admiral from its duty to defend Basic Research.
Basic Research respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court's
decision that Admiral has no duty to defend Basic Research in the Miller, Tompkins and
Forlenza lawsuits, and to hold that Admiral must reimburse Basic Research for its
defense fees and expenses to date with prejudgment interest thereon from the date of each
invoice, and must pay the defense fees and costs going forward until each of those
underlying consumer lawsuits has been fully and finally resolved.
ARGUMENT
I.

APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS
Basic Research moved for summary judgment declaring that Admiral, under the

terms of the insurance policies it issued to Basic Research, owes a duty to defend Basic
Research in the underlying consumer lawsuits. Without regard or deference to the district
court's prior ruling, this Court reviews Basic Research's and Admiral's cross-motions de
novo. Peterson v. The Sunrider Corp., 2002 UT 43, ^f 13, 48 P.3d 918; see also Swan
Creek Vill Homeowners Ass 'n v. Warm, 2006 UT 22, f 16, 134 P.3d 1122. Utah law
applies.3
Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issues of material fact exist,
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. {Peterson, Swan

The district court so concluded on the ground that pursuant to the forum selection
clause contained within the Admiral policies, Admiral agreed to the jurisdiction of Utah
courts and to the application of Utah law. Opinion, pp. 2-3.
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Creek). As an insurer's duty to defend is a question of law, summary judgment is the
proper means by which to resolve this issue. Ohio Cas. Inc. Co. v. Cloud Nine, LLC, 464
F. Supp. 2d 1161,1165 (D. Utah 2006) (citing Utah law).
A duty to defend exists when facts give rise to a potential of liability under the
insurance policy. DeseretFed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 714 P.2d
1143, 1146 (Utah 1986).4 If the facts render coverage uncertain, the insurer has a duty to
defend until those uncertainties have been clarified to reveal conclusively that there is no
coverage. Benjamin v. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co., 2006 UT 37, f 22, 140 P.3d 1210 (Utah
2007) (so noting); Equine Assisted Growth and Learning Ass 'n (UEAGALA ") v. Carolina
Cas. Ins. Co., 2011 UT 49, f 8,

P.3d

, 2011 WL 3652331, at *2 (Aug. 19, 2011)

(same, citing Benjamin). Where there is any doubt, the default conclusion is that the
insurer must defend. Id. ("When in doubt, defend.") (quoting Appleman on Insurance
Law and Practice § 136.2[C] (2d ed. 2006)); see also Cloud Nine, 464 F. Supp. 2d at
1166 (same).
"An insurer denying a duty to defend must establish that the claims fall outside the
coverage of the policy or the claims are exempted from coverage." Simmons v. Farmers
Ins. Group, 877 P.2d 1255, 1258, n.3 (Utah App. 1994). Policy provisions purporting to
limit or exclude coverage are "strictly construed" against the insurer. U.S. Fid. & Guar.

4

See also, Harris v. Zurich-Holding Co. of Am., No. 2:05-CV-482 TC, 2006 WL
120258, at *2 (D. Utah Jan. 17, 2006) (unpublished), citing and quoting Montrose Chem.
Corp. v. Superior Court, 6 Cal. 4th 287, 861 P.2d 1153, 1161 (Cal. 1992) ("[I]t is the
insurer's burden to establish that the suits filed against [the insured] fall outside of the
policy's coverage . . . . '[T]he insured need only show that the underlying claim may
fall within policy coverage; the insurer must prove it cannot' " (emphasis added)).
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Co. v. Sandt, 854 P.2d 519, 523 (Utah 1993).
To determine Admiral's defense duty the Court begins "by comparing the
language of the insurance policy with the allegations in the complaint." Fire Ins. Exch. v.
Estate ofTherkelsen, 2001 UT 48, f 21, 27 P.3d 555. But the coverage analysis does not
end there. As held in EAGALA, supra, 2011 UT 49, ^[18 (following Therkelsen, supra)
(emphasis added):
If the language found within the collective 'eight comers'
of these documents clearly and unambiguously indicates
that a duty to defend does or does not exist, the analysis is
complete. However, if coverage is premised on information
not contained the complaint, [this Court] must continue [its]
inquiry to examine that information.
Thus, the Court's review of the complaint and the policy "does not end [the
Court's] inquiry." Therkelsen, 2001 UT 48, f 21 ("While the analysis always begins with
an examination of the policy language and the complaint, it ends there only if the policy
terms when compared with the allegations definitively indicate that there is or is not a
duty to defend." EAGALA, 2011 UT 49, *[jl 1 (emphasis added)). Extrinsic evidence may
be necessary to make a final determination as to whether a duty to defend exists.
Therkelsen, 2001 UT 48,125; EAGALA, 2011 UT 49, ^ 19 (because the complaint did
not allege facts clarifying whether the underlying claim triggered a policy exclusion, "the
court's examination must go on to develop the facts relevant to answer the inquiry" —
i.e., "extrinsic evidence may be considered to make this determination"). See also, DISH
Network Corp. v. Arch Specialty Ins. Co.,

F.3d

, 2011 WL 4908108, at *4 (10th

Cir. (Colo.) 2011) (recognizing exception to Colorado's "eight comers" rule (like Utah's)
to allow judicial consideration of an "indisputable fact that is not an element of either the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

[underlying] cause of action or a defense in the underlying litigation" as well as the
policy and underlying complaint because "notice pleading does not contemplate detail
and specificity" and the underlying complaint may " 'lack detail necessary to
conclusively establish the duty.' ") Id.
II.

ADMIRAL'S COVERAGE IS
ANALYZED ACCORDINGLY
A.

OFFENSE-BASED

AND

MUST

BE

A Three-Part Test Applies To Evaluate Potential Coverage under
Admiral's Policy Language

Admiral promised to defend Basic Research "against any 'suit'
seeking ... damages" "because of 'personal and advertising injury' to which this
insurance applies/' including "injury ... arising out of [the offense of] 'use of another's
advertising idea in your "advertisement."'" [R47, 107] The elements required to
establish potential coverage under Admiral's policy are:
(1) "Damages because of 'personal and advertising injury' to which this insurance
applies."
(2) "Injury . . . arising out of... an offense . . .;" and
(3) "Use of another's advertising idea in your 'advertisement/" with
"advertisement" policy-defined as a "notice . . . published to . . . specific market
segments about your goods . . . for the purpose of attracting customers or supporters."
The "use of another's advertising idea in your 'advertisement'" offense has three
principal elements: (1) "advertising idea" . . . "use;" (2) "of another's," and (3) in your
"advertisement." Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Alters Medical, Inc., No. 03-1037-CV-W-ODS,
2005 WL 2319820, at *4 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 22, 2005).
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B.

Facts Pled in the Underlying Complaints, Not the Labels of their
Causes of Action, Determine Potential Coverage

Contrary to the district court's analysis (Order, p. 29), the underlying actions need
not "specify a cause of action covered by a particular policy." Not all elements of torts
falling within the ambit of an enumerated policy offense need be found within the
underlying complaint. Only potential coverage need be demonstrated. Sharon Steel
Corp. v.Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 931 P.2d 127, 135 (Utah 1997).
Other jurisdictions agree, including a seminal Missouri Supreme Court opinion.
McCormackBaron Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 989 S.W.2d
168, 171 (Mo. 1999) ("The word 'offense' cannot be read to limit coverage only to a
particular 'cause of action' or 'claim.' The word 'offense' simply does not have this
meaning in either common usage or legal usage.").
Other courts have recognized this proposition when addressing "personal injury"
coverage for defamation or disparagement, as well as when discussing the general
character of offense-based coverage. Bankwest v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. ofMd., 63 F.3d
974, 981 (10th Cir. (Kan.) 1995) (dissemination of "other defamatory or disparaging
material" evidences potential for defamation as well as disparagement based on
inferences that claimants were not to be trusted to consummate real estate deals based on
estoppel letters sent to their bank which harmed a legal interest that had "pecuniary
value.").
The elements of "personal injury" and "advertising injury" are distinct from those
for "bodily injury" or "property damage." Judge Croskey explained in Atlantic Mut. Ins.
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Co. v. J. Lamb, Inc., 100 Cal. App. 4th 1017, 1032, 1034 (2002) that construing an
insurance policy focusing on the injury or damages, which need only arise out of the
offense, is an erroneous approach.
Under the personal injury policy provision, "[cjoverage ... is
triggered by the offense, not the injury or damage which a
plaintiff suffers." . . . The triggering event is the insured's
wrongful act, not the resulting injury to the third party
claimant . . . The scope of the duty does not depend on the
labels given to the causes of action in the third party
complaint; instead it rests on whether the alleged facts or
known extrinsic facts reveal a possibility; that the claim may
be covered by the policy, (original italics ; bold emphasis
added)).
III.

ADMIRAL MISSTATES THE ELEMENTS OF PROOF FOR POTENTIAL
COVERAGE UNDER ITS APPLICABLE "ADVERTISING INJURY"
POLICY COVERAGE LANGUAGE
A.

The "Injury Arising Out O f the Offense Is Alleged

"Personal and advertising injury" means "injury . . . arising out of [an] offense,"
with "arising out o f meaning "originating from," "growing out of," "flowing from,"
"incident to" or "connected with." Durbano v. American Empire Ins., No. 91-4115, 914142, 1992 WL 112246, at *2 (10th Cir. (Utah) 1992) (unpublished) citing Nafl Farmers
Union Prop. & Cas. Co. v. W. Cas. & Sur. Co., 577 P.2d 961, 963 (Utah 1978):
The term "arising out o f has a broad meaning under Utah
law. . . . The phrase is 'commonly understood to mean
originating from, growing out of, or flowing from, and
requires only that there be some causal relationship between
the injury and the risk for which coverage is provided.' "
Admiral's policy requires no causal connection between the injury and the
insured's advertising activity. Novell, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 141 F.3d 983, 986 (10th Cir.
1998) (on which Admiral has relied) analyzed different coverage language for
"advertising injury caused by an offense committed in the course of advertising [the
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insureds] goods, products or services/' without articulating the distinct "causal
connection between injury and advertising activity" language in Admiral's policy.
Potential coverage in Novell required only that the "advertising injury" offense be
"committed in advertising your goods, products or services." That nexus was held to be
satisfied where an "advertising idea" is allegedly used "in your 'advertisement.'" Id.
Neither "advertising activity" nor the undefined term "advertisement" itself was an
element of the Novell offense.
Admiral's policy's required causal nexus is set forth by the words "in your
'advertisement.'" The required connection is not between an "advertising activity" and an
"injury," but between an "advertisement" and the "use of another's 'advertising idea'"
offense. The claimant's "injury" need only "arise out o f an enumerated offense to satisfy
this "injury"/"advertising injury" nexus. Only advertising that "materially contrasts to
the offense" is required.5
Admiral has admitted that the underlying complaints allege misleading
advertising. Admiral "does not dispute the fact that the Forlenza plaintiffs alleged that
Basic Research made misleading claims in its advertisements . . . " [R 1258] "Admiral
does not dispute that the Miller complaint alleges that Basic Research made . . .
misleading claims in its advertisements of [Akavar]." [R 1249] Admiral "does not
dispute that... others have made similar claims to advertise weight loss

5

Central Mutual Ins. Co. v. StunFence, Inc., 292 F. Supp. 2d 1072, 1079 (N.D. 111.
2003) ("Under a straightforward reading of the revised Primary Policy language, Central
had a duty to defend StunFence if Gallagher claimed (as it did) that it suffered an injury
that arose out of StunFence's use of its 'advertising idea.'").
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products." [R 1256]
The underlying complaints allege the class members were injured or harmed by
Basic Research's use of advertising phrases because consumers could be misled into
buying Akavar. [R 828, 919, 921, 1014-15] They do not allege injury from the class
members' failure to lose weight, but from their purchase of the product caused by the
advertising.
The Miller/Tompkins Class Certification Order, 2011 WL 818150, at *2 [R 146677] indisputably confirms that the underlying claims are not premised on damages caused
by Akavar's failure to perform as advertised instead of injury caused by Basic
Research's advertising of the product. The certified class simply consists of:
Persons who purchased Akavar after seeing or hearing the
marketing slogan "Eat all you want and still lose weight"
during the relevant damages period.
This Order is fully consistent with the allegations of the Miller and Tompkins
complaints, in which the class members alleged injuries (parting with money) arising out
of their purchases of Akavar after seeing or hearing Basic Research's advertisements
containing the accused "advertising ideas" - without regard to whether Akavar
worked as advertised or whether they actually lost weight or even tried the product
after buying it. Contrary to the arguments Admiral raised to the district court and to that
court's erroneous ruling, the requisite nexus alleged and now established is between
"injury" and the covered "offense" of "use of another's advertising idea in your
'advertisement.'"
Any Admiral contention that some specific connection between the advertisement
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and the advertising injury offense is required for potential coverage and a defense is error
and should not be followed. Hudson Ins. Co. v. Colony Ins. Co., 624 F.3d 1264, 1269
(9th Cir. (Cal.) 2010), evaluating a policy offense (infringement of slogan) that is not a
tort, found a duty to defend a suit where the claimant NFL alleged the insured's sale of
counterfeit football jerseys bearing the phrase "Steel Curtain" on their back:
[I]t does not matter that the complaint never referred to "steel
curtain' as a slogan and never listed slogan infringement as a
cause of action. . . . The technical label on a cause of action
does not dictate the duty to defend whether the claimed cause
of action was omitted out of negligence or "for strategic
adversarial reasons."
As long as the underlying plaintiffs' injury is alleged to arise out of or is
connected with advertisements that use advertising ideas of another, the covered offense
("use of another's advertising idea in your 'advertisement' ") is complete.
B.

Requirement of "Damages Because of 'Advertising Injury' " Is
Satisfied

Admiral promised "to pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated
to pay as "damages because of 'personal and advertising injury' . . . " [R 37, 97] The
alleged wrongful act for which underlying damages are sought is misleading advertising.
The damages thereby sought in each underlying complaint are because of an alleged
"advertising injury."
Correctly understood, the "injury" (i.e., the conduct alleged) must "arise out o f
(i.e., have some connection with) the "use of another's advertising idea in your
'advertisement,'" offense. This policy is offense-based, not injury- or damage-based.6

6

Butler v. Clarendon Am. Ins. Co., 494 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1132, 1132 n.10 (N.D. Cal.
2007) ("In commenting on this second type of insuring provision, California courts have
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Admiral's policy requires no causal connection between the operative offense
("use of another's advertising idea in your 'advertisement'") and damages. It merely
requires that a damage remedy exists for such claims triggering the offense.7
Here, the "damages because o f element is met. The Miller First Amended
Complaint, at ^[181 alleges: "As a result of defendant's careless, unreasonable and
negligent representations and omissions, as described herein, Plaintiffs and members of
the class have been injured and have suffered loss of money and property, and they are
entitled to recover damages from the Defendants." [R 851] The Tompkins Class Action
Complaint, at ^[49 alleges, "Plaintiffs and class members have all suffered . . . harm and
damages, as a result of Defendant's unlawful and wrongful conduct...." [R 923] The
Forlenza Second Amended Class Action Complaint, at | 5 of its Prayer for Relief,
alleges, "Plaintiffs and members of the class request that the Court enter an order or
judgment against the Defendants as follows: . . . for compensatory and general damages
according to proof...." [R 1038]
Damages need not be expressly articulated under any specifically-labeled claim.
J. Lamb, Inc., 100 Cal. App. 4th at 1032 ("Coverage for [advertising injury] is not
determined by the nature of the damages sought in the action against the insured, but by

stated that '[i]n the world of liability insurance, personal injury coverage applies to injury
which arises out of the commission of certain enumerated acts or offenses ... Coverage ...
is triggered by the offense, not the injury or damage which a plaintiff suffers . . . .' The
same provision also generally covers 'advertising injury liability.'").
7

Banfc of the West v. Superior Court, 833 P.2d 545, 551-53 (Cal. 1992)
(indemnification for monies paid in settlement precluded where suit sought no money
damages within policy's meaning but only the insured's disgorgement "of ill-gotten
gains.").
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the nature of the claims made against the insured in that action

The triggering event

[under "advertising injury" offense-based coverage] is the insured's wrongful act, not the
resulting injury to the third party claimant"); Syvertsen v. Great American Ins. Co., 700
N.Y.S.2d 289, 291-92 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999).8
"Damages because of'advertising injury'" is satisfied since all requirements are
met by the underlying complaints' fact allegations: the nature of the offense elements,
that injury arising out of that offense, and that damages result from such injury arising out
of that offense.
IV.

THE MILLER, TOMPKINS AND FORLENZA CONSUMER CLAIMS
TRIGGER ADMIRAL'S DUTY TO DEFEND UNDER THE "USE OF
ANOTHER'S ADVERTISING IDEA IN YOUR ADVERTISEMENT"
DEFINITION OF "PERSONAL AND ADVERTISING INJURY"
A.

"Advertising Idea Use," Which Replaced "Misappropriation of
Advertising Ideas," is Factually Implicated Here
1.

The District Court Narrowly Construed "Advertising Idea Use"
as if Limited to the Misappropriation or Wrongful Taking of
Another's Advertising Idea, Thereby Misstating Applicable Law

The district court supported its erroneous and limited interpretation of "use of
another's advertising idea" to mean the "wrongful taking of another's advertising idea"
by repeatedly citing and heavily relying on DISH Network Corp. v. Arch Specialty Ins.
Co., 734 F.Supp.2d 1173 (D. Colo. 2010) [Opinion, pp. 14-17] which the Tenth Circuit
recently reversed in a published opinion authored by Chief Judge Briscoe. DISH, 2011
WL 4908108, at * 10. The "misappropriation of advertising ideas" policy offense was
held to be implicated, requiring a defense:
s

StunFence, Inc., 292 F. Supp. 2d at 1079 ("[Analyzing the same policy language],
Central had a duty to defend StunFence if Gallagher claimed (as it did) that it suffered an
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[IJnsurers concede that some of [the underlying claims for
infringement of automated wireless telecommunications
services and related financial services and call processing]
explicitly claim the technology's capacity for advertising
[and] 'the patented technology could theoretically be used for
advertising purposes." . . . The functions patented by
[claimant] conceivably allow Dish not only to sell the product
a consumer calls up to purchase, but also to make up-sell
offers[fn] tailored to the specific caller. When the
technology's patented advertising capabilities are considered
in conjunction with the vague factual assertions made in the
complaint, the allegations are sufficiently broad to encompass
"distribution of promotional materials," [or to fall within any
variant definition of'advertising ideas.'] (footnote omitted)).
Flatly rejecting the district court's reasoning that "DISH cannot have
misappropriated advertising ideas because it did not incorporate patented technologies as
a substantive element of its communications and interactions with customers...." the
Tenth Circuit found it sufficient that DISH allegedly misappropriated "a means of
conveying content to and tailoring its interactions with its customers." Id. at * 11." The
court specifically declined to follow other cases where courts too narrowly construed the
potential for coverage by applying an indemnity standard. Id. at *15.
Other cases that Admiral has cited are similarly inapposite and unpersuasive. For
example, in Superformance, International v. Hartford Cas. Ins., 203 F. Supp. 2d 587
(E.D. Va. 2002), the district court was confronted with "personal and advertising injury"
policy-defined as "[c]opying, in your 'advertisement', a person's or organization's
'advertising idea' or style of 'advertisement' . . . . " - not the offense here at issue.
Applied Bolting Tech. Prods, v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 942 F. Supp. 1029 (E.D. Pa.
1996) dealt with "personal and advertising injury" defined as the "misappropriation of

injury that arose out of StunFence's use of its 'advertising idea.'").
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advertising ideas" - again, not the "use o f offense here at issue and, contrary to the
District Court's view, not "comparable" to "use o f which lacks "misappropriation's"
wrongful taking component. As the policy language in Superformance and Applied
Bolting distinctly differs from Admiral's, these cases provide no guidance.
2.

The Predecessor "Misappropriation of Advertising Ideas"
Offense is Not Limited to Common Law Misappropriation

Under Utah law, trademarked slogans are "advertising ideas." Cloud Nine, 464 F.
Supp. 2d at 1167. Admiral has never disputed this [R 1243], nor did the district court
reach the issue. The salient issue is whether the facts pled by the underlying claimants
implicated "advertising ideas," bringing their claims potentially within Admiral's policies
"use of another's advertising idea in your 'advertisement'" offense.
No genuine issue of material fact exists with respect to the "advertising ideas"
alleged in those complaints. "Eat All You Want and Still Lose Weight" and "And We
Couldn't Say It If It Wasn't True" are slogans that were registered as trademarks. [R
1215-16]. In light of these undisputed facts, the "advertising idea" element of the
specific type of personal and advertising injury under which Basic Research seeks
coverage is easily met.
"Misappropriation of advertising ideas" is not limited to common law situations.
AMCOIns. Co. v. Lauren-Spencer, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 721, 730 (S.D. Ohio 2007)
("Much of the rationale of Advance Watch [the Sixth Circuit's ruling limiting the
'misappropriation' policy offense to claims based on common law misappropriation] has
often been severely criticized by other courts and represents the minority view. See Pizza
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Magialnt'l, LLC v. Assurance Co. of Am., 447 F.Supp.2d 766, 772 (W.D.Ky.2006)
(summarizing criticism of Advance Watch and declining to apply its holding). Notably,
"Michigan courts have wholly rejected the Sixth Circuit's Advance Watch construction of
Michigan law

" Lauren-Spencer, Inc., 500 F.Supp.2d at 730.

Admiral itself conceded this point. [R 1281] Nevertheless, Admiral has sought by
implication to inconsistently limit the offense's scope to that of common law
misappropriation, urging adoption of the reasoning of two readily distinguishable triallevel cases, Sorbee InVlLtd. v. Chubb Custom Ins. Co., 735 A.2d 712, 714 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1999) and Armament Sys. & Procedures v. Northland Fishing Tackle, No. 01-C-l 122,
2006 WL 2519225 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 28, 2006). Neither is persuasive. Sorbee, applying
distinct Pennsylvania law, substituted the requirements for pleading the tort of common
law misappropriation that would require the "advertising idea" to be "novel," "new" or
"concrete." Riese v. QVC, Inc., No. CIV. A. 97-40068, 1999 WL 178545, at *3 (E.D. Pa.
Mar. 30, 1999). But nothing in Admiral's policy supported this limit on
"misappropriation's" scope. Moreover, it is not the operative offense here. See DISH,
2011 WL 4908108, at *5 ("We note though, that in spite of their broad language, many of
the cases insurers cite focus on [distinct] policy terms.").
Armament Systems assumed that "misappropriation" means "wrongful taking,"
and then further limited coverage by claiming that the idea was too general to be
possessed by the party using it. Like Sorbee, Armament Systems adopted a common law
"misappropriation" standard to limit the word's meaning in the policy, albeit without
acknowledging that it had done so.
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This approach is analogous to that used by federal courts to determine the legal
sufficiency of pleadings under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), which does not test whether
there is a possibility of coverage but whether a valid claim is stated upon which relief can
be granted. Each case improperly looked to the merits of the underlying action to
evaluate whether that suit could pass muster as a common law misappropriation claim.9
This approach is inconsistent with Utah law, which requires the interpretation of
undefined policy terms like "misappropriation" in favor of coverage. Benjamin, 2006 UT
37, J 22.
These arguments are like those rejected by the 10th Circuit in DISH, 2011 WL
4908108, at* 11:
[W]e reject the district court's reasoning that Dish cannot
have misappropriated advertising ideas because it did not
incorporate patented technologies as a substantive element of
its communications and interactions with customers.
3.

Even the Predecessor Coverage for "Misappropriation" is
Ambiguous Because It Can Mean "Misuse" As Well As
"Wrongful Taking"

"Advertising idea" is ambiguous because it is susceptible of more than one
reasonable interpretation. The district court acknowledged Basic Research's contention
that "Eat All You Want and Still Lose Weight" and "And We Couldn't Say It If It Wasn't
True" are "advertising ideas" within the meaning of Admiral's policy (which does not
define the term). (Opinion, pp. 11-12) The district court then approvingly cited Cloud
Nine, 464 F. Supp.2d at 1166, which explained that an "advertising idea" is an "idea for

9

Davis H. Elliott Co. v. Caribbean Utilities Co., Ltd., 513 F.2d 1176, 1182 (6th Cir.
1975).
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calling public attention to a product or business, especially by proclaiming desirable
qualities so as to increase sales or patronage." (Opinion, p. 15) But the district court did
not decide whether these slogans fell within the definition. (Opinion, pp. 15-17).
As held in WestfieldIns. Co. v. Factfinder Marketing Research, Inc., 860 N.E.2d
145, 152 (Ohio App. 2006):
Some courts have defined "advertising idea" to mean "any
idea or concept related to the promotion of a product to the
public." . . . [Advance Watch's] restrictive holding [limiting
the 'misappropriation' offense to the common law tort of
misappropriation] has been criticized as ignoring the ordinary
meaning of the term "misappropriation." . . . [W]e resolve
this ambiguity in the provision in favor of insurance
coverage[.]
There is no single meaning to these terms because "[t]here is nothing about the
terms . . . neither of which constitutes a recognized tort, which compels [the court] to
conclude one way or the other as to just how broadly or narrowly they should be read."
Lebas Fashion Imports of USA, Inc. v. ITT Hartford Ins. Group, 50 Cal. App. 4th 548,
565, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 36, 46 (1996).
Basic Research agrees that common law misappropriation claims potentially fall
within the scope of the "misappropriation" offense because the term is ambiguous.
"Misappropriation" includes both wrongful taking and misuse.10 Dictionary definitions
also support construing "misappropriation" to include "misuse." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY

1998 (6th ed. 1990) ("Misappropriation: the unauthorized, improper or

unlawful use of funds or other property for purposes other than that for which intended ..
l0

Winklevoss Consultants, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 991 F. Supp. 1024, 1037 (N.D. 111.
1998) ("[The plaintiff] maintains that the phrase 'misappropriation of advertising ideas or
style of doing business' is ambiguous . . . . This Court agrees that the language is
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. . The term may also embrace the taking or use of another's property for the sole
purpose of capitalizing unfairly on the goodwill and reputation of property owner.").
RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY

1228 (2d ed. 1993) ("Misappropriate"

means "to put to a wrong use; to apply wrongfully or dishonestly, as funds entrusted to
one's care.").
Numerous courts have found "misappropriation" includes misuse and false
advertising. Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. American Hardware Mfrs. Assfn, 898 N.E.2d 216, 236
(111. App. 2008) (allegations that the insured deceptively advertised its trade show by
suggesting that it was the continuation of the trade show to which claimants claimed
exclusive rights implicated both "misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing
business" and "use of another's advertising idea in your 'advertisement' " under two
policies); American Simmental Ass 'n v. Coregis Ins. Co., 282 F.3d 582 (8th Cir. (Neb.)
2002) (insured's alleged misuse of "fullblood" to describe cattle that did not meet the
term's requirements met the offense); Flodine v. State Farm Ins. Co., No. 99 C 7466,
2001 WL 204786, at *3, 11 (N.D. 111. Mar. 1, 2001) ("[M]isuse of an advertising idea"
included the insured's alleged labeling its products with descriptive tags that "falsely
suggest [ed] that they were produced by North American Indians

Capitalizing upon

the goodwill associated with Indian-made products is a marketing idea concerned with
how to persuade consumers to buy certain goods. The wrongful use of these ideas, or
ways of marketing 'Southwestern style' arts and crafts, are 'advertising injuries' under
the policy."); DecisionOne Corp. v. ITT Hartford Ins. Group, 942 F. Supp. 1038 (E.D.

susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation.").
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Pa. 1996) (duty to defend when the underlying plaintiff alleged the insured falsely
designated the source of its ability to maintain the plaintiffs equipment and falsely
advertised that it could maintain the plaintiffs equipment, all in violation of the Lanham
Act); Applied Bolting Tech. Prods., Inc. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 942 F. Supp.
1029, 1032 (E.D. Pa. 1996) ("misuse" held a preferred dictionary definition for
"misappropriation" that a layperson would use); Atlapac Trading Co., Inc. v. American
Motorists Ins. Co., No. CV 97-0781 CBM, 1997 WL 1941512, at *7 (CD. Cal. Sept. 19,
1997) (mislabeling mixed olive/canola oil as olive oil is a misuse that injures the public
as well as competitors whose pricing may be disadvantageously undercut).
Admiral's policy language does not require that the "advertising idea" have been
previously owned or used by another (much less by a competitor), nor that the
"advertising idea" be wrongfully taken. Basic Research's advertising activities need only
misuse an "advertising idea." As long as injury "arises out o f the advertising, the policy
language is satisfied.
4.

"Use" Means More Than "Misappropriation;" It Includes
"Employment OP

Utah has not defined the precise scope of Admiral's policy term "use" within the
"use of another's advertising idea" offense. Admiral has attempted to fill in the gaps with
out of state case law supporting the notion that "use" must mean "misappropriation" or
"wrongful taking." [R 1279-81]
Confusion as to the source of goods has readily been found to support a defense
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where the advertising idea was not "wrongfully taken" but merely "misused."11 Limiting
"misappropriation" to a "wrongful taking" adds words of limitation not in the policy,
rewriting the policy for the insurer's benefit in direct contravention of Utah law. Alfv.
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 850 P.2d 1272, 1275 (Utah 1993).
B.

The "Of Another" Element is Met
1.

"Of Another" Merely Means "Does Not Originate With the
Insured"

Under Utah law, the phrase "of another" in the "use of another's advertising idea
in your 'advertisement'" offense is ambiguous. Quaidv. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 158 P.3d
525, 528 (Utah 2007) ("Insurance policy language is considered ambiguous if it is
'unclear, it omits terms, or the terms used to express the intentions of the parties may be
understood to have two or more plausible meanings.' "). It is undisputed that
"ambiguities" in an insurance contract are construed against the insurer. Novell, Inc. v.
Federal Ins. Co., 141 F.3d 983, 985 (10th Cir. (Utah) 1998).
As the Ninth Circuit apropos the narrower predecessor offense of
"misappropriation" expressly ruling that it did not require any wrongful taking of a
competitor's advertising idea: "Nor can we discern any contextual, public-policy, or
logical significance to who owns the legal rights to the advertising idea in question."
Hyundai Motor Am. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, 600 F.3d 1092, 1101
(9th Cir. 2010). Nor does Utah's law of insurance policy interpretation permit any
11

CAT Internet Services v. Providence Washington Ins. Co., 333 F.3d 138, 142 (3d
Cir. (Pa.) 2003) ("We now hold that when a complaint alleges that an insured
misappropriates and uses . . . ideas in connection with marketing and sales and for the
purpose of gaining customers, the conduct constitutes 'misappropriation of an advertising
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narrower construction. Benjamin, 2006 UT 37, f 24 (" '[Ijnsurance policies should be
construed liberally in favor of the insured and their beneficiaries so as to promote and not
defeat the purposes of insurance.' "). Any other result would be in derogation of the
principle that "[t]he objectively reasonable expectations of applicants and intended
beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance contracts will be honored even though
painstaking study of the policy provisions would have negated those expectations. DISH,
2011 WL 49081088, at *8.
The "of another" can be reasonably understood to include an entity other than
Basic Research for five distinct reasons:
First, consistent with dictionary definitions, "of another" means "a different one."
Random House Unabridged Dictionary 84 and 1343 (2d ed. 1993). Draughon v. CUNA
Mutual Ins. Soc >, 771 P.2d 1105, 1108 (Utah App. 1989) (When interpreting insurance
contract court should construe policy as it "would be understood by the average,
reasonable purchaser of insurance."). Cyprus Plateau Min. Corp. v. Commonwealth Ins.
Co., 972 F. Supp. 1379, 1384 (D. Utah 1997) ("Ordinarily, a dictionary is a valuable
resource for interpretation."). Critically, Admiral did not specifically contest this
definition "of another" on summary judgment and is not expected to do so here. [R 1243]
Nor did the district court address this issue in its summary judgment motion.
Second, the policy's language does not inform a lay policyholder that "of
another's" means only "of an underlying claimant that may sue you one day." Indeed,
Admiral's policy language contains no definitional or contextual limit (i.e., restructuring

i d e a . . . . ' ").
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"of another" to " o f a "different" underlying claimant or " o f someone else.). Had
Admiral meant "of another" to refer only to "of an underlying claimant" it could have
said so in its policy. Dish, 2011 WL 4908108, at *16.
Third, exclusion (g), which eliminates certain forms of "false advertising" for
"failure to conform to representations of quality or performance" reveals that coverage
for some forms of false advertising are contemplated.
Fourth, construing the phrase "of another" to mean "advertising ideas" that were
not originated by the insured poses a lesser actuarial risk to insurers who need not insure
against newly created advertising concepts, whose originality may generate litigation
disputes, as is true of those in the "advertising" business falling within exclusion (j)(l)Fifth, fact allegations of false advertising satisfy the "of another" provision where
an "advertising idea" misuse engenders consumer confusion: General Cas. Co. of Wis. v.
Wozniak Travel Inc., 762 N.W.2d 572, 579 (Minn. 2009) ("Hobbit Travel," used by
insured, was not a phrase owned by claimant heirs of JRR Tolkien). Cloud Nine, 464 F.
Supp. 2d at 1167 (consumer confusion over source and origination of product names, not
their ownership).
2.

Admiral's Overly Restrictive Construction of the "Of Another"
Policy Language Is Inconsistent with Utah Law

Had Admiral intended, it could easily have clarified by definition that the "other"
in its coverage had to be the underlying plaintiffs. Alf 850 P.2d at 1275 ("[A] court may
not rewrite an insurance contract for the parties if the language is clear and
unambiguous . . . . " ) . But Admiral did not. Its failure to do so when it could have created
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an ambiguity about "of another's" meaning within the policy, requiring interpretation and
application on behalf of Basic Research because "of another," reasonably understood to
mean "any other," brings the Miller, Tompkins and Forlenza fact allegations potentially
within Admiral's coverage. Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 931 P.2d 127,
133 (Utah 1997).
Speaking to an analogous defense based coverage scenario, the Tenth Circuit
advised inDish, 2011 WL 4908108, at *10:
It is not clear from the complaint whether or not Dish is
alleged to have infringed advertising-related claims in
RAKTL's patents by conveying promotional information.
Nonetheless, Insurers have not met their "heavy burden" of
proving that "the underlying claim [cannot] fall within policy
coverage."
Admiral could avoid its defense duty if there are words of limitation specifically
expressing the limited meaning of "of another" that Admiral argues. But there are none,
and Utah law prohibits courts from ferreting out such a restrictive meaning when the
insurer had not expressed it. Simmons v. Farmers Ins. Group, 877 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah
App. 1994) ("Language limiting an insurer's duty to defend an insured must be clear,
unambiguous, and sufficiently conspicuous in order to give proper notice to the insured
of the limitations on the duty to defend."). The district court erred by disregarding this
law and finding "of another" limited to underlying claimants where Admiral did not
express that limit.
3.

"Others" Previously Used the Accused Slogans to Advertise
Weight Loss Products Before Basic Research Did

The "advertising idea" of others embodied in the slogans was well known and was
available to Admiral when Basic Research tendered the Miller, Tompkins and Forlenza
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Suits for a defense. Both the Miller and Tompkins complaints allege that "fraudulent
weight-loss products" have been nationally advertised "as making it easy to lose weight
or allowing one to lose weight without diet or exercise." [R 814-15, 913] The Forlenza
complaints similarly compare Akavar advertising to "miracle pills" advertised as
allowing consumers to "lose weight effortlessly" without diet or exercise. [R 935]
The Federal Trade Commission has sued other defendants than Basic Research for
misusing this "advertising idea" and it established guidelines for its use. In 2004, the
FTC sued another company for using the slogan "Eat All You Want and Still Lose
Weight (Pill Does All the Work)" to advertise Bio Trim, a weight loss product. FTC v.
Natural Products, LLC (CD. Cal. Case No. SACV 04-1279). [R 1208, 1218, 1235-36]
The FTC identified the advertising idea "Eat all the foods you love, and still lose weight
(pill does all the work)" as a "Red Flag Claim" in its Red Flag | Bogus Weight Loss
Claims microsite (http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/microsites/redflag/falseclaim2.html). [R
1208, 1238] This is an "advertising idea" others used for other products.
4.

Western Holdings, LLC, an Entity Distinct from Basic Research,
Owns the Trademarked Slogans at Issue Herein

The "of another" component of the policy language is also readily met because, as
Admiral concedes, "other entities may have used similar slogans and statements which
Basic Research is using." [R 1261] Non-party Western Holdings, LLC applied on April
18, 2007 to register with the United States Patent & Trademark Office ("USPTO") the
trademark "Eat All You Want and Still Lose Weight," claiming that the mark was first
used in commerce on January 26, 2007. [R 1208, 1215] Western Holdings also applied
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to register the trademark "And We Couldn't Say It In Print If It Wasn't True" on April
27,2007, claiming this trademark was first used in commerce on January 26, 2007. [R
1208, 1216] Both trademark registrations were issued on June 3, 2008. [R 1208, 121516]
These dates were before the commencement dates of all three underlying lawsuits,
as well as the inception of both Admiral policies. [R 669-71] Western Holdings is not a
party to this case and seeks no defense. [R 1-24] If Western Holdings was not an entity
distinct from Basic Research there would be no point in its acquiring its own equal rights
under Admiral's policy as an "additional insured."12
Collective action among Western Holdings and Basic Research (as Admiral has
argued) [R 1260] does not change the coverage analysis. Such action instead proves the
reverse - that the entities are "different from" one another. Western Holdings is owned
separately from the Plaintiff insureds and has an arms-length informal license agreement
with Basic Research and Dynakor permiting their use of its trademarked slogans in their
advertisements. [R 670, 808]
Admiral provided no evidence to disprove that Western Holdings and Plaintiff
insureds are distinct entities. DeseretFed, 714 P.2d at 1147. Also, since Western
Holdings and the Plaintiff insureds are distinct from the FTC defendants who earlier used
the accused phrases, Admiral cannot avoid its defense duties. Cloud Nine, LLC, 464 F.
Supp. 2d at 1168:

travelers Ins. Cos. v. Dickey, 799 P.2d 625, 628 (Okla. 1990) ("An insurer's
undertaking cannot be altered or modified by an insured's agreement with a third party in
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Even if the court were to find that [the underlying] Complaint
presents factual questions or an uncertainty regarding whether
an advertising injury is alleged, the insurers still have a duty
to defend until those uncertainties are resolved. 'Where
factual questions render coverage uncertain, . . . the
insurer must defend until those uncertainties can be
resolved against coverage. "When in doubt, defend." ' "
(emphasis added))
Under the commonly accepted dictionary definition of "another", there is no
genuine issue of fact that the slogans touting Akavar, about which the plaintiffs in the
underlying consumer lawsuits have complained, belong to "another," not to Basic
Research. "Eat All You Want And Still Lose Weight" and "And We Couldn't Say It In
Print If It Wasn't True" are Western Holdings' registered trademarks. [R 1208, 1215-16]
Western Holdings is distinct from Basic Research, LLC and all of the other appellant
insureds herein. [R670]
Other third parties also previously used slogans and phrases substantially similar
to those trademarked by Western Holdings and sued upon here. For example, Natural
Products, LLC — the manufacturer and distributor of a weight loss product called
BioTrim — was using the slogan "Eat All You Want and Still Lose Weight (Pill Does All
the Work) when it was sued in 2004 by the Federal Trade Commission. [R 1208, 1218,
1235-36] The FTC identified other similar claims/slogans/sayings used by other
unidentified third parties on its Red Flag|Bogus Weight Loss Claims Internet microsite as
well.13 [R 1208, 1238] Consequently, the "of another" portion of the offense is satisfied.

the absence of the insurer's consent.").
1^

Although Utah is a "four corners" state in which coverage disputes are typically
resolved with reference to the policy and the underlying complaint, extrinsic evidence
(e.g. of Western Holding's trademark application or registration, or of the FTC's prior
enforcement actions) can be considered as "undisputable facts" that are " 'not an element
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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5.

Cases Narrowly Defining "Of Another" Deviate From Utah Law

Cases in which "use of another's advertising idea" was at issue in which
"misappropriation/wrongful taking" was equated to "use" cannot be used to limit the
meaning of "use" within Admiral's policy. Utah requires: "'[Insurance policies should
be construed liberally in favor of the insured.. .so as to promote and not defeat the
purposes of insurance.'" Benjamin, 2006 UT 37, f 24 (quoting United States Fid. &
Guar. Co. v. Sandt, 854 P.2d 519, 521 (Utah 1993) and Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Versaw,
2004 UT 73,124, 99 P.3d 796).
In Cloud Nine, 464 F. Supp. 2d 1161, the only reported case in which "use of
another's advertising injury" has been analyzed under Utah law, the District of Utah
followed Utah's liberal construction rules. One of the salient issues was whether the
facts pled in that allegedly violated statute governing false advertising could constitute a
predicate offense. The policy defined "personal and advertising injury" as "use of
another's advertising idea in your advertisement" - the same offense here at issue. Cloud
Nine, 464 F. Supp. 2d 1161.
Cloud Nine rejected arguments premised on cases narrowly construing the
coverage for the prior offense of "misappropriation of advertising ideas," as the Cloud
Nine policy insured against "use of another's advertising ideas." This fact was
determinative as "use is broader than 'misappropriation.'" Id. at 1168, n.8. As Judge
Campbell observed, at 1168:

of either the [underlying] cause of action [against Basic Research], or a defense in the
underlying litigation.' " DISH, 2011 WL 4908108, at *4.
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Edizone alleges a claim under the Utah Truth in Advertising
Act, which specifically requires allegations of deceptive trade
practices occurring in advertising. "The purpose or [the Utah
Truth in Advertising Act] is to prevent deceptive, misleading,
and false advertising practices and forms in Utah." Utah Code
Ann. § 13-11 a-1. Clearly, the crux of a cause of action for
violation of the Utah Truth in Advertising Act is advertising.
The Court should undertake the well-accepted approach of interpreting the
meaning of "use of another's advertising idea" through the use of a dictionary. See, e.g.,
Cyprus Plateau Min. Corp, v. Commonwealth Ins, Co,, 972 F. Supp. 1379, 1384 (D. Utah
1997) ("Dictionaries . . . are general guides to common usage. Ordinarily, a dictionary is
a valuable resource for [insurance policy] interpretation."). Webster's Encyclopedic
Unabridged Dictionary of The English Language at 2097 (Random House Value
Publishing, Inc. 1996) defines "use" as "to employ for some purpose; put into service."
Under this definition, the underlying consumer lawsuits claim injury from "use." The
plaintiffs in those cases alleged that Basic Research employed the slogans "Eat All You
Want And Still Lose Weight" and "And We Couldn't Say It If It Wasn't True" in the
Akavar marketing and packaging upon which they relied and by which they were
purportedly damaged. Thus, the allegations in the underlying consumer lawsuits
complain of a "use" and, by extension, personal and advertising injury fall within the
Admiral policies.
C.

"Advertising Ideas" Are Set Forth In Basic Research's
"Advertisement" to Meet the "In Your 'Advertisement'" Element
1.

Admiral Conceded the "Advertisement" Component Is Satisfied

The term "advertisement" is expressly defined in Admiral's policies as "a notice
that is broadcast or published to the general public or specific market segments about
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your goods, products or services for the purpose of attracting customers or supporters."
[R 45, 105] Underlying claimants alleged that Basic Research's statements about Akavar
appeared in television commercials, on Internet websites, in point-of-purchase
advertisements and in national magazine advertisements that the claimants
read/heard/relied upon and which injured them. [R 822, 911, 1010-13] There is no
dispute that such items constitute "notices . . . broadcast or published to the general
public or specific market segments" about Basic Research's "products . . . for the
purpose of attracting customers or supporters." Admiral has not contended otherwise.
So, the "in your advertisement" element of the personal and advertising injury is
satisfied.
2.

Injury Need Only "Arise Out Of," That Is, Be Connected With
Offense (f) and Offense (f) Must Occur "In Your
'Advertisement'"

Admiral has argued that there can be a causal connection between the alleged
"injury" and the "use of another's advertising idea in your advertisement" offense only if
the underlying plaintiffs have alleged a misappropriation or wrongful taking of that
plaintiffs own "advertising idea." [R 1280-82] But this argument assumes a flawed
interpretation of Admiral's policy that is at odds with Utah's liberal policy construction
rules.14 As explained above, Admiral's construction of the predicate offense is far too
limited and is not conclusively supported by Utah law.
The district court erred by granting Admiral's summary judgment motion and
denying Basic Research's on that sole basis. (Opinion, pp. 14-17) The district court
u

See § IIIA & § IVA(4).
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erred in stating that "the basis of the claim against [Basic Research] is the failed promise
of weight loss without any behavior or lifestyle changes and not the use of the phrases
'Eat All You Want & Still Lose Weight' and 'And We Couldn't Say It In Print If It
Wasn't True' to advertise Akavar.'" (Opinion at 14).
But holding that it could find no causal connection between the advertising and the
injury, the district court articulated a definition of "use" limited to "misappropriation" or
"wrongful taking." (Opinion at 14-15) It also assumed that a causal nexus must exist
between injury and advertising activity even though Admiral's policy language does not
support such a policy construction.
This was error on both fronts as "use" is not so narrowly defined by any dictionary
or Utah judicial decision, nor by Admiral's policy itself and injury need only be
"connected with" offense (f) not an "advertisement," as defined in the policy. The focus
of the "in your 'advertisement'" policy language is satisfied where the defined class is
persons who purchased Akavar in response to the marketing slogans whether or not they
never used the product.
Admiral's contention and the district court's ruling against potential coverage on
the grounds that underlying claimants' damages resulted not from Basic Research's
advertising but from Akavar's failure to perform as advertised is further refuted by the
Miller/Tompkins court's Class Certification Order15 (of which Basic Research requested
the district court below to take judicial notice).16 [R 1466-77] There, the certified

15

Miller v. Basic Research, LLC, 2011 WL 818150, at *2 (D. Utah, March 2, 2011).

16

The district court did not rule on the Request for Judicial Notice, nor did it mention
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plaintiff class broadly consists of "[p]ersons who purchased Akavar after seeing or
hearing the marketing slogan 'Eat all you want and still lose weight' during the relevant
damages period."
This means a claimant need not have used Akavar without losing weight to
recover from Basic Research. Such persons may be among the class members, provided
that they purchased the product after exposure to the advertising. The latter is required
for class membership; the former is not. The Order demolishes any contrary Admiral
contention, as well as any merit to the district court's contrary conclusion.
Broadly construing "use" as required leads to the reverse result. This Court should
correct the district court's error.
3.

Although Not Required by Admiral's Policy, There Is a Causal
Connection Between The Injuries Alleged By The Underlying
Claimants And The Predicate Offense at Issue

Although Admiral's policies do not require that the fact allegations of the
underlying lawsuits include a causal connection between the underlying plaintiffs'
injuries and the insured's advertising activities, here that connection is pled. The Miller,
Tompkins and Forlenza plaintiffs allege that Basic Research's advertisements caused
them to purchase Akavar to their financial detriment. [R 803-804, 828, 911, 919, 921,
1014-15, 1026-27] Alleged damages include money spent on purchases, among other
requested remedies that include an injunction prohibiting Basic Research from making
such statements in advertising and marketing Akavar. [R 852-53, 919, 921, 1014-15] If
the plaintiffs' injuries were not causally connected to Basic Research's advertising,

the request or the certification order in its Opinion.
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plaintiffs would not request an injunction against it.
V.

CASES CITED BY ADMIRAL BELOW THAT ANALYZE PRICE FIXING
ANTITRUST COVERAGE DO NOT PRECLUDE FINDING POTENTIAL
COVERAGE HERE
Admiral cited to the district court several antitrust coverage cases factually

distinguishable from the case. And they avoided coverage for antitrust suits by applying
improperly narrow policy interpretations. Champion Labs., Inc. v. American Home
Assur. Co., No. 09 C 7251, 2010 WL 2649848, at *5 (N.D. 111. June 30, 2010) substituted
the term "advertising" for the term "published" within the definition of "advertising."
That court then adopted a restricted definition of "advertising idea," formulated to assert
policyholder interpretive provisions, that emphasized why the "misappropriation of
advertising ideas" language could encompass trademark infringement lawsuits. But to
encompass is not to exhaust, and nothing in Champion states or suggests that
17

interpretation was intended to exhaust the offense's definitional parameters.
Champion also redefined the policy offense there at issue to require "the wrongful
taking of the manner by which another advertises its goods or services," then finding that
definition not satisfied where the insured only provided a customer with a spreadsheet,
including outdated input costs intended to justify price increases. Ultimately no coverage
was found because "[this] communication ... was directed at one private label customernot to the general public or a specific market segment as required by the relevant
insurance policies." Id. at *5. But here, Basic Research's widespread promotional

17

See, J.A. Brundage Plumbing & Roto-Rooter, Inc. v. Massachusetts Bay Ins. Co.,
818 F. Supp. 553, 557 (W.D.N.Y. 1993).
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activity is alleged.
Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 772 F. Supp. 2d 994 (S.D. Ind. Feb.
18, 2011) found no "advertisement" alleged in an underlying antitrust case because of the
absence of any references to Rose Acre's "website nor any other broadcast or publication
making use of any animal welfare advertising idea is referenced in the Underlying
Complaints." Id. at 1002. Concerned that the offense's "of another" component could not
be satisfied by allegations against a co-defendant, Rose Acre presumed that the policy
required a "wrongful taking," even though the offense implied no such language.
The Rose Acre court's explanation that it was "hard-pressed" to find "of another"
satisfied where the claimant's "advertising idea" was not being used was consistent with
its finding of potential liability under applicable Indiana law, compelling a defense.
Contrary to Indiana law, Rose Acre failed to understand or assess the ambiguity of "of
another" within the "use of another's advertising idea in your advertisement" offense.
The underlying cases here make no antitrust claims but repeatedly complain about
Basic Research's advertising of Akavar using another's advertising idea, an earlier,
allegedly misleading, idea to promote weight loss products about which the FTC had
issued a "red flag" warning. Rose Acre is factually inapposite. It misinterpreted the
policy and minimized advertising claims in order to avoid coverage for antitrust cases.
The Eleventh Circuit asserted in Trailer Bridge, Inc. v. Illinois National Ins. Co.,
F. 3d _ , 2011 WL 4346579 (11th Cir. (Fla.) Sept. 19, 2011)18 that "the underlying

18

Petition for Rehearing En Banc, Trailer Bridge, Inc. v. Illinois National Ins. Co.,
U.S.C.A. Eleventh Circuit, No. 10-13913, filed September 27, 2011.
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plaintiffs could not have recovered damages [for advertising injury] because the allegedly
misappropriated 'advertising idea5 was not that of the underlying plaintiffs, but rather
was alleged to have been the advertising idea of other parties altogether." But a damages
remedy is not necessary to be pled in the underlying complaint as a claim for "false
advertising" since "[u]nder Florida law, 'tort law principles do not control judicial
construction of insurance contracts.'" Creative Hospitality Ventures, Inc. v. United States
Liab. Ins. Co., 655 F. Supp. 2d 1316, 1329 (S.D. Fla. 2009).
VI.

EXCLUSION "G" DOES NOT APPLY TO RELIEVE ADMIRAL FROM
ITS DUTY TO DEFEND
A.

The "Failure to Conform" Exclusion Only Bars Limited Forms Of
False Advertising Where Specific Representations As To "Quality" or
"Performance" Are At Issue

Admiral also contended that its policy's Exclusion "g" bars a defense in the
underlying consumer lawsuits. [R 1282] Admiral bears the burden of proving
applicability of any exclusion, as they are strictly construed against the insurer, and in
favor of the insured. LDS Hosp., aDiv. of Intermountain Health Care, Inc. v. Capitol
Life Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1988); Sandt, 854 P.2d at 523. Any ambiguity in
the exclusion's language is construed as a matter of law in favor of coverage. Cyprus
Plateau, 972 F. Supp. at 1382 (citing^// 850 P.2d at 1274). Unless coverage is "clearly
excluded," the presumption is that coverage is available to the insured. LDS Hosp., 765
P.2d at 859. Exclusions are "construed most strictly against the insurer." Id.
Admiral's exclusion "g" bars coverage for "'[p]ersonal and advertising injury'
arising out of the failure of goods, products or services to conform with any statement of
quality or performance made in [Basic Research's] 'advertisement'." [R 38, 98]
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Admiral's policies do not define "quality" or "performance." But "quality" is dictionarydefined as "an essential or distinctive characteristic, property or attribute" and "high
grade; superiority; excellence." WEBSTER'S ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE

1579(2001). "Performance" is dictionary-defined as: "the manner

in which or the efficacy with which something reacts or fulfills its intended purpose." Id.
at 1439.
The exclusion can therefore reasonably be read to exclude coverage only where
there is an underlying claim that a product: (1) lacks the essential or distinctive
characteristic, property or attribute advertised; (2) is not of a high grade, superior or
excellent, despite advertisements so declaring; and, (3) does not react or fulfill its
intended purpose in the manner or with the efficacy advertised.
The advertising statements of which the underlying plaintiffs complain are: "Eat
All You Want And Still Lose Weight" and "And We Couldn't Say It In Print If It Wasn't
True." Neither statement provides information about "the essential or distinctive
characteristic, property or attribute" of Akavar. Neither speaks to the grade, superiority
or excellence of Akavar. Neither addresses the manner or efficacy, or how Akavar
"reacts or fulfills its intended purpose." Thus, the underlying claims do not fit within
Exclusion "g's" definitional limits.
Admiral has never provided a reasonable competing interpretation of "quality" and
"performance" that would invalidate this plain meaning of its exclusionary language or
these arguments against its application. Admiral simply asserted below that the exclusion
should be read to exclude coverage for claims alleging the product at issue did not live up
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to what its advertisements stated about what "the product can be expected to do and/or
how it will perform." [R 1283-84]
Admiral's interpretation is unreasonable because it adds restrictions not present in
the policy language. The exclusion must be construed against Admiral. LDSHosp., 765
P.2d at 859; Sandt, 854 P.2d at 523. Even if Admiral's overbroad suggested meaning of
Exclusion "g" were thought reasonable, Admiral would succeed only in revealing an
ambiguity that, once judicially acknowledged, must be resolved under Utah law in favor
of coverage. Cyprus Plateau, 972 F. Supp. at 1382. Under either scenario coverage is
not "clearly excluded," requiring Admiral to defend. LDSHosp., 765 P.2d at 859.
B.

Cases Admiral Relies Upon Are Distinguishable

Admiral cited Superformance Int'l, Inc. v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 203 F. Supp. 2d
587 (E.D. Va. 2002) {"Superformance 7") and Total Call Int'l, Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co.,
181 Cal. App. 4th 161,172 (2010) to the district court to argue that "[Admiral's] nonconformity exclusion precluded coverage" for a manufacturer's false advertising claims
where the manufacturer used a competitor's name in marketing materials. [R 1288]
Such arguments are of no moment here because no competitor's name is at issue.
Superformance and Total Call were lawsuits by the insured's competitors, alleging that
the insured's advertisements induced customers who might have purchased their goods or
services to instead purchase the insured's goods or services. The narrow issue of the
goods' or services' "failure to conform" to the insured's advertised statements was not at
issue in either case.
Even if the underlying facts were apposite to those here, a Utah court would not
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follow Superformance and Total Call Neither case followed Utah's requirements of
narrow policy exclusion construction. Neither found that the insurer's preferred meaning
of the exclusion was the only one possible.
There is a significant difference between making "misleading statements" and
making "false statements." Only the latter could possibly implicate the exclusion; e.g.,
where the insured's "advertisement" misrepresents the service a customer can expect
(i.e., the number of call minutes consumers would receive for a certain cost, as in Total
Call). In contrast, here Basic Research's statements in the accused advertisements do not
rise to the level of accusations of actual falsity. What is pled is not that the product did
not work when tried, but that it cannot work and therefore the advertising improperly
separated claimants from their money. [R 804, 808, 815, 826, 909-10, 911, 914-16, 92425, 1014-15, 1026-27] Admiral's non-conformity exclusion is ambiguous where there
are two or more possible contextually viable interpretations of the exclusionary language
and only one of them can trigger its application.
C.

Other Cases Have Found the Exclusion Does Not Apply

What matters here is that there is more than one reasonable meaning for the
exclusion. Since that is so, Admiral bears the burden of proving that its preferred
meaning of the exclusion is the only one in all possible worlds. LDSHosp., 765 P.2d at
859 (" '[T]hat which is not clearly excluded from the operation of [an insurance] contract
is included in the operation thereof ").
Admiral's exclusion has been found reasonably susceptible to more than one
meaning. Elcom Techs Co. v. Hartford Ins. Co. of the Midwest, 991 F. Supp. 1294, 1298
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(D. Utah 1997) (applying Pennsylvania law) ("Because Phoenex's false advertising claim
does not allege that Elcom's product failed to rise to the level advertised, the failure to
conform exclusion does not apply to that claim.")
Applying Utah law, Jewelers Mut. Ins. v. Milne Jewelry Co., No. 2:06-CV-243
TS, 2006 WL 3716112, at *3 (D. Utah Dec. 14, 2006) similarly held that where there is
only a possibility that an exclusion may apply it cannot bar a defense. In Milne, a
defense was required where the underlying claimant alleged the insured's fake public
assertions that its goods were "Indian Made." The allegations were deemed a false
advertising claim. The insurer's policy's exclusion for failure to conform to statements
of quality of the goods did not bar a defense because the statements were not of "quality:"
Defendant replies that the term 'quality' in the policy relates
not to a characteristic, such as Native American authenticity,
but rather, to the fitness of the product. The term 'quality' as
written in the policy is reasonably susceptible to more than
one meaning, and therefore, must be construed against
Plaintiff. Accordingly, the policy's quality exclusion does
not preclude coverage.
Here too, the term "quality" in Admiral's exclusion is "reasonably susceptible to
more than one meaning and, as such, should be construed against enforcement.
The most recent decision addressing related exclusions for "knowledge of falsity"
from the Eighth Circuit, applying Minnesota law,19 reversed the district court for reasons
equally germane here:
3M's complaint alleged that ITI committed unfair advertising
under the Lanham Act in two separate regards . .. [But] [t]he
district court . . . focused on some of the conduct alleged to
prove the claim rather than the global claim itself. . . . .
"AMCOIns. Co. v. Inspired Technologies, Inc., 648 F.3d 875, 882-83 (8th Cir. 2011)
(italics added).
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[because] AMCO failed to satisfy its burden of demonstrating
as a matter of law that every claim in 3Mfs complaint fell
clearly outside the Policy's coverage.
VII.

CONCLUSION
Admiral should not be permitted to continue evading its duty to defend Basic

Research in the Miller, Tompkins and/or Forlenza lawsuits. Basic Research respectfully
requests the Court (a) reverse the trial court's May 24, 2011 Ruling on the parties' crossmotions for summary judgment and (b) grant its motion for summary judgment here, (1)
declaring that Admiral has a duty to defend Basic Research in the underlying Miller,
Tompkins, and Forlenza lawsuits and ordering Admiral to honor that continuing duty
with respect to the consolidated Miller and Tompkins suits, which continue to be litigated,
(2) finding that Admiral breached the insurance policies at issue when it failed to defend
Basic Research in those actions, (3) ordering Admiral to reimburse Appellants for all
attorneys' fees and costs incurred in defending those lawsuits, plus prejudgment interest
at the legal rate from the date of invoice, and (4) remanding this case to the district court
for further proceedings to determine the amount of defense fees and expenses Admiral
must reimburse Basic Research.
Dated: November 4, 2011
Alan G^nidshaw
Aaron C. Garrett

David

A. Gauntlett
j a m e s A. Lowe
Andrew M. Sussman
GAUNTLETT & ASSOCIATES
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
BASIC RESEARCH, LLC, et al,
RULING
Plaintiffs,

vs.

Case No. 110901154

ADMIRAL INSURANCE COMPANY,

Judge: L.A. DEVER

Defendant.
The above entitled matter is before the Court on the Plaintiffs' and Defendant's
Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. Having reviewed the related Motions and
Oppositions, and having heard oral arguments on the matter on March 24, 2011, the
Court makes the following Ruling.
Background
The entitled matter stems from an alleged breach of breach of contract,
specifically the Commercial Lines Policy entered into between the named parties.
Plaintiffs' causes of action include: (1) Declaratory Relief- Duty to Defend, Miller Suit,
(2) Breach of Contract, Miller Suit, (3) Declaratory Relief- Duty to Defend, Tompkins
Suit, (4) Breach of Contract, Tompkins Suit, (4) Declaratory Relief - Duty to Defend,
Forlenza Suit, and (5) Breach of Contract, Forlenza Suit.
Plaintiffs' claims arose after parties and other unnamed class members, relied on
Plaintiffs' claims that their product would result in weight loss without altering lifestyle.
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Plaintiffe maintain that pursuant to the terms of the insurance policy, Defendant has a
duty to defend Plaintiffs.
Defendant asserts that because the suits against Plaintiffs are the result of
Plaintiffs' false claims regarding their product, such a duty is specifically excluded under
the terms of the insurance policy.
Legal Discussion/Analysis
Choice of Law
Although noted, neither party presents an argument as to which forum's law is
applicable in the entitled matter. Defendant's maintain that California law is the
applicable law of choice, while Plaintiffs claim Utah law is the appropriate choice.
Regardless, the forum selection clause, "Service of Suit," unambiguously
provides:
In the event of our failure to pay any amount claimed to be due, we,
at your request, will submit to the jurisdiction of any court of competent
jurisdiction within the United States of America or Canada and will comply
with all requirements necessary to give such court jurisdiction and all
matters arising hereunder shall be determined in accordance with the law
and practice of such Court.
(Price .bed. Ex. 1, p. 59) (emphasis added).
In addressing choice of law matters, the Utah Supreme Court explained:
When interpreting a contract, we begin by looking within the four
corners of the contract to determine the parties' intentions, which are
controlling. If the language within the four corners of the contract is
2
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unambiguous, . . . a court determines the parties1 intentions from the plain
meaning of the contractual language as a matter of law.
Innerliqht Inc. v. Matrix Group. LLC. 2009 UT 31.1J14, 214 P.3d 854 (quotations and
citations omittedV.see also Id. 2009 UTat1}16, n.5 ("A forum-selection clause is
understood not merely as a contract provision, but as a distinct contract in and of
itself—that is, an agreement between the parties to settle disputes in a particular
forum-that is separate from the obligations the parties owe to each other under the
remainder of the contract." (citation omitted)); compare Morris v. Health Net of
California. Inc.. 1999 UT 95, p \ 988 P.2d 940.
Accordingly, Utah serves as the appropriate jurisdiction for the entitled matter.
Summary Judgment, Generally
Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Anaya v. Crossroads Managed Care Sys.. Inc.. 195 F.3d
584, 589-90 (10th Cir. 1999) (quotations and citation omitted).
A disputed fact is "materiar if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the
1

"ln the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties . . . , the contacts to be taken into
account in applying the principles of Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws § 6 to determine the law
applicable to an issue include:(a) the place of contracting, (b) the place of negotiation of the contract, (c)
the place of performance, (d) the location of the subject matter of the contract, and (e) the domicile,
residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties." (citing Restatement
(Second) Conflict of Laws § 188 (1971)).
3
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governing law, and the dispute is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Schutz v. Thome, 415 F.3d 1128,
1132 (1 Oth Cir. 2005). In applying the summary judgment standard, a court views the
evidence and draws reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. Id: see also DISH Network Corp. v. Arch Specialty Ins. Co.. 734 F.
Supp. 2d 1173, 1177 (D. Colo. 2010) (explaining that in a summary judgment, a court
does not weigh the evidence in deciding whether the movant has carried its burden,
rather a court draws all reasonable inferences from it in the light most favorable to the
nonmovant).
Interpretation of Insurance Contracts
Although this issue was not briefed before the hearing, it is an important
consideration for appropriate analysis of the specific matters presented to the Court.
"Utah law provides that insurance contracts are interpreted under general
contract principles and that interpretation of such contracts is a question of law to be
determined by the courts." Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Cloud Nine; LLC. 464 F. Supp. 2d
1161, 1165 (D. Utah 2006)(citations and quotations omitted); see also Id. ("When the
existence of a contract and the identity of the parties are not in issue and when the
contract provisions are clear and complete, the meaning of the contract can
appropriately be resolved by the court on summary judgment." (citation omitted)).

4
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When interpreting a contract, a court is to look within the four corners of the
contract to determine the parties' intentions, which are controlling. Innerliaht, Inc. v.
Matrix Group, LLC, 2009 UT 31,1J14, 214 P.3d 854 (citation and quotations omitted).
"If the language within the four corners of the contract is unambiguous, a court
determines the parties' intentions from the plain meaning of the contractual language as
a matter of law." jdL (citation omitted). See LPS Hosp. v. Capitol Life Ins. Co., 765
P.2d 857, 858-59 (Utah 1988) (explaining that insurance policy language is not
ambiguous if it is "plain to a person of ordinary intelligence and understanding, viewing
the matter fairly and reasonably, in accordance with the usual meaning of the words,
and in the light of existing circumstances, including the purpose of the policy.")
A contractual term or provision is ambiguous if it is capable of more
than one reasonable interpretation because of uncertain meanings of
terms, missing terms, or other facial deficiencies. Contractual ambiguity
can occur when (1) there is facial ambiguity with regard to the language of
the contract and (2) when there is ambiguity with regard to the intent of
the contracting parties. The first situation presents a question of law to be
determined by the judge. The second situation presents a question of fact
where, if the judge determines that the contract is facially ambiguous,
parol evidence of the parties' intentions should be admitted.
Citv of Grantsville v. Redevelopment Agency of Tooele Citv. 2010 UT 38,1J30, 233 P.3d
461 (citations and quotations omitted).
Additionally, the fact that the parties do not agree upon the meaning of certain
terms does not prove contractual ambiguity. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. P & H Cattle Co..

5

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

248 Fed. Appx. 942, 947 (10th Cir. Kan. 2007) (citation omitted).
A court must construe each section of the contract in the context of and
consistent with the entire agreement, rather than critically analyzing a single provision,
id. at 948 (citation omitted). "A court's job is to use common sense and not to strain to
create an ambiguity in a written instrument when one does not exist."Id. (citation
omitted); see also Nature's Sunshine Prods., Inc. v. Watson, 2007 UT App 383,1J18,
174 P.3d 647(explaining that a contract should be interpreted as a whole to harmonize
all of its provisions (citation omitted)).
In regards to insurance contracts, ambiguities in it are generally construed
against the insurer. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Worthinqton. 46 F.3d 1005,1008 (10th Cir.
1995). Moreover, under Utah law, courts strictly construe against the insurer provisions
that limit or exclude coverage. See United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Sandt. 854 P.2d
519, 523 (Utah 1993).
Duty to Defend
In Utah, as a general rule, an insurer's duty to defend is determined by
comparing the language of the insurance policy with the allegations of the complaint.
Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Cloud Nine. LLC. 464 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1165 (D. Utah 2006)
(citing Fire Ins. Exch. v. Estate of Therkelsen. 2001 UT48, fl21, 27 P.3d 555 (Utah
2001) (quotations omitted)); see also Benjamin v. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co.. 2006 UT 37,
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fl16, 140 P.3d 1210 ("When we engage in a duty-to-defend analysis, we focus on two
documents: the insurance policy and the complaint. An insureds duty to defend is
determined by comparing the language of the insurance policy with the allegations of
the complaint." (citations and quotations omitted)).
A duty to defend arises "when the insurer ascertains facts giving rise
to potential liability under the insurance policy." Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna
Cas.&Sur., 931 P.2d 127,133 (Utah 1997). When the allegations, if proven,
show "there is no potential liability [under the policy], then there is no duty to
defend." Deseret Fed. Sav. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar.. 714 P.2d 1143,1147 (Utah
1986).... If one claim or allegation triggers the duty to defend, the insurer
must defend all claims (that is, covered and non-covered claims), at least
until the suit is limited to the non-covered claims, jd- at 1216. Finally, and
perhaps most important: "'When in doubt, defend."1 id- at 1215 (quoting
Appleman on Ins. Law & Practice § 136.2[C] (2d ed. 2006)).
]d. at 166: see also Benjamin. 2006 UT at fl17 ("Because the duty to defend is contractual,
our starting point must always be the underlying policy." (citation omitted)).
Moreover:
Where an insurance policy obligates an insurer to defend claims of
unintentional injury, the insurer is obligated to do so until those claims are
either dismissed or otherwise resolved in a manner inconsistent with
coverage. Even where the complaint details egregious, intentional conduct,
an expected injury exclusion like the one found in the Homeowners Policy
does not relieve an insurer of its duty to defend claims of unintentional injury.
Inferences and assumptions about an insured's intent to injure are improper
and inconsistent both with the well-accepted practice of alternative pleading
and with our oft-repeated instruction that "insurance policies should be
construed liberally in favor of the insured and their beneficiaries so as to
promote and not defeat the purposes of insurance."
Benjamin. 2006 UT-at 1J24 (citation omitted)(emphasis added).
7
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"An insurer denying a duty to defend must establish that the claims fall outside
the coverage of the policy or the claims are exempted from coverage." Simmons v.
Farmers Ins. Group, 877 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Any language limiting
the duty to defend, "must be clear, unambiguous, and sufficiently conspicuous" to give
the appropriate notice to the insured of the limitations. ]d. (citation omitted).
Advertising Idea
The relevant portion of the Commercial Lines Policy ("Policy") provides:
Section I - Coverages...
B 1 . . . a. We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally
obligated to pay as damages because of "personal advertising
injury[.]".. . [W]e will have no duty to defend the insured against
any "suit" seeking damages for "personal and advertising injury" to
Which this insurance does not apply...
2. Exclusions.. .
a.
Knowing Violation of Rights of Another...
. b.
Material Published With Knowledge of Falsity...
g.
Quality or Performance of Goods - Failure to Conform
to Statements
"Personal and advertising injury" arising out of the
failure of goods, products or services to conform with
any statement of quality or performance made in your
"advertisement.".
Section VI - Definitions...
1. "Advertisement" means a notice that is broadcast or published
to the general public or specific market segments about your
goods, products or services for the purpose of attracting customers
or supporters....
8
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14. . . f. The use of another's advertising idea in your
advertisement!.]
(Price Decl. Ex. 1, pp. 11, 12, 19, 21 )(emphasis added).
1

Underlying Glass Action Suits

Plaintiffs maintain that because of their use of another's2 advertising slogans
"Eat All You Want And Still Lose Weight" and "And We Couldn't Say It in Print If it
Wasn't True," several suits, including class actions suits have been filed against them.
Plaintiffs claim that they are entitled to insurance coverage by Defendant because the
suite arose out of Plaintiffs' use of another's advertising ideas.
The Miller Complaint was initially filed in the U.S. District Court in Utah on
November 9, 2007. An Amended Complaint3 was filed May 23, 2008. Miller's causes

2

The slogans are registered trademarks of Western Holding, LLC. The slogans were not
registered until June 3, 2008, the Miller complaint was filed against Plaintiffs and others, in the U.S.
District Court in Utah on November 9, 2007, and the Tompkins complaint was filed in California state court
on December 6, 2007. The Policies were issued from August 20, 2007, to August 20, 2008, number
CA000011665-01, and August 20, 2008, to August 20, 2009, number CA000011665-02. Section 1(B)(1)(b)
provides that the "insurance policy applies to 'personal and advertising injury1 caused by an offense... if
the offense was not committed before the Retroactive Date of August 20, 2002[.]n
3

Provides in relevant part:

1. This nationwide class action seeks to redress the pervasive pattern of
fraudulent, deceptive and otherwise improper advertising, sales and marketing practices
that Defendants [in the matter before this Court, includes in-part, Plaintiffs] have engaged
in, and are currently engaged in, with respect to weight-loss dietary supplement products;
specifically, AkSvar 20/50
7. As part of their pervasive pattern of wrongful conduct,
during the Class period Defendants have utilized (and continue to utilize) the U.S. mail
and interstate wire facilities, including television, Internet, point-of-purchase
advertisements and advertisements published in national print publications (such as
Parade magazine) to advertise, label, offer for sale, sell and distribute Akavar by falsely
claiming that Akavar is a "New! European Weight-Loss Breakthrough" product that offers
9
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of action include: (1) Violations fo Section 1962(c),(d) of RICO, (2) Violations fo Section
1962(c),(d) of RICO, (3) Violations of Section 76-10-1603(3), (4) of the Utah Pattern of
Unlawful Activity Act, (4) Violations of Section 76-10-1603(3), (4) of the Utah Pattern of
Unlawful Activity Act, (5) Fraud, (6)Violation of the Utah Consumer Services Protection
Act and Other Consumer Protection Statutes, (7) Unjust Enrichment, and (8) Negligent
Misrepresentation.
The Tompkins Complaint4 was filed on or around December 21, 2007, in the
California Superior Court, Sacramento County. Tompkins1 causes of action include: (1)
Violations of the Unfair Competition Law, the Deceptive, False and Misleading

a "foolproof alternative to weight loss with "guaranteed success and "WITHOUT
GRUELING DIET AND EXERCISE REGIMENS!".... Defendants' advertisements for
Akavar falsely and misleadingly state that "Studies have provide a virtual 100% success
rate among the participants," and that by taking the product the consumer will see excess
fat "PULLED F R O M BULGING PARTS OF YOUR BODY."
(Price Deck Ex. 3, p. 2, 7).
4

Claims in relevant part:

Defendants [includes Plaintiffs in-part, in the entitled matter] have used television,
the internet, and national publication to advertise Akavar as a product that offer "foolproof
alternative to weight loss with "guaranteed success" and "WITHOUT GRUELING DIET
AND EXERCISE REGIMENS!" These advertisements also falsely state that "Studies
have proved a virtual 100% success rate among the participants," and that by using the
product the consumer will see excess fat "PULLED FROM BULGING PARTS OF YOUR
BODY." Defendants also falsely allege that the results are "scientific fact, documented by
published medical findings" and that "a team of doctors working in a recognized medical
university discovered the caloric-restricting qualities" of Akavar. However, in truth, Akavar
is not a foolproof alternative to weight loss with guaranteed success, and the product has
not been subjected to clinical trials.
(Price Decl. Ex. 4, pp.2-3, no. 3).
10

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Advertising Statutes, and (2) Violations of Consumer Legal Remedies Act.
The Forlenza Complaint5 was filed on May 26, 2009, in the U.S. District Court
Central District of California. Forlenza's causes of action include: (1) Violation of
California Legal Remedies Act, (2) Unjust Enrichment, (3) Fraud, (4) Violation of
California Business and Professions Code Sections 1700 et seq, and (5) Breach of
Warranty.
2

Plaintiffs' Legal Argument

Plaintiffs' primary argument for coverage is pursuant to the terms of "advertising
injury." Specifically, Plaintiffs maintain that because they used the advertising ideas of
another, that is Western Holding, LLC, they are entitled to coverage pursuant to Section
Vl(14)(f), which provides in relevant part, "'Personal and advertising injury'" means
injury including consequential 'bodily injury' arising out of one or more of the following
offenses... [t]he use of another's advertising idea in your 'advertisement[.]'w (Price

5

Asserts in relevant part:

Akavar claims to be the "fastest, easiest weight loss ever." It purports to allow
consumers to "eat all you want and lose weight." Defendants [includes Plaintiffs in-part, in
the entitled matter] claim that Akavar makes weight loss "effortless" by "automatically
reducing] caloric intake.. .and eliminating traditional dieting, calorie counting, strenuous
exercise, fad diets, supermarket 'miracle' pills, Japanese wonder diets, rubber suits, belts,
creams or anything else you have ever tried before." However, Akavar is use one of
those "miracle pills" it derides. Defendants attempt to sell Akavar by convincing
consumers that they can avoid the only proven and safe weight-loss method recognized
by the FDA.
(Price Decl. Ex. 5, p. 6, no. 21).

11
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Decl. Ex. 1, p. 21)(emphasis added).
The two specific "advertising ideas" that Plaintiffs maintain fall into the coverage
provision are: (1) primarily, "Eat All You Want & Still Lose Weight" and, (2) "And We
Couldn't Say It In Print If It Wasn't True." Plaintiffs' reliance on case law and the
causes of action of the class action complaints against Plaintiffs is misplaced.
For example, Plaintiffs rely on the two-part test set out in Novell, Inc. v. Fed. Ins.
Co., 141 F.3d 983, 989 (10th Cir. Utah 1998), to determine an advertising injury. The
test requires a (1) predicate offense and (2) a causal connection. ]d. The Novell court
explained that the "predicate offense" is that which is specifically listed in the definition
of "advertising injury." ]d. at 986. Additionally, the "advertising injury must have a
causal connection with the insured's advertising activities before there can be
coverage." ]d. at 989 (citation and quotations omitted).
The predicate offenses as unambiguously provided in Defendant's Policy
provides:
"Personal and advertising injury" means injury including
consequential "bodily injury" arising out of one or more of the following
offenses:
a.
False arrest, detention, or imprisonment;
b.
Malicious prosecution;
c.
The wrongful eviction from, wrongful entry into, or invasion
of the right of private occupancy of a room, dwelling or
premises that person occupies, committed by or on behalf of
its owner, landlord, or lessor;
d.
Oral or written! publication in any manner of material that
12
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e.
f.
g.

slanders or libels a person or organization or disparages a
person's or organization's goods, products, or services;
Oral or written publication, in any manner, of material that
violates a person's right of privacy;
The use of another's advertising idea in your
"advertisement"; or
Infringing upon another's copyright trade dress or slogan in
your "advertisement."

(Price Decl. Ex. 1, p. 21, no. 14) (emphasis added).
While Plaintiffs maintain that the class action suits were the result of their use of
the noted slogans, upon review of the complaints it is apparent that the basis of the
claim against Plaintiffs is the failed promise of weight loss without any behavior or
lifestyle changes and not the use of the phrases "Eat All You Want & Still Lose Weight"
and "And We Couldn't Say It In Print If It Wasn't True" to advertise Akavar. Supra nn.
3-5 (emphasis added).
Plaintiffs also rely on unpublished cases and cases in other jurisdictions for
support of their argument of an "advertising idea." (Pis' Mem. In Supp. fn. 18-25); see
McLaughlin v. Schenk. 2009 UT 64, if 17, 220 P.3d 146 (explaining that in the absence
of Utah [i.e. jurisdictional] precedent, the court looks to Utah statutes and case law from
other jurisdictions for guidance (citation omitted)); see also generally Huslev v. Astreue.
280 Fed. Appx. 756, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 12006 (10th Cir. 2008) (explaining that while
an unpublished decision is not precedential it could be cited for its persuasive value
consistent with 10th Cir. R. 32.1, although the case relied on by the lower court was
13
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found to have little persuasive value because it was materially distinguishable from the
case at hand)(unpublished).
However, a tenth circuit court has recently issued a decision in which "advertising
injury" is clearly defined. DISH Network Corp. v. Arch Specialty Ins. Co.. 734 F. Supp.
2d 1173, 1183 (D. Colo. 2010). Although this is not the verbatim language of
Defendant's Policy, it is comparable i.e., misappropriation6 versus use7. See
Warburton v. Virginia Beach Fed. S & L Ass'n. 899 P.2d 779, 782 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)
(holding that ordinary meaning of contract terms are often best determined through
standard dictionaries). The court in DISH Network explained:
Most courts hold that "misappropriation of advertising ideas" means
the "wrongful taking of the manner by which another advertises its goods
or services" or the "wrongful taking of an idea about the solicitation of
business." The misappropriation of advertising ideas must occur "in the
elements of the advertising itself, in its text, form, logo, or pictures, rather
than in the product being advertised."
734 F. Supp. 2d at 1183 (citations omitted)(emphasis added). The latter sentence is
enlightening as it applies in the matter before this Court.

6
Defined as: "to appropriate wrongIy[.]" Merriam-Webster Dictionary,
http://w\AAA/.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/misappropriate.
7

Defined as: "the act or practice of employing something; the fact or state of being used; a
method or manner of employing or applying something!.]" Merriam-Webster Dictionary,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/use.
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To clarify, the Ohio Casualty court provided a definition of "advertising idea8."
The court explained that "[a]n 'advertising idea' is an idea for calling public attention to
a product or business, especially by proclaiming desirable qualities so as to increase
sales or patronage." 464 F. Supp. 2d at 1166 (citations and quotations omitted). This
definition is parallel to the Policy definition of "advertisement." See supra 8..
Based upon the foregoing, the "advertising injury" from the "use" of an
"advertising idea" must arise "in the elements of the advertising itself, in its text, form,
logo, or pictures, rather than in the product being advertised" DISH Network Inc., 734
F. Supp. 2d at 1183 (citations omitted)(emphasis added). As is apparent from review of
the class action complaints, the claims against Plaintiffs stem from the failed promise of
the performance of the supplement i.e., the promise to cause weight loss without any
changes in lifestyle. See supra nn. 3-5 (emphasis added). While there are references
to the trademarked slogans of "Eat all You Want & Still Lose Weight" and, "And We
Couldn't Say It In Print If It Wasn't True," this is not the basis of the complaints. See
supra nn. 3-5.
Accordingly, coverage is excluded pursuant to Policy Section 1(B)(2). (Price Decl.
Ex. 1, p. 11-12): see Ohio Casualty Ins. Co.. 464 F. Supp. 2d at ("[l]n Utah, as a

defendant's Policy does not provide a definition for "advertising idea," rather it provides a
definition for "advertisemenfas "a notice that is broadcast or published to the general public or specific
market segments about your goods, products or services for the purpose of attracting customers or
supporters." (Price Decl. Ex. 1, p. 19, no. 1).
15
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general rule, an insurer's duty to defend is determined by comparing the language of
the insurance policy with the allegations of the complaint.... [T]the allegations, if
proven, show there is no potential liability [under the policy], then there is no duty to
defend." (citations and quotations omitted)).
The relevant jurisdictional cases as cited by Plaintiffs, are factually
distinguishable and therefore, not persuasive. Compare Novell, Inc., 141 F.3dat985
(party asserting claim against plaintiff, that plaintiff "effectively appropriated and
usurped his research, development, and marketing efforts, and undermined his ability
to market and license his product"); DISH Network Corp., 734 F. Supp. 2d at 1176
(explaining that plaintiff insured, cable television providers, sued for a declaratory
judgment that defendant insurers were obligated to defend them in a suit wherein a
patent holder alleged patent infringement from the insureds' use of automated
telephone systems, that allowed customers to perform pay-per-view ordering and
customer service functions over the telephone); Ohio Casualty Ins. Co.. 464 F. Supp.
2d at 1164 ("According to Unigard, Edizone's Complaint triggers a duty to defend under
the 'advertising injury' portion of the Policy because it alleges that the Cloud Nine
Defendants used Edizone's 'advertising ideas' (the trade names GellyComb, Gelastic,
and Intelli-Gel) in their advertisement, all to Edizone's detriment."); Jewelers Mut. Ins. v.
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Milne Jewelry Co.. 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90551, *9-10 (D. Utah, Dec. 14, 2006)
("Plaintiff argues that the term 'quality' refers to a certain characteristic, and that being
of Native American origin is a quality contemplated by the policy. Defendant replies that
the term 'quality' in the policy relates not to a characteristic, such as Native American
authenticity, but rather, to the fitness of the product[.]"); ( Elcom Techs.. Inc. v. Hartford
Ins. Co.. 991 F. Supp. 1294, 1295 (D. Utah 1997) ("Phoenex Corporation filed a lawsuit
(the underlying action) against Elcom sometime in November of 1995. In the underlying
action, Phoenex alleged that Elcom willfully and deliberately infringed upon Phoenex's
patents by manufacturing and selling a product known as the ezPHONE. Phoenex also
asserted that Elcom falsely claimed in its advertising brochures that the ezPHONE is
based upon patented technology."); ( Tynan's Nissan. Inc. v. Am. Hardware Mut. Ins..
917 P.2d 321, 325 (Colo Ct. App. 1995) ("We agree with the trial court's interpretation
of the policy here that a generic style of doing business not related to advertising
activities is not covered under the policy.")
.

Conclusion

Because Plaintiffs failed to show that as a matter of law they are entitled to
coverage pursuant to the unambiguous terms of the Policy, Plaintiffs' Motion for
Summary Judgment is DENIED.
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Furthermore, because Defendant established that pursuant to the unambiguous
exclusion provision of the Policy that Plaintiffs claims are claims premised upon
Akavar's "performance" and not the use of the slogans "Eat All You Want & Still Lose
Weight" and "And We Couldn't Say It In Print If It Wasn't True," Defendant's Motion is
GRANTED.
The following Ruling stands as the Order of the Court. No further order is
required.

Dated this 24th day of May, 2011.

BY THE COURT:
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ADMIRAL INSURANCE COMPANY

A STOCK COMPANY
(herein called "the Company)

COMMON POLICY DECLARATIONS
Policy No.:

CA000011665-01

Renewal/Rewrite of:

NEW

I Named Insured and Mailing Address
COVARKLLC
DBA: BASIC RESEARCH LLC
5 7 4 2 W HAROLD GATTY DRIVE
SALT LAKE CITY, U T 84116

Policy Period:

From

08/20/2007

To

08/20/2008

At I2til AM. Standard Time at the address of the Named Insured as staled herein

THE NAMED INSURED IS:

D Individual;

•Partnership;

D Corporation;

BUSINESS DESCRIPTION:

VITAMINS, HERBAL & NATURAL SUPPLEMENTS

AUDIT PERIOD:

0 Annual;

D Joint Venture;

0 Other
^

D Other

IN RETURN FOR THE PAYMENT OF THE PREMIUM AND SUB JECT TO ALL TI3E TERMS OF THIS POUCY, WE AGREE
WITH YOU TO PROVIDE THE INSURANCE AS STATED IN THIS POLICY.
THIS POLICY CONSISTS OF THE FOLLOWING COVERAGES FOR WHICH A PREMIUM IS INDICATED. THIS PREMIUM
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TO ADJUSTMENT.
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Commercial Property Coverage
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$

$687
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$

Coverage

$
PREMIUM: $

$687,000.00

TERRORISM PREMIUM: $
^
•
Form(s) and Endorsements) made a part of this poHcy at inception:

TOTAL PREMIUM: $

$687,000.00

REFER TO SCHEDULE OF FORMS, Al 0018 03 98

This policy is not binding unless countersigned by Admiral IhsuTance Company or it's authorized representative.
Countersigned On:
At

10/10/07
Seattle, WA

•_
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'
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Authorized Representative vl

THESE COMMON POLICY DECLARATIONS AND, IF APPLICABLE, THE COMMERCIAL PROPERTY COVERAGE, THE COMMERCIAL GENERAL
LIABILITY DECLARATIONS TOGETHER WITH THE COMMON POLICY CONDITIONS, COVERAGE PART(S), FORM(S> AND ENDORSEMENTS, IF
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DECLARATIONS
Policy No.: CA000011665-01

Effective Date: 08/2072007 12:01 A. M., Standard Time

LIMITS OF INSURANCE
General Aggregate Limit
(Other Than Products- Completed Operations)
Products - Completed Operations Aggregate limit
Personal and Advertising Injury limit
Each Occurrence limit
Damage To Premises Rented To You Limit
Medical Expense Limit
RETROACTIVE

$

5,000,000

$
$
$
$
$

5,000,000
5,000,000
5,000,000
50,000
EXCLUDED

Any One Premises
Any One Person

DATES

Coverages A and B of this insurance does not apply to "bodily injury", "personal injury", "property damage" or "advertising
injury* which occurs before the Retroactive Date, if any, shown here:
08/20/2002
(Enter Date or "None" ifno Retroactive Date Applies)

PREMIUM
I {Code NoTj 1 Premium Basis

Classification
DERATIONS RATED AS: VITAMINS, HERBAL & NATURAL
JUPPLEMENTS

52343

Rate

Per

11 Advance Premium I

$106,860,840 (3) $1,580
$1,000
Cosmectics
$101,139,158 (3) $3,790
$1,000
Ingestables
$52,000,000 (3) $2,593
$1,000
Foreign
Total Advanced Premium
Minimum Term Premium

$168,840.00
$383,317.00
$134,843.00
$687,000.00
$618300.00

ADDITIONAL DECLARATIONS
When used as a Premium basis:
(1) "remuneration" means the entireremunerationearned timing the policy period by proprietors and by all employees of the Named Insured other
man chauffeurs (except operators of mobile equipment) and aircraft pilots and co-pilots, subject to any overtime earnings or
limitation or remuneration rule applicable in accordance with the manuals in use by the Company,
(2) "cost" means me total cost to the Namedfcisuredwith respect to operations perfbmied for fte Named msured during the policy period by
independent contractors of all work let or sub-let in connection with each specific project, including the cost of all labor, materials and
equipment furnished, used or delivered for use in the execution of such work, whether furnished by the owner, contractor or sub-contractor,
including all fees, allowances, bonuses or commissions made, paid or due.
(3) "sales" means the gross amount of money charged by the Named msured, his concessionaires, and others ttading under his name, for goods and
products sold or distributed, operations performed (installation, repair or servicing), dues or fees andrentalsduring me policy term, and
includes taxes, other man taxes which the Named msured and such others collect as a separate item and remit directly to a governmental
division.

THESE DECLARATIONS ARE PART OF THE POLICY DECLARATIONS CONTAINING THE NAME OF THE INSURED AND
THE POLICY PERIOD
>E20 02 0700
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COMMERCIAL GENERAL IIABILTTY
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COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY COVERAGE FORM
COVERAGES A AND B PROVIDE
CLAIMS-MADE COVERAGE
PLEASE READ THE ENTIRE FORM CAREFULLY
Various provisions in this policy restrict coverage. Read the
entire policy carefully to determinerights,duties and what
is and is not covered.

(2) The "bodily injury" or "property damage" did
not occur before the Retroactive Date, if any,
shown in the Declarations or after the end of
the policy period; and

Throughout this policy the words "you* and "your* refer to
the Named Insured shown in the Declarations, and any
other person or organization qualifying as a Named Lisured
under this policy. The words "we", "us" and "our" refer to
the Company providing this insurance.
The word "insured" means any person or organization
qualifying as such under Section II - Who Is An Insured.
Other words and phrases that appear in quotation marks
have special meaning. Refer to Section VI - Definitions.

(3) A claim for damages because of me "bodily
injury" or "property damage" isfirstmade
against any insured, in accordance with Paragraph c. below, during the policy period or
any Extended Reporting Period we provide
under Section V - Extended Reporting Periods.
c.

SECTION I - COVERAGES
COVERAGE A BODILY INJURY AND PROPERTY
DAMAGE LIABILITY

(1) When notice of such claim is received and recorded by any insured or by us, whichever
comesfirst;or

1. Insuring Agreement
a.

We will pay those sums that the insured becomes
legally obligated to pay as damages because of
"bodily injury" or "property damage" to which this
insurance applies. We will have the right and duty
to defend the insured against any "suit" seeking
those damages. However, we will have no duty to
defend the insured against any "suit" seeking damages for "bodily injury" or "property damage" to
which this insurance does not apply. We may, at
our discretion, investigate any "occurrence" and
settle any claim or "suit" that may result. But:

(2) When we make settlement in accordance with
Paragraph l.a. above.
.All claims tor damages because of "bodily injury"
to the same person, including damages claimed by
any person or organizationforcare, loss of services, or death resulting at any time from the "bodily injury", will be deemed to have been made at
the time thefirstof those claims is made against
any insured.
All claims for damages because of "property damage" causing loss to the same person or organization will be deemed to have been made at the time
thefirstof those claims is made against amy insured.

(1) The amount we will pay for damages is limited as described in Section HI - Limits Of
Insurance; and
(2) Ourrightand duty to defend ends when we
have used up the applicable limit of insurance
in the payment ofjudgments or settlements
under Coverages A or B or medical expenses
under Coverage C.
No other obligation or liability to pay sums or perform acts or services is covered unless explicitly
provided for under Supplementary Payments Coverages A and B»
b. This insurance applies to "bodily injury" and
"property damage" only if:
(1) The "bodily un'roy" or "property damage" is
caused by an "occurrence" mat takes place in
the "coverage territory";

CG 00 0212 04

A claim by a person or organization seeking damages will be deemed to have been made at the earlier of the following times:

2.

Exclusions
This insurance does not apply to:
a.

Expected Or Intended Injury
"Bodfy hrjnry" or "property damage" expected or
intendedfromthe standpoint of the insured This
exclusion does not apply to "bodily injury" resultingfromthe use of reasonableforceto protect persons or property.

b. Contractual Liability
"Bodily injury"1 or "property damage" for which
the insured is obligated to pay damages by reason
of the assumption of liability in a contract or
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(1) The amount we will pay for damages is limited as described in Section IH - Limits Of
Insurance; and

This exclusion does not apply to the loss of use of
other property arising out of sudden and accidental
physical injury to "your product" or "your work"
after it has been put to its intended use.

(2) Our right and duty to defend end when we
have used up the applicable limit of insurance
in the payment ofjudgments or settlements
under Coverages A or B or medical expenses
under Coverage C.

n. Recall Of Products, Work Or Impaired
Property
Damages claimed for any loss, cost or expense incurred by you or others for the loss of use, withdrawal, recall, inspection, repair, replacement,
adjustment, removal or disposal of:

No other obligation or liability to pay sums or perform acts or services is covered unless explicitly
provided for under Supplementary Payments Coverages A and B.

(1) "Ycro product";
(2) "Your work*; or
(3) "Impaired property*1;
if such product, work, or property is withdrawn or
recalled from the market or from use by any person or organization because of a known or suspected defect, deficiency, inadequacy or dangerous
condition in i t

b. This msurance applies to "personal and advertising
injury" caused by an offense arising out of your
business, but only if:
(1) The offense was cxmimrttedin tic "coverage
territory";
(2) The offense was not committed before the
Retroactive Date, if any, shown in the Declarations or after the end of the poKcy period;
and

o. Personal And Advertising Injury
"Bodily mjury" arising out of "personal and advertising injury".

(3) A claim for damages because of the "personal
and advertising injury" is first made against
any insured, in accordance with Paragraph c.
below, during the policy period or any Extended Reporting Period we provide under
Section V - Extended Reporting Periods.

p» Electronic Data
Damages arising out of me loss o£ loss of use of,
damage to, corruption o£ inability to access, or inability to manipulate electronic data.
As used in this exclusion, electronic data means information, facts or programs stored as or on, created or used on, or bransmitied to or from computer software, including systems and applications
software, hard or floppy disks, CD-ROMS, tapes,
drives, cells, data processing devices or any other
media which are used with electronically controlled equipment.

c

1. Insuring Agreement
a. We will pay those sums that the insured becomes
legally obligated to pay as damages because of
"personal and advertising injury" to which this insurance applies. We will have the right and duty to
defend me insured against any "suit" seeking those
damages. However, we will have no duty to defend
the insured against any "suit* * seeking damages for
"personal and advertising injury" to which mis insurance does not apply. We may, at our discretion,
investigate any offense and settle any claim or
"suit" that may result But:
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A claim made by a person or organization seeking
damages will be deemed to have been made at the
earlier of the following tunes:
(1) When notice of such claim is received and recorded by any insured or by us, whichever
comes first; or
(2) When we make settlement in accordance with
Paragraph 1 .a. above.

Exclusions c through n- do not apply to damage by fire
to premises while rented to you or temporarily occupied by you with permission of the owner. A separate
limit of insurance applies to this coverage as described
in Section HI — Limits Of Insurance.
COVERAGE B PERSONAL AND ADVERTISING
INJURY LIABILITY

Page 11 of 59

All claims for damages because of "personal and
advertising injury" to the same person or organization as a result of an offense will be deemed to
have been made at the time thefirs:of those
claims is made against any insured.
Exclusions
This insurance does not apply to:
a.

Knowing Violation Of Rights Of Another
"Personal and advertising injury" caused by or at
the direction of the insured with the knowledge
that the act would violate the rights of another and
would inflict "personal and advertising injury".

b. Material Published With Knowledge Of Falsity
"Personal and advertising injury" arising out of
oral or written publication of material, if done by
or at the dire
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However, this exclusion does not apply to Paragraphs 14a., b. and c. of "personal and advertising
injury" under the Definitions Section

Material Published Prior To Policy Period
"Personal and advertising injury" arising out of
oral or written publication of material whose first
publication took place before the Retroactive Date,
if any, shown in the Declarations.

d.

e.

Quality Or Performance Of Goods - Failure To
Conform To Statements
"Personal and advertising injury" arising out of the
failure of goods, products or services to conform
with any statement of quality or performance made
in your "advertisement".

h.

i

"Personal and advertising injury" arising out of an
electronic chatroom or bulletin board the insured
hosts, owns, or over which the insured exercises
control.
I.

m. Pollution
'Personal and advertising injury" arising out of the
actual, alleged or threatened discharge, dispersal,
seepage, migration, release or escape of "pollutants" at any time.
n.

Pollution-Related

Wrong Description Of Prices

Any loss, cost or expense arising out of any:

"Personal and advertising injury" arising out of the
wrong description of the price of goods, products
or services stated in your "advertisement".

(1) Request, demand, order or statutory or regulatory requirement that any insured or others
testfor,monitor, clean up, remove, contain,
treat, detoxify or neutralize, or in any way respond to, or assess the effects o£ "pollutants";
or

Infringement Off Copyright, Patent, Trademark
Or Trade Secret
"Personal and advertising injury" arising out of the
infringement of copyright, patent, trademark, trade
secret or other intellectual property rights.

(2) Claim or suit by or on behalf of a governmental authority for damages because of testing for, monitoring, cleaning up, removing,
containing, treating, detoxifying or neutralizing, or in any way responding to, or assessing
the effects of, "rwtfutants".

However, this exclusion does not apply to infringement, in your "advertisement", of copyright,
trade dress or slogan
j.

Unauthorized Use Of Another's Name Or
Product
"Personal and advertising injury" arising our of the
unauthorized use of another's name or product in
your e-mail address, domain name or metatag, or
any other similar tactics to mislead another's potential customers.

Breach Of Contract
"Personal and advertising injury*' arising ont of a
breach of contract, except an implied contract to
use another's advertising idea in your "advertisemenr".

g.

k. Electronic Chatrooms Or Bulletin Boards

Contractual Liability
"Personal and advertising injury" for which the insured has assumed liability in a contract or agreement. This exclusion does not apply to liability for
damages that the insured would have in the absence of the contractor agreement

L

For the purposes of this exclusion, the placing of
frames, borders or links, or advertising, for you or
others anywhere on the Internet, is not by itself,
considered the business of advertising, broadcasting, publishing or telecasting.

Criminal Acts
'Personal and advertising injury" arising out of a
criminal act committed by or at the direction of the
insured.

Page 12 of 59

Insureds In Media And Internet Type Bus*"Personal and advertising injury" corniuttedbyan
insured whose business is:
(1) Advertising, broadcasting, publishing or telecasting;
(2) Designing or determining content or web-sites
for others; or
(3) An Internet search, access, content or service
provider.

CG 00 0212 04

o.

War
'Personal and advertising injury", however caused,
arising, directly or mdirectly, out of:
(1) War, mcluding undeclared or civil war;
(2) Warlike action by a military force, including
action in hindering or defending against an
actual or expected attack, by any government,
sovereign or other authority using military
personnel or other agents; or

© ISO Properties, Inc., 2003
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page 6 of 16

Case 2:09-cv-0087Ww
7™

b. This insurance applies to such liability assumed by
Reinsured;
c

mm
Filed 05/05W10

Document 24-3

Page 14 of 59

SECTION H - WHO IS AN INSURED
1.

The obligation ID defend, or the cost of the defense
o£ that indemnitee, has also been assumed by the
insured in the same "insured contract";

If you are designated in the Declarations as:
a. An individual, you and your spouse are insureds,
but only with respect to the conduct of a business
of which you are the sole owner.

d. The allegations in the "suit" and the information
we know about the "occutxence" are such that no
conflict appears to exist between the interests of
the insured and the interests of the indemnitee;

b. A partnership or joint venture, you are an insured.
Your members, your partners, and their spouses
are also insureds, but only with respect to the conduct of your business.

e.

The indemnitee and die insured ask us to conduct
and control the defense of that indemnitee against
such "suit" and agree that we can assign the same
counsel to defend the insured and the indemnitee;
and

c

The indemnitee:

d. An organization other than a partnership, joint
venture or limited liability company, you are an insured Your "executive officers" and directors are
insureds, but only with respect to their duties as
your officers or directors. Your stockholders are
also insureds, but only with respect to their liability as stockholders.

f.

(1) Agrees in writing to:
(a) Cooperate with us in the investigation,
settlement or defense of the "suit";
(b) immediately send us copies of any demands, notices, summonses or legal papers received in connection with the
"suit";
(c) Notify any other insurer whose coverage
is available to the indemnitee; and
(d) Cooperate with us with respect to coordinating other applicable insurance available to the indemnitee; and
(2) Provides us with written authorization to;
(a) Obtain records and other information related to the "suit"; and
(b) Conduct and control the defense of the
indemnitee in such "suit".
So long as the above conditions are met, attorneys' fees
incurred by us indie defense of that indemnitee, necessary litigation expenses incurred by us and necessary
litigation expenses incurred by the indemnitee at our
request will be paid as Supplementary Payments. Notwithstanding the provisions of Paragraph 2.b.(2) of
SectionI- Coverage A-Bodily injury And Property
Damage liability, such payments will not be deemed to
be damages for "bodily injury4' and "property damage"
and will not reduce the limits of insurance.

e.

2.

A limited liability company, you are an insured
Your members are also insureds, but only with respect to the conduct of your business. Your managers are insureds, but only with respect to their
duties as your managers.

A trust, you are an insured. Your trustees are also
insureds, but only with respect to their duties as
trustees.

Each ofthe following is also an insured:
a. Your "volunteer workers" only while perfonning
duties related to the conduct of your business, or
your "employees", other than either your "executive officers" (if you are an organi2ation other than
a partnership, joint venture or limited liability
company) or your managers (if you are a limited
liability company), but only for acts within the
scope of their employment by you or while performing duties related to the conduct of your business. However, none of these "employees" or
"volunteer workersM are insureds for:
(1) "Bodfly injury" or f,personal and adverb^ing
h^ury":

Our obligation to defend an insured's indemnitee and to
pay for attorneys' fees and necessary litigation expenses as Supplementary Payments ends when:
a. We have used up the applicable limit of insurance
in the payment of judgments or settlements; or
b. The conditions setforthabove, or the terms of the
agreement described in Paragraph £ above, are no
longer met

CG 00 0212 04

(a) To you, to your partners or members (if
you are a partnership or joint venture), to
your members (if you are a limited liability company), to a co-"employee" while
in the course ofhis or her employment or
performing duties related to the conduct
of your business, ortoyour other "volunteer workers" while perfonning duties
related to die conduct of your business;
(b) To the spouse, child, parent, brother or
sister of that co-"employee" or "volunteer
worker" as a consequence of Paragraph
(l)(a) above;
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(c) For which there is any obligation to share
damages with or repay someone else who
must pay damages because of the injury
described in Paragraphs (l)(a) or (b)
above; or
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SECTION m - LIMITS OF INSURANCE
1.

The Limits of Insurance shown in the Declarations and
the rules below fix the most we will pay regardless of
the number of:
a. Insureds;

(d) Arising out of his or her providing or
failing to provide professional health care
services.

b. Claims made or "suits" brought; or
c

(2) "Property damage" to property:
(a) Owned, occupied or used by,

2.

(b) Rented to, in the care, custody or control
of, or over which physical control is being exercised for any purpose by

c.

Any person or organization having proper tejnporary custody of yourproperty if you die, but only:

b.

3,

Any organization you newly acquire or form, other
than a partnershipJoint venture or limited liability
company, and over which you maintain ownership or
majority interest, will qualify as a Named Insured if
there is no other similar insurance available to that organization. However:
a.

Coverage under this provision is afforded only until the 90th day after you acquire or form the organization or the end of the policy period, whichever is earlier;

b.

Coverage A does not apply to "bodily injury" or
"property damage" that occurred before you acquired or formed the organization; and

c

Coverage B docs not apply to "personal and advertising injury" arising out of an offense committed before you acquired or formed the organization.

No person or organization is an insured with respect to the
conduct of any current or past partnership, joint venture or
limited liability company that is not shown as a Named
Insured in the Declarations.
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Damages under Coverage A, except damages:

c.

Damages under Coverage B.

3.

The Pmd^:ts-Campleted Operations Aggregate Limit
is the most we will pay under Coverage A for damages
because of "bodily injury" and "property damage" included in the "products-completed operations hazard".

4.

Subject to 2. above, the Personal and Advertising
Injury limit is the most we will pay under Coverage B
for the sum of all damages because of all "personal and
advertising injury" sustained by any one person or or-

5.

Subject to 2. or 3. above, whichever applies, the Each
Occurrence limit is the most we will pay for the sum
of:

(2) Until your legal representative has been appointed.
Your legal representative if you die, but only with
respect to du&es as suck That representative will
have all your rights and duties under this Coverage
Part

Medical expenses under Coverage C;
because of "bodily injury" or "property damage"
included in the "products-completed operations
hazard"; and

(1) With respect to liabiKty arising out of the
maintenance or use of that property; and

d.

Persons or organizations making claims or bringing ,,suitsH.

The General Aggregate Limit is the most we will pay
forthesumof:
a.

you, any of your "employees", "volunteer
workers", any partner or member (if you are ai
partnership or joint venture), or any member
(if you are a limited liability company).
b. Any person (other than your "employee'1 or "volunteer worker") or any organization while acting
as your real estate manager.

Page 15 of 59

a.

Damages under Coverage A; and

b. Medical expenses under Coverage C
because of all "bodily injury" and "property damage"
arising out of any one "occurrence".
6.

Subject to 5. above, the Damage To Premises Rented
To You Limit is the most we will pay under Coverage
A for damages because of "property damage" to any
one premises, while rented to you, or in me case of
damage by fire, while rentedtoyou or temporarily occupied by you with permission of the owner.

7.

Subject to 5. above, the Medical Expenses Limit is the
most we will pay under Coverage C for all medical expenses because of "bodily injury" sustained by any one
person.

The limits of Insurance of this Coverage Part apply separately to each consecutive annual period and to any remaining period of less than 12 months, starting with the
beginning of the policy period shown in the Declarations,
unless the policy period is extended after issuance for an
additional; period of less than 12 months. In that case, the?
additional period will be deemed part of the last preceding
period for purposes of determining the Limits of Insurance.
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tai Extended Reporting Period, including a provision to
the effect that the insurance afforded for claimsfirstreceived during such period is excess over any other
valid and collectible insurance available under policies
in force after the Supplemental Extended Reporting Period starts.
6. If the Supplemental Extended Reporting Period is in
effect, we will provide me supplemental aggregate
limits of insurance described below, but only for claims
first received and recorded during the Supplemental
Extended Reporting Period.
The supplemental aggregate limits of insurance will be
equal to the dollar amount shown in the Declarations in
effect at the end of the policy period for such of the
following limits of insurance for which a dollar amount
has been entered:
General Aggregate limit
froducts-Completed Operations Aggregate Limit
Paragraphs 2. and 3. of Section m - Limits Of Insurance will be amended accordingly. The Personal and
Advertising Injury Limit, the Each Occurrence Limit
and the Damage To Premises Rented To You limit
shown in the Declarations will then continue to apply,
as set forth in Paragraphs 4., 5. and 6. of that Section.
SECTION VI - DEFINITIONS
1, "Advertisement" means a notice that is broadcastor
published to the general public or specific market segments about your goods, products or services for the
purpose of attracting customers or supporters. For the
purposes of this definition:
a. Notices that are published include material placed
on the Internet or on similar electronic means of
communication; and
b. Regarding web-sites, only that part of a web-site
that is about your goods, products or services for
the purposes of attracting customers or supporters
is considered an advertisement.
2. "Auto" means:
a. A land motor vehicle, trailer or semitrailer designed for travel on public roads, including any
attached machinery or equipment; or
b. Any other land vehicle that is subject to a compulsory orfinancialresponsibility law or other motor
vehicle insurance law in the state where it is licensed or principally garaged.
However, "auto" does not include "mobile equipment".
3. "Bodily injury" means bodily injury, sickness or disease sustained by a person, including death resulting
ftom any of these at any time.
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4. "Coverage territory" means:
a. The United States of America (including its territories and possessions), Puerto Rico and Canada;
b. International waters or airspace, but only if the
injury or damage occurs in the course of travel or
transportation between any places included in a.
above; or
c. All other parts of the world if the injury or damage
arises out of:
(1) Goods or products made or sold by you in the
territory described in a. above;
(2) The activities of a person whose home is in
the territory described in a. above, but is away
for a short time on your business; or
(3) "Personal and advertising injury" offenses that
take place through the Internet or similar
electronic means of communication
provided the insured's responsibility to pay damages is
determined in a "suit" on the merits, in me territory described in a. above or in a settlement we agree to.
5. "Employee" includes a 'leased worker". "Employee"
does not include a "temporary worker".
6. "Executive officer" means a person holding any of the
officer positions created by your charter, constitution,
by-laws or any other similar governing document
7. "Hostilefire"means one which becomes uncontrollable or breaks outfromwhere it was intended to be.
8. "Impaired property" Tpfrflftfl tangible property, other
than "your product" or "your work", that cannot be
used or is less useful because:
a. It incorporates "your product" or "your work" that
is known or thought to be defective, deficient, inadequate or dangerous; or
b. You have failed to fulfill the terms of a contract or
agreement;
if such property can be restored to use by:
a. The repair, replacement, adjustment or removal of
"your product* or "your work"; or
b. Your fulfilling the terms of the contract or agreement.
9. "Insured contract" means:
a. A contract for a lease ofpremises. However, that
portion of the contract for a lease of premises that
indemnifies any person or organization for damage
byfireto premises while rented to you or temporarily occupied by you with permission of the
owner is not an "insured contract";
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b. A sidetrack agreement;

b. While it is in or on an aircraft, watercraft or
"auto"; or

c. Any easement or license agreement; except in
connection with construction or demolition operations on or within 50 feet of a railroad;
d. An obligation, as required by ordinance, to indemnify a municipality, except in connection with
work for a municipality;
e.

An elevator maintenance agreement;

f.

That part ofany other contract or agreement pertaining to your business (including an indemnification of a municipality in connection with work
perfoimed for a municipality) under which you assume me tort liability of another party to pay for
"bodily injury" or "property damage" to a third
person or organization. Tort liability means a liability that would be imposed by law in the absence ofany contract or agreement
Paragraph f. does not include that part of any contract or agreement;
(1) That indemnifies a raifcoadfor"bodify injury"
or "property damage" arising out of construction or demolition operations, within 50 feet
ofany railroad property and affecting any railroad bridge or trestle, tracks, road-beds, tunnel, underpass or crossing;
(2) That indemnifies an architect, engineer or surveyor for injuiy or damage arising out of:

a

12. "Mobile equipment" means any of thefollowingtypes
of land vehicles, including any attached machinery or
ecniipment
a. Bulldozers, farm machinery, forklrfis and other
vehicles designed for use principally off public
roads;
b. Vehicles maintained for use solely on or next to
premises you own or rent;
e.

Vehicles that travel on crawler treads;

d. Vehicles, whether self-propelled or not, rnarntained primarily to provide mobility to permanently mounted:
(1) Power cranes, shovels, loaders, diggers or
drills; or
(2) Road construction or resurfacing equipment
such as graders, scrapers or rollers;
e.

Vehicles not described in a., b., c or d. above that
are not self-propelled and are maintained primarily
to provide mobility to permanently attached
equipment of thefollowingtypes:
(1) Air compressors, pumps and generators, including spraying, welding, building cleaning,
geophysical exploration! lighting and well
servicing equipment; or

(b) Giving directions or instructions^ or failing to give them, if that is the primary
cause of the injury or damage; or

10. "Leased worker" means a person leased to you by a
labor leasingfirmunder an agreement between you and
the labor leasingfirm,to perform duties related to the
conduct of your business. "Leased worker" does not
include a "temporary worker".

While it is being moved from an aircraft, watercraft or "auto" to the place where it is finally delivered;

but "loading or unloading" does not include the movement of property by means of a mechanical device,
other than a band truck, that is not attached to the aircraft, watercraft or "auto".

(a) Preparing, approving, or failing to prepare or approve, maps, shop drawings,
opinions, reports, surveys, field orders,
change orders or drawings and specifications; or

(3) Under which the insured, if an architect, engineer or surveyor, assumes liability for an in. jury or damage arising out of the insured's
rendering or failure to render professional
services, including those listed in (2) above
and supervisory, inspection, architectural or
engineering activities.

(2) Cherry pickers and similar devices used to
raise or lower workers;
f.

Vehicles not described in a., b., c. or d. above
maintained primarilyforpurposes other than the
transportation of persons or cargo.
However, self-propelled vehicles with the following types of permanently attached equipment are
not "mobile equipment" but will be considered
"autos":
(1) Equipment designed primarily for:
(a) Snow removal;
(b) Road maintenance, but not construction
or resurfacing; or

11- "Loading or unloading" means the handling of property:
a.

After it is moved from the place where it is accepted for movement into or onto an aircraft, watercraftor^auto";
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(c) Street cleaning;
(2) Cherry pickers and similar devices mounted
on automobile or truck chassis and used to
raise or lower workers; and
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(a) When all of the work called for in your
contract has been completed.

(3) Ak compressors, pumps and generators, including spraying, welding, building cleaning,
geophysical exploration, lighting and well
servicing equipment

(b) When all of the worktobe done at the
job site has been completed if your contract calls for work at more man one job
site.

However, "mobile equipment" does not include land
vehicles that are subject to a compulsory or financial
responsibility law or other motor vehicle insurance law
in the state where it is licensed or principally garaged.
Land vehicles subject to a compulsory orfinancialresponsibility law or other motor vehicle insurance law
are considered "autos".

(c) When that part of the work done at a job
site has been put to its intended use by
any person or organization other than another contractor or subcontractor working
on the same project

13. "Occurrence" means an accident, including continuous
or repeated exposure to substantially the same general
harmful conditions.
14. "Personal and advertising injury" means injury, including consequential "bodily injury", arising out of
one or more of the following offenses:
7u False arrest, detention or irnprisonment;
b. Malicious prosecution;
c

The wrongful eviction from, wrongful entry into,
or invasion of the right of private occupancy of a
room, dwelling or premises that a person occupies,
committed by or on behalf of its owner, landlord
or lessor;

d.

Oral or written publication, in any manner, of material that slanders or hbels a person or organization or disparages a person's or organization's
goods, products or services;

e.

Oral or written publication, in airy maimer, of material that violates a person'srightof privacy;

1

The use of another's advertising idea in your "advertisement"; or

g.

Infringing upon another's copyright, trade dress or
slogan in your "advertisement*.

15. "Pollutants" mean any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal
irritant or contaminant, including smoke, vapor, soot,
fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals and waste. Waste includes materials to be recycled, reconditioned or reclaimed.
16. "Products-completed operations hazard'*:
a.

Includes all "bodily injury" and "property damage"
occurring a wayfrompremises you own or rent and
arising out of "your product" or "your work" except
(1) Products that are still in your physical possession; or
(2) Work that has not yet been completed or
abandoned. However, "your work" will be
deemed completed at the earliest of the following times:
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Work that may need service, maintenance,
correction, repair or replacement, but which is
otherwise complete, will be treated as completed.
b. Does not include "bodily injury" or "property
damage" arising out of:
(1) The transportation of property, unless the injury or damage arises out of a condition in or
on a vehicle not owned or operated by you,
and that condition was created by the "loading
or unloading" of that vehicle by any insured;
(2) The existence oftools,unmstalled equipment
or abandoned or unused materials; or
(3) Products or operations for which the classification, listed in the Declarations or in a policy
schedule, states that products-completed operations are subject to the General Aggregate
Limit
17. "Property damage" means:
a. Physical injury to tangible property, including all
resulting loss of use of that property. All such loss
of use shall be deemed to occur at the time of the
physical injury that caused it; or
b. Loss of use of tangible property that is not physically injured. All such loss of use shall be deemed
to occur at the time of the "occurrence" that
caused it
For the purposes of this insurance, electronic data is
not tangible property.
As vscd in this definition, electronic data means information, facts or programs stored as or on, created or
used on, or transmitted to orfrom,computer software,
including systems and applications software, hard or
floppy disks, CD-ROMS, tapes, drives, cells, data
processing devices or any other media which are used
with electronically controlled equipment.
18. "Suit" means a civil proceeding in which damages
because of "bodily injury", "property damage" or "personal and advertising injury" to which this insurance
applies are alleged. "Suit" includes:
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Policy Number CA000011665-01

CG20 26 0704
Effective Date: 08/20/2007

THIS ENDORSEMENT CHANGES THE POLICY. PLEASE READ FT CAREFULLY.

ADDITIONAL INSURED - DESIGNATED
PERSON OR ORGANIZATION
This endorsement modifies insurance provided under the following:
COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY COVERAGE PART
SCHEDULE
Name Of Additional Insured Person(s) Or Organizations)

'

AS REQUIRED BY WRITTEN CONTRACT PRIOR TO AN "OCCURRENCE" OR LOSS
Information required to complete this Schedule, if not shown above, will be shown in the Declarations.
Section II - Who Is An Insured is amended to include
as an additional insured the person(s) or organization^)
shown in the Schedule, but only with respect to liability
for "bodily injury", "property damage" or "personal and
advertising injury" caused, in whole or in part, by your
acts or omissions or the acts or omissions of those acting
on your behalf:
A. In the performance of your ongoing operations; or
B. In connection with your premises owned by or rented
to you.

CG 20 26 07 04
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ADMIRAL INSURANCE COMPANY
A STOCK COMPANY
(heofc called *the Company)
COMMON POLICY DECLARATIONS

Policy No.:

CAOOOOt 1665-02

Renewiil/Rewritcaf:

CA0OQ011665-01

1 Named Insured and Mailing Address
The insurer issuing this poficy does not hold a certificate
of authority to do business in this state and thus is not
fufly subject to regulation by the Utah Insurance
CommrssJoher. Ttiife policy receives no protection from
any of the guaranty associations created under Chapter
28. Title 31A{0C31A45-103{8}f:
Worldwide Facilities, Inc. - License #91434

COVARZX LLC
DBA BASIC RESEARCH LLC;
See Named Insured Schedule A 0 0785
5742 W HAROLD GATTY DRIVE
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84116

Policy Period:

ftom

OS/2O/20OS

To

08/20/2009

At 12:0] AJ^StsuodaidTmieaitbeaddr^ofliifiN^

THE NAMED INSURED IS:

D Individual;

D Partnership;

O Corporation;

BUSINESS DESCRIPTION:

VITAMINSJ£ERBAL & NATURAL SUPPLEMENTS

AUDIT PERIOD:

Ef Annual;

D Joint Venture;

0 Other

D Other

IN RETURN FOR THE PAYMENT OF THE P
WITH YOU TO PROVIDE THE INSURANCE AS STATED IN THIS POLICY.
THIS POLICY CONSISTS OF THE FOLLOWING COVERAGES FOR WHICH A PREMIUM IS INDICATED. THIS PREMIUM
MAY BE SUBJECT TO ADJUSTMENT.
Commercial Property Coverage

$

Commercial General liability Coverage

$

Products/Convicted Operations Liability Coverage

BROKER FEIU2£222£L

Equipment Breakdown Coverage
.

. ,.

$475,000,00

$
$

Coverage

$
PREMIUM;

$

5475,000.00

TERRORISM PREMIUM: S

TC^TJOfUM: $
$475,000.00
Form(s) and Bndoisement(s) made a part of this
extent as may otherwise be provided herein, the coverage of this
,ftEFBRTO SCHEDULE €>F FORMS, Al 00 18 03
hi limited generally to liability for only those claims that arefiratmade against
the wsurad while the policy h in fore* Pfeeae review the policy carefully and casctisa
(he coverage thereunderwith your insurance agent or broker
This policy is not binding unless countersigned by Admiral Insurance Company or it*s aumoroed representative,
Countersigned On:
At

09/30/08
Seattle, WA

By: * X < r * T ^ &£
Authorized Rfipresentative

THESE COMMONTOUTYEQUATIONS AWK & A**UCABLE,THE COMMERCE PRQEERTY COVERAGE* THE COMMERCIAL GENERAL

OABHJXY: mcij^iibm7o0
CONDXiipNS, COVERAGE*A$Li(i& K»MGS) AND efebRSEMENts. IF
ANY, testes to FORM A £ARTTHE*SOF, coMFiETjs THE ABOVE mtiJmk *6UCY.
DE20O1 0700
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COMMERCIAL GENERAL LUBDQITY COVERAGE PART
DECLARATIONS
PoDcyNo.: CA000011665-02

Effective Date:

03/20/2008 J 2:01 A.fcL,Standard Time

LIMITS OF INSURANCE
General A g g r e g a t e I w
(Other Than Products- (krnpieted Operations)
Products ~ Completed .Operations Aggregate Limit
Personal and Advertising Injury Limit
Each Occurrence Limit
Damage To Premises Rented To Yo<i limit
Medical Expense Limit

$

5,000,000

$
i
$
$

5,000,000
5,000,000
5,000,000
50,000
EXCLUDED

1

Airy One Premises
Any One Person

RETROACTIVE DATES
Coverages A and B of this insurance does not apply to ,1x>dily injury", "personal injury", ^property damage" or "advertising
injury" which occurs before die Retroactive Date, if any, shown here:
08/02/2002
(Enter Date or "None1* if no Retroactive Dace Applies)

PREMIUM
Classification
OPERATIONS RATED ASr VITAMINS, HERBAL &1SATURAL
SUrTLEMENIS

tfCodTNoJ |

IVemium Basis

52343

$263,4^,336(3)

|j

££»

\ f

$L$00

Per

| j AdvancePremium j

SK0O0

Total Advanced Premium
Minimum Term Premium

$475,000.00
$475,000.00
S427.500.00

ADDmOttAL DECLARATIONS
When usedas.a Premiumbaste
<!} "roxiuaaalitMi" means the entire remitaetaaan eariied during the policy, period by proprietors and by all employees of the Named Insured other
than diauififenra (except operators of mobile eompmenr) and aircraft jatots and iJD-pilois, subject to any overtime earnings or
H H ^ f l * or itmiineraiibarule-appiioab je in aecckoance with the manuals m use by me Company;.
{2} "cosT means to total cost to &e Named fai*u^^
mdcj>endent contactors of allwoii: let ^r $nb-tet in connection yitb tack tpecinc project, inelnjing the coat o/aUlab^ T materials and
oqnipfliciitfijqmii&bd,used or dctfvtsrtd for use in theexecution o f web work, whether rmuisbed by me owner, extractor or sub-contraictoi •„
including all feta* allowance, bonuses or comrntwiona made, paid «r'"one.
(3)

H

sales*twanst^gnwamo^
a ^ d j a } | y d i r i » y i y jbr jpod»aa<
piooWits sold or distfifarte^
dues orfecsi and ratals during me policy ierni; and
jnctudes taxes, other man taxes which ctie Named Insured and such others co! tect as-a separate item and remit directly to a governmental
division..

THESEDEC&ARATIOKS AREPART OF THE POLICY DEGtARATIONS^QNTAJNING THE NAME OF THE INSURED AJ©
THE POLICY PERIOD
Dfi20O2&7OG
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COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY
CG00021207

COMMEROAL GENERAL LIABILITY COVERAGE FORM
COVERAGES A AND B PROVIDE CLAJMS-MADE COVERAGE
PLEASE READ THE ENTIRE FORM CAREFULLY
Various provisions in this policy restrict coverage. Read the
entire policy carefully to determine rights, duties and what
is and is not covered

(1) The "bodily injury"'or "property damage* is
caused by an ^occurrence" that takes place in
the "coverage territory*;

Throughout this polity the word* "yon" and "you** ttftrio
the Named Insured shown in the Declarations, and any
other person or organization qualifying as a.Named Insured
under this policy. The words wweff4 "us" and "our" refer to
the Company providing this insurance.

(2) The"bodilymjury"or"propertydamage"did
not occur before the Retroactive Date, if any,
shown in the Declarations or after tiit end of
the policy period; and
(3) A claim for damages because ofthe "bodily
injury" or "property damage" isfirstmade
against any insured, m accordance with Paragraph c, below, during the policy period or
any Extended Reporting Period we provide
under Section V - Extended Reporting Periods.

The word "insured" means any person or organization
qualifying as such under Section U - Who Is An Insured.
Other words and phrases that appear in quotation marks
have special meaning. Refer to Section VI - J>efmitions.
SECTIONI-COVERAGES
COVERAGE A BODILY INJURY AND PROPERTY
DAMAGE LIABILITY
1- Insuring Agreement

c.

a. We will pay those sums that the insured becomes
legally obligated to pay as damages because of
"bodiry injury" or "property damage" to which this
insurance applies. We will have the right and duty
to defend the insured against any -suit" seeking
those damages* However, we will have no duty to
defend the insured against any "suit" seeking damages for "bodiry injury* or "property damage" to
which this insurance does not apply. We may, at
our discretion, investigate any "occurrence* and
settle any claim or "suit* that may result But*

(1) When notice of such claim is received and re~
corded by any insured or by us, whichever
comesfirst;or
(2) When we make settlement in accordance with
Paragraph a^ above*
All claims for damages because of* *bodiIy injury"
to the. same person, including damages claimed by
any person or organization for care, loss Ofser~
vices, or death resulting at any time fx<m tjhe "bodily injury*, will be deemed to have been made at
the time thefirstof mose claims is made against
any insured.
All claims for damages because of "property damage" causing loss to the same person or organization will be deemed to have been made at the time
thefirstof those claims is made against any insured*

(1) The amount we wiilpay for damages is limited as described in Section 1 0 -limits Of
insurance; and
{2) Ourrightand duty to defend ends when we
have used up the applicable limit of insurance
in the payment ofjudgments ox settlements
under Coverages A or B or medical expenses
under Coverage C.
No other obUgation or liabihty to pay sums or perforin acts or services Is covered unless explicitly
provided for under Supplementary Payments ~
Coverages A and B.
b. This insurance applies to "bodily injury" and
H
rxorjcrty damage11 only if:

CG 00 02 12 07

A claim by a person or organization seeking damages will be deemed to have been made at the eaxfiar of the following times:

2.

Exclusions
This insurance does not apply to;
a.

Expected Or Intended Injury
"Blodiiy injury" or "property damage* expected or
intendedfromthe standpoint of the insured this
exclusion does not appfy to "bodily injury* resultingfromthe use of reasonable force to protect persons or property.

©ISO Properties, hit* ?O06
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0) A claim vfordamages because of the "personal
and advertising injur/* is first made against
any insure^ in accordance with Paragraph c*
below, during the policy period OF any .fixtended Reporting Period we provide under
Section V—Extended Reporting Periods.
c

A claim made by a person or organization seeking
damages will be deemed to have been made at me
earlier of the following times:
(1) When notice of such claim is received and re*
corded by any insured of by us, whichever
comesfirst;or
(Z) When we make settlement m accordance with
Paragraph it above.
All claims for damages because of "persona} and
advertising injury" to the same person or organization as a result of an offense will be deemed to
have been made at the time thefirstof those
claims is nxade against any insured.

flBl
Filed 05/0^)10

1

g.

hi. Wrong Description Of Prices
"Personal and advertising Injury" arising out of tbe
wrong description of the price of goods, products
or services stated in your "advertisement".
i.

c

Material Publisl ed Prior To Policy Period
"PetsonalantfaoVertfe^
oral or written publication of material whose first
publication took place before the Retroactive Date,
if any, shown in the Declarations,

d\ Criminal Acts
"Personal and advertising mjury^ arising out of a
criiiiinal act eornrnittod by or at tbe direction ofthe
Triarrrnd
e.

Contractual Liability
"Personal and advertistng injury for which the insured has assumed liabihty in a contract or agreement This exclusion does not apply to -liability for
damages that she uiisured would have in the absence of the contract or agreement

C<3 00 02 XX 07

Infringement Of Copyright, Patent, Trademark
Or Trade Secret
"Personal and advertising injury" arising out of the
infringement of copyright, patent, trademark, trade
secre or other intellectual property rights. Under
this exclusion; such other intellectual property
rights do not include the use ofanother's advertising idea in your "adveitisemeut".

Knowing Violation Of Rights Of Another

"Personal and advertising injury* arising out .of
oral or written publication of material, if done by
or at the direct ion of tbe insured with knowledge
of its falsity.

Quality Or Performance Of Goods - Failure To
Conform To Statements
"Personal and advertising injury" arising out of the
failure of goods* products or services to conform
with any statement of quality or performance made
in your "advertisement".

This insurance does riot apply to:
''Personal and advertising: injury" caused by or at
the direction of the insured with the knowledge
that the act would violate the rights of another and
would inflict "personal and advertising injury0.
b. Material Published WitJb Knowledge Of Falsity

Breach Of Contract
"Personal and advertising injury" arising out of a
breach of contract, except an implied contract to
use another's advertising idea in your "advertisement".

Exclusions

a.

Page 12 of 65

However, this exclusion does not apply to inErihgement, in your "advertisement", of copyright,
trade dress of slogan.
J.

Insureds In Media And Internet Type
Basin esses
"Personal and advertising injury" committed by an
insured whose business is:
11) Advettistag^ ra-oadcastings publishing or telecasting;
(2) De%amgordereiim^mgcor^^
for others; or
(3) An Internet search, access, content orservice
provider.
However, this exclusion does not apply to Paragraphs 144U, b. and c. of "personal and advertising
injury* under 1b& Derrnitions Section.
For the purposes of this exclusion, the placing of
fiames borders or b^,ccadvcitmng; for you or
others anywhere on the Internet is not by itself;
considered the business; of advertising, broadcastkg, pu pushing or telecasting.
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(1) TheTelepixme<^sumerRrote^
(tCPAX including any amendment of or addttion to such law; or

kv Electronic Chairooms Or Bulletin Boards
"Personal and advertising injury* arising out of an
electronic cbatroom or bulletin board the insured
hosts, owns, or over which the insured exercises
control.
I.

(2) TT3*CAN^PAMAetof20O3,niclu4mgaiiy
amendment of or addition to such law; or
(3) Any statute, ordinance or regulation, other
than the TCPA orCJW-SPAM Act of 2003,
that prohibits or limits the sending, transmitting, communicating or distribution of materid or information.

Unauthorized Use Of Another*s Name Or
Product
"Personal and advertising injury1* arising out of the
unauthorized use of another's name or product in
your e-mail address, domain name or metatag, or
any other: similar tactics to mislead another's potential customers,

COVERAGE C MEDICAL PAYMENTS
J .Insuring Agreement

m. Pollution

a.

"Personal and advertising injury^ arising out of the
actual, alleged or threatened discharge, dispersal,
seepage, migration, release or escape of "pollutants* at anytime.

We will pay medical expenses as described below
for "bodily injury" caused by an accident:
(1) On premises you own or rent;
(2) On ways next to premises you own or rent; or
(3) Because of your operations;

n» Pollution-Related

provided that:

Any loss, cost or expense arising out of any:

(a) The accident takes place in the "coverage
territory" and during the policy period;

(1) Request, demand, order or Statutory or regulatory requirement that any insured or others
test for, monitor, clean up, remove, contain,
treat, detoxify of neutralize, or in any way respond to, or assess the effects o£ "pollutants";
or

(b) The expenses are incurred and reported to
us within one year of the date of the accident; and
(e) The injured person submits to examination, at our expense, by physicians of our
choice as often as we reasonably require.

(2) Claim or suit by or on behalf of a governmental authority for damages because of testing
lor, monitoring,, cleaning up, removing, containing, dealing, detoxifying or neutralizing,
or in any way responding to, or assessing the
effects o£ "pollutants".
o.

b.

War

We will make these payments regardless of fault
These payments will not exceed the applicable
limit of insurance. We will pay reasonable
expenses for:
(1) First aid administered at me time of an accident;

"Personal and advertising injuryn, however caused,
arising, directly or in directly, cait ofe
(1) War, including undeclared or civil war;
(2) Warlike action jbya militaryforce., including
action in hindering or defending a gainst an actual cor expected attack, by any govemment,
sovereign orother authority using military
personnel orother agents;
(3) Insurrection, rebellion,revolution,usurped
power, or action takeii by goverraiietiial authority in hindering or defending against any
Ofinese;
p.
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(2) Necessary medical, surgical, x-ray and dental
services^ including prosthetic devices; and

2.

(3) Necessary ambulance, hospital, professional
nursing and funeral services.
Exclusions
We will not pay expensesfor"bodily injury* :•
a. Any Insured
To any insured, except Volunteer workers\
b.

Hired Person
To a person hired to do work for or oh behalfof
any insured or a tenant of any insured

Distribution Of Materia!Is VIolaiio a Of
Statutes

c.

"Personal and advertising injury* arising directly
OTradirectlyout of any action or omission that violates or is alleged to violate;

Injury On Normally Occupied Premises
To apersc* injured on that partofpremies you
own or rent that the person normally occupies.

I
€ € 0 0 0 2 1 2 07
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Our obligation to defend an insured's indernuitee and to
pay for attorneys' fees and necessary litigation expenses as Supplementary Payments endis wjben we have
used up the applicable limit of insurance in the pay meet of judgments ox settlements or the conditions set
forth above, or the terms of the agreement described in
Paragraph £ above, are no longer mat

(a) To you, to your partners or members (if
you are a partnership or joint venture), to
your members (if you arc a limited liability company), to a co-wempkjyeen while
' in the course of his or h<^ employment or
performing duties related to the conduct
ofypur business, oxtoyour other "volunteer workers* while performing duties related to the conduct of your business;

SECTION n - WHO IS AN INSURED
L

If you are designated in die Declarations as:
a.

(b) To the spouse, child, parent, brother or
sister of that co-*employee* or Volunteer
worker" as a consequence of Paragraph
(a) above;

An individual, you and your spouse ate insureds,
but only with respect to the conduct of a business
of which you are the sole owner.

b. A partnership or joint venture, you are an insured.
Your members^ your partners, and their spouses
are also insureds, but only with respect to the conduct of your business.
c.

(c) For which there is any obligation to share
damages with or repay someone else who
must pay damages because of the injury
described in Paragraphs (a) ox (b) above;
or

A limited liability company, you are an insured.
Your members are also insureds, but only with respect to the conduct of your business. Your managers arc insureds, but only with respecttoi&eir
duties as your managers.

(d) Arising out of his or her providing or failing to provide professional health care
services.
(2) "i^per^ damage" to rjmpe^ty:

& An organization other than a partnership, joint
venture or limited liability company, you are an insured Your "executive officers" and directors are
insureds, but only with respect to their duties as
your officers or directors. Your stockholdenj are
also insureds, but only with respect to their liability as stockholders.
e,

A trusty you are an insured. Your trustees are also
insureds, but only with respect to their duties as
trustees,

2. Each of the following is also an insured:
a* Your "volunteer workers" only while performing
duties related to the conducts your business, or
your "employees", other than either your "execu
tive officers0 (if you are an organization other than
a partnership, joint venture or limited liability
company) or youi ruanagers (if you are a limited
liability company;^, but only for acts within the
scope of their crimloyment by you or while performing duties related ito the conduct of your btisi*
ness. However, none of these "employees'* or
"volunteer workers" are insureds for;
(1) "Bodily injury" or "personal and adverriring
injury1':

CG 00 02 12 07
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(a) Owned, occupied or used by,
(b) Rented to, inthe care,custody or control
o£ or over which physical control k being exercised for any purpose by
you, any of your "employees", "volunteer
workers", any partner or member (if you are a
partnership or joint venture), or any member
(if you are a limited liability company);
&• Any p erson (other than your "employee" or * volunteer worker") or any organization while acting
as your real estate manager,
c.

Ally person or organization having proffer temporary custody of your properly if you die, but only:
(1) With respect to liability arising out of the
maintenance or use of that property; and
(2) Until your legal representative has been ap«
pointed

d.

Your kgalrepresentariveifyou die, but only with
respect to duties as such. That representative will
have all youfrightsand duties under this Coverage
Part;

OBO Properties, Inc.* 2006
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Any organization you newly acquire orform,other
tharl a partnership Joint venture or limited liability
company, and oyer which you maintain o wnecship or
majority interest, will qualify as a Named Insured if
mere is no other similar insurance available to that organization. However:
a.

Mr

Document 24-4

Coverage under this provision is afforded only until the 90th day after you acquire or form the organization ox the end of the policy period, whichever is earlier;
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because of all "bodily injury* and "property damage"
arising out of any one "occurrence".
6.

Subject to Paragraph 5. above, the Damage To Premises Rented To You limit is the most we will pay under Coverage A for damages because of "property
damage" to any one premises, while rented to you, or
in the ease of damage byfire,while rented to you or
temporarily occupied by you with permission of the
owner.

7.

Subject to Paragraph 5. above, the Medical Expense
Ltmtt is the most we will pay under Coverage C for all
medical expenses because of "bodily injury" sustained
by any one person;

fa. Coverage A does not apply to *bodily injury * or
"property damage* that occurred before you acquired orformedthe organization; and
c* Coverage B does not apply to "personal and advertising injury" arising out of an offense committed
before you acquired or formed the organization.
No person or organization is an insured with respect to the
conduct of any current or past partneraiup, joint venture or
limited liability company that is not shown as a Named
Insured in the Declarations.
SECTION m - LIMITS OF INSURANCE
} * Hie limits of Insurance shown m die Declarations and
Hie rules below fix the most we will pay regardless of
the number of;
b. Claims made or "suits* brought; or

2.

Persons or organrzatiom making claims or bringing "suits "\

The General Aggregate Limit is the most we will pay
far the sum of:
a.

The Limits of Insurance of this Coverage Part apply separately to each consecutive annual period and to any remaining period of less than 12 months, starting with the beginning of the policy period shown in the Declarations, unless
the policy period is extended after issuance for an additional period of less than 12 months. In teat case, die additional period will be deemed part of the last preceding
period for purposes of determining the Limits of insurance.
SECTION IV - COMMERCIAL GENERAL
LIABILITY CONDITIONS
1, Bankruptcy
Bankruptcy or insolvency of the insured or of the insured's estate will not relieve us of our obligations under this Coverage Part.

a* Insureds;
c

X .Duties In The Event Of Occurrence, Offense, Claim
OrSott
a.

Medical expenses under Coverage C;

b» Damages under Coverage A» except damages be*
cause of ^bodilyinjury*1 or ^property Sdlamage" indueled in the "products-completed operations hazard"; and

(2) The names and addresses of any injured persons awl witnesses; and
(3) The naturearid locationof any injury or damage arising out of the "occurrence* or offense
Notice of an "occurrence" or offense is not notice
ofaclaim.

The Products<:ompleted Operations Aggravate Limit

is the most we will pay under Coverage A for damages
because of "bodily injury* and "property damage* included in the "producte-completed operations hazard".
4

5.

Snbjedt to Paragraph X above, the Personal and Advertising Injury limit is the most we will pay under Coverage B for the sum of all damages because of all "personal and advertising injury* sustained by any one
person or organization.
Subject to Paragraph 2. or & above, whichever applies,
the Each Occurrence Limit is the most we will pay for
die sum of}

Youroustsee to it mat we are notified as soon as
practicable of an "occurrence** or offense which
may result in a claim. To the extent possible, notice should rnclude:
(J) How, when and where the ^occurrence" or offense took place;

& Damages under Coverage B*
3.

Page 16 of 65

b. If a claim is received by any insured, you must
(1) irhhiediatdyrecorrln^
and the date received; and
(2) Notify us as soon as practicable.
YoumustseetoftrriatYv^recdvewrit^
the claim ais soon as practicable.
c

You and any other involved insured must*

a. Damages under Coverage A; and
b. Medical expenses under Coverage. C
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6L If me Supplemental Extended Reporting Period is in
effect, we will provide the supplemental aggregate limits of insurance described below, but onlyforclaims
first received and recorded Airing the Supplemental
Extended Reporting Period.

c

All i^tber parts of the world if the: injury ox damage
arises out of:
CO Goods or pipduicts made or sold by you in the
temtory described in Paragraph iu above;
(2) The activities of a person wrtose home is in
the territory described in Paragraph a- above,
but is awayfora short time on your business;
or

The supplemental aggregate limits of insurance will be
equal to the dollar amount shown in the DecUuatioas in
effect at the end of the policy period for such of the following limits of insurance for which a dollar amount
has been entered;

(3) 'Personal and advertising rr^uxy" offenses that
take place through the Internet or similar electronic means of communication

General Aggregate'limit
Products-Completed Operations Agg^gafe Limit
Paragraphs 2, and 3. of Section £0 - Limits Of Insurance will be amended accordingly. The Personal and
Advertising Injury Limit, the Bach Occurrence Limit
and the Damage To Premises Rented To You Limit
shown in the Declarations will then continue to apply,
as set forth in Paragraphs 4., 5. and & of that Section.
SECTION VI - DEFINITKWS
1.

2,

"Advertisement" means a notice that is broadcast or
published to the general public or specific market segments about your goods, products or services for the
purpose of attracting customers or supporters. For the
purposes of mts definition:

provided the insured's responsibility to pay damages is
detennined in a "suit" on the merits, in theterritorydescribed k\ Paragraph a. above or in a settlement we
agree to.
5.

"Employee" includes a "leased worker". "I&iployee"
does not include a "temporary worker^

6.

"Executive officer" means a person holding any of the
officer positions created by your Charter, constitution,
by-laws or any other similar governing document.

7.

"Hostilefire*means one which becomes uncontrollable or breaks out from where it was intended to be.

&

"Impaired property" means tangible property, other
than "you; product*' or "your work*, that cannot be
used or is less useful because:

a» Notices that are published include material placed
on the Internet or on similar electronic means of
communication; and

a.

b. Regarding web-sites, only that part of a web-site
that ss about your goods* products or services for
the purposes of attracting customers or supporters
is considered an advertisement

b. You haye failed to fulfill the terms of a contract or
agreement;

"Auto* means:
a* A land motor vehicle* trailer or semitrailer designed for travel on public roads, including any attached machinery or equipment; or
b* Any other land vehicle that is subject to a compulsory or financial i esponsibinry law or other motor
vehicle insurance law tit the state whereftis licensed or priric ipaUy garaged.

3* "Bodily injury* means bodily injury, sickness or disease sustained by a person, including death resulting
fiomanyoftbeseatanymrje,

9> 'Insured contract" means;
a.

a* The United States of Arnoica (including its territories and possessions), Puerto Rico and Canada;
b. International waters or airspace, but only if the injury or damage occurs in the course of travel or
transportatian between any places included in
Paragraph a. above; or

CG 00 02 It 07

A contract for a lease ofpremises. However, that
portion of the contract for a Jease of premises that
mdetrxnifies any person or orgamzaiion ibr damage
by fire to premises while rented to yon or temporarily occupied by you with pentussion -of the
owner is not an 'insured contract";

• b. A sidetrack agreement;
C

*f^eragetcixito^

It kcorpoi»tes*your product" or "your work" that
is known or thought to be. defective, deficient, inadequate or dangerous; or

if such property can be restored to use by the repair,
replacement, adjustment or removal of "your, product"
or "your work * or your fulfilling the terms of the contract or agreement;

However, "auto1* does not include ''mobile equipment*.

4.

Page 20 of 65

Any easement or license agreement, except in
connection with construction or demolition operalicmsbnorwitnm^

d. An obii gation, as required by ordinance* to indemnify a mtmicipality, except in connection with
workforamurik^alhy;
c.

An elevator maintenance agreement

01SO Properties, Inc., 2006
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That part of any other contract or agreement pertaining to your, business (including an indemnification of a municipality in connection with work per*
formed for a municipality) under which you
assume the tort liability of another party to pay for
"bodily iirjttry* or "property damage" to a third
person or organization. Tort liability means a liability that would be imposed by taw in the absence of any contract or agreement
Paragraph f. dbe£ not include, that part of any contract or agreement;
(1) IhatindermiifiesaTdhioadfor
or "property damage* arising out of construction or demolition operations, wi thin 50 feet
of any railroad property and affecting airy railroad bridge or trestle, tracks, road-beds, tun*
nel, underpass or crossing;
(2) That indemnifies an architect, engineer or surveyor for injury or damage arising out of;
(a) Preparing, approving, or failing to prepare or approve, maps, shop drawings,
opinions, reports, surveys, field orders,
change orders or drawings and specifications; or

Filed 05/0 J B l O

but "loading or unloading" does not include the movement of property by means of a mechanical device,
other than a hand truck, that is not attached to the aircraft, watercraft or "auto",
12. "Mobile equipment" means any of the following types
of land vehicles, including any attached machinery or
equipment:
a* Bulldozers, farm machinery, forkbfts and other
vehicles designed for use principally off public
roads;
b.

Vehicles maintainedforuse solely on or next to
premises you own or rent;

c

Vehicles that travel on crawler treads;

<L Vehicles, whether self-propelled or not, maintained primarily to provide mobility to permanently mounted:
(1) Power cranes, shovels, loaders, diggers or
drills; or
(2) Road construction or resurfacing equipment
such as graders, scrapers or rollers;
e.

(b) Giving directions or instruc rions. or failing to gfve them, rf that is the primary
cause of the injury or damage; or
(5) Under which the insured, if an architect, engineer or surveyor, assumes liability for an injury or damage arising out of the insured's
rendering orfoilure to render professions 1
services, including thosefistedin Paragraph
(2) above and supervisory* inspection, architectural or engineering activities,
10. "Leased worker" means a person leased to you by a
labor leasmg firm under an agreement between you and
the labor leasingfirm,to perform duties related to the
conduct of your business. "Teased worker" does nor
include a "temporary worker".
11. "Loading or unloading" means the handling ofproperty:

Vehicles not described in Paragraph a^b^c or d.
above that are not self-propelled and arc maintained primarilytoprovide mobility to permanently attached equipment of thefollowingtypes:
(1) Air compressors, pumps and generators, including spraying, welding, building cleaning,
geophysical exploration, lighting and well
servicing equipment; or
(2) Cherry pickers and similar devices used to
raise or lower workers;

f.

Vehicles not described in Paragraph a^h n c o r d ,
above maintained primarily for purposes other
than the transportation of persons or cargo.
However, self-propelled vehicles with the following types of permanentlyattached equipment are
not "mobile equipment" but will be considered
(i) Equipment designed primarily ft>n
(a) Snowremoval;

«* After it is mo ved from the place where it is accepted for movement into or onto an jiircrafl, wa»

(b) Road maintenance, but not construction
or resurfacing; or

ter^raStor^auto^
b

(c) Street cleaning;

While it is in or on an aircraft, watercraft or
"auto*; or

c* While it is being moved from an aircraft, watercraft or "auto" to the place where it isfinallydelivered;

CG 00 02 12 07
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(2) Gberry pickers and similar devices mounted
on automobile or truck chassis and used to
raise or lower workers; and
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(3) Air compressors, pumps and generators, including spraying, welding, building cleaning
geophysical exploration, lighting and well
servicing equipment.

(a) When all of the work called for in your
contract has been completed.
(b> When all of the work to be done at the
job site has been completed if your contract calls for work at more than one job
site.

However, "mobile equipment" does not include land
vehicles that are subject to a compulsory or financial
responsibility law or other motor vesicle insurance law
in the state where H is licensed or principal^ garaged
Land vehicles subject to a compulsory orfinancialre*
sponsibiBty law or other motor vehicle insurance law
are considered "autos\

(c) Wbmu^partoftheworkdkmeatajob
site has been put to its intended use by
any person or organization other than another contractor or subcontractor working
on the same project.

1& ^Occurrence* means an accident, mcludkg continuous
or repeated exposure to substantially the same general
harmful conditions.
14* "Personal and advertising injury1 means injury, including consequential "bodily injury", arising out of one or
more of the following offenses:
a.

False arrest dettaition or imprisonment;

b. Mafcknis prosecution;
c.

The wrongful eviction from, wrongful entry into,
or invasion of the right of private occupancy of a
room, dwelling or premises that a person occupies,
committed by or on behalf of its owner, landlord
or lessor;

Work that may need service* maintenance,
correction* repair or replacement, but which is
otherwise complete, will be treated as com*
pleted
^ Does not include "bodily injury" or "property
damage" arising out of:
(1) The transportation of property, unless the injury or damage arises out of a condition in or
on a vehicle not owned or operated by you,
. and thatcondition was created by * e "loading
or unloading" of that vehicle by any insured;
(2) The existence of tools, uninsnilled equipment
or abandoned or unused materials; or

d. Oral or written publication, in any manner, of material that slanders or libels a person or organization or disparages a person's or organization's
goods^ products or services;
e.

Oral or written publication, in any manner, of material that violates a person's right of privacy;

f.

The use of another's advertising idea in your "advertisement"; or

g.

Infringing upon another's copyright, trade dress or
slogan in your Advertisement",
15. "Poilutants'' mean any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal
iiritant or contaminant; including smoke, vapor, soot,
fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals and waste. Waste Includes materials to be recycled, reconditioned or reclaimed.
16. "Products-compfeted operations hazard*:
a.

Includes all "bodily injury" and "property damage"
occurringaway from premises you own or rent and
arising out of ''your product" or "your work." except:
(1); Products that are still in your physical possessk>n;or
(2) Work that has not yet been completed or
ahaadpnep!- rtyweyer, *ypur work" will be
deemed completed attbe earliest of the following titnes:

CG 00 02 12 07

Page 22 of 65

(3) Products or operationsforwhich the classification, listed in the Declarations or in a policy
schedule, states that pK>dudts-coorpleted op*
erations are subject to the <jeneral Aggregate
Limit
17. "Property dunnage" means:
a.

Physical injury to tangible property, including ail
resulting loss of use of that property, All such loss
of use shall be deemed to occur at the time of the
physical injury that caused ft; or

b. Loss of use of tangible property that is not physically injured All such loss of use shall be deemed
to occur at the time of the "occurreoce" that
causedit
For the purposes of ibis insurance; electronic data is
nottan|^bl»propert3^
As used in this definition, electronic data means information, facts or programs stored as or on, created or
used on, or transmitted to orfrom,computer software,
including systems and applications software, hard or.
flopjpy <h^C3>-ROMS,tapes, drives, cells, data
processing devices or any other media which are used
with electro nicaily controlled equipment
^ "$ufi* means a dvil proceeding in which damages
because of Tbodiry hiiiury^, "property damage" or "personal and advertising injury" to. which this insurance
applies are alleged. "Suit" includes:
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Policy Number. CA0O0Q11665-02
Issued Date: 10717/2Q08

AD 07 85 01 95
Effective Date; 0&20/2008

THIS ENDORSEMENT CHANGES THE POLICY. PLEASE READ IT CAREFULLY.

NAMED INSURED ENDORSEMENT
This endorsement modifies insurance provided under the following;
COMMEIUC^.GENERAL LIABILITY COVERAGE PART
It is agreed die Named Insured as shown on me Common Policy Declarations is as follows:

COVARIXLLC
DBA; BASIC RESEARCH LLC;
COVARIX, LLC AND SUBSIDIARIES;
WESTERN HOLDINGS, LLC AND SUBSIDIARIES;
COMMAND ENTERPRISE, LLC AND SUBSIDIARIES;
PC MANAGEMENT AND SUBSIDIARIES;
5742 HOLDINGS LLC

AD 07 85 01 95
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employment by you or while performing duties related to the
conduct of your business.

SECTION VI - DEFINITIONS
1. "Advertisement" means a notice that is broadcast or published to the
general public or specific market segments about your goods, products
or services for the purpose of attracting customers or supporters. For
the purposes of this definition:
a. Notices that are published include material placed on the Internet
or on similar electronic means of communications; ...
5. "Employee" includes a "leased worker." ...

10. "Leased worker" means a person leased to you by a labor leasing firm
under an agreement between you and the labor leasingfirm,to perform
duties related to the conduct of your business.

14. "Personal and advertising injury" means injury, including
consequential "bodily injury", arising out of one or more of the
following offenses:

f. The use of another's advertising idea in your "advertisement"
[emphasis added] [Id. atflf2 & 3, Exhs. " 1 " & "2."]
8.

The named insured under the Admiral Policies, Basic Research, is designated as a

limited liability company in the declarations pages of the policies. [Id.] Dennis Gay is the
manager of Basic Research. [Id. at f 5.]
9.

Gay, Mowrey, and Friedlander are each employed by Bydex Management, LLC,

an employee management and labor leasing company. [Id. at ^ 6.] Each provides services to
Basic Research pursuant to an agreement between Bydex and Basic Research. [Id] The Admiral
Policies provide coverage for Basic Research "employees," including "leased workers." [Id. at
THf 2 & 3, Exhs. " 1 " & "2."] The conduct of Gay, Mowrey, and Friedlander as alleged in the
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underlying lawsuits concerns their duties as Basic Research "employees":
Defendants Gay, Mowrey and Friedlander have knowingly engaged in a
deliberate pattern of wrongful, illegal and fraudulent practices in conducting the
affairs of Defendants Basic Research[, et aL] [Id. at f 8, Exh. " 3 " (Miller
Amended Complaint), f L]
Defendant Gay is an officer and a principal shareholder of, among other
companies, Defendants Basic Research and Dynakor... [and] directs, controls, or
participates in the acts or practices of Defendants, including Basic Research and
Dynakor
Defendant Mowrey is a principal shareholder of, and the Director of
Scientific Affairs at, Defendant Basic Research . . . [and] serves as a consultant
for Defendant Dynakor .. . Defendant Friedlander, the self-proclaimed marketing
guru of Basic Research . . . is a marketing consultant to, among others . . . Basic
Research and Dynakor. [Id. at If 9, Exh. "4" (Tompkins Complaint),ffij12, 13 and
14.]
DENNIS GAY ('Gay') is an individual and an owner and operator of Dynakor
and Basic Research
DANIEL B. MOWREY . . . ("Mowrey") is the director
of scientific affairs at Defendant Basic Research, serves as a consultant to
Defendant Dynakor, and owns and operates . . . a business organization used by
Defendants as an instrumentality of the Defendants to develop, market, endorse
and promote products for Defendants Basic Research and Dynakor. . . .
MITCHELL K. FRIEDLANDER is an individual who controls and operates
Defendants. [Id. at J 13, Exh, "5" (Forlenza Complaint), Iffl 12, 13 and 14.]
10.

A named insured endorsement to each Admiral policy includes Covarix, LLC and

its subsidiaries as named insureds under the policy. [Id. at fflf 2 & 3, Exhs. " 1 " and "2."]
Dynakor, Carter-Reed and Zoller Labs are all subsidiaries of Covarix, LLC. [Id. at \ 7.]
Covarix, LLC does business as Basic Research, LLC. [Id.]
11.

Collectively, Basic Research, LLC, Dynakor Pharmaceutical, LLC, The Carter-

Reed Company, LLC, Zoller Laboratories, LLC* Dennis Gay, Daniel B. Mowrey and Mitchell K.
Friedlander are insureds under Admiral's Policy (the "Plaintiffs").
B.

The Underlying Suits
1.

12.

The Miller Suit

On November 9, 2007, Pamela Miller, Randy Howard and Donna Patterson filed

a putative class action complaint against Basic Research, Dynakor, Gay, Mowrey and
Friedlander, among others, in a lawsuit styled as Pamela Miller, Randy Howard and Donna
168295.15-10448-014-7/8/2010
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On December 8, 2009, counsel for Basic Research again e-mailed Admiral to

request that it honor its acknowledged defense obligations. In its response, Admiral confirmed
that it has accepted the defense of Basic Research under a reservation of rights and that it was
having the invoices for the incurred defense costs reviewed by counsel. [Id. at ff 5 & 6 & Exh.
"20."]
45.

By letter dated January 11,2010, Admiral belatedly advised Basic Research it had

appointed "an associated counsel" for Basic Research who would also serve as "panel counsel"
for Admiral. [Id. at ^f 7 & Exh. "21."] However, the appointed counsel did not participate in the
defense of Basic Research in the Forlenza Suit. [Id. at 18.]
46.

On April 7, 2010, Admiral filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings in this

action, arguing for the very first time that it has no duty to defend the Forlenza Suit. [Admiral's
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [Docket. No. 20].] Admiral never previously asserted that
the allegations in the Forlenza Suit do not establish a potential for coverage under the second
Admiral policy.
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DECLARATION OF RONALD F. PRICE
1.

I am an Associate General Counsel for Basic Research, LLC. The facts set forth

in this declaration are true and correct based on my personal knowledge thereof and, if called to
testify, I could and would testify competently thereto. Part of my duties as Associate General
Counsel for Basic Research involves overseeing each of the lawsuits which is identified below,
including reviewing all of the invoices which are received from the law firms which have been
retained to represent the defendants in those cases. My duties also include overseeing the tender
of the defense of those lawsuits to Admiral Insurance Company.
DEFENDANT ADMIRAL AND THE ADMIRAL POLICIES
2.

Admiral Insurance Company ("Admiral") issued to named insured and Plaintiff

Basic Research, LLC ("Basic Research") a commercial general liability (CGL) insurance policy
(policy no. CA000011665-01) with a policy period from August 20, 2007 - August 20, 2008. A
copy is attached as Exhibit "1" ("2007-2008 Policy").
3.

Admiral subsequently issued to named insured and Basic Research, a CGL

insurance policy (policy no. CA000011665-02) with a policy period from August 20, 2008 August 20,2009. A copy is attached as Exhibit "2" ("2008-2009 Policy").
4.

Both Policies were issued in Utah. Payments for both Policies* premiums were

also made from Utah.
DEFENDANTS IN THE UNDERLYING LITIGATION
5.

Dennis Gay serves as the manager of Basic Research.

6.

Dennis Gay, Daniel B. Mowrey and Mitchell K. Friedlander are each employed

by Bydex Management, LLC, an employee management and labor leasing company whose
employees provide services to other companies, including Basic Research. Each individual
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provides services to Basic Research pursuant to an agreement between Bydex and Basic
Research.
7.

Dynakor, Carter-Reed and Zoller Labs are all distinct, separate corporate entities,

and are all subsidiaries of Covarix, LLC. Western Holdings, LLC is a separate and distinct
corporate entity from Basic Research and the other plaintiffs in this action. Until June of 2009,
Western Holdings was a Wyoming limited liability company.

In May of 2009, Western

Holdings was merged into a Nevada limited liability company named Western Holdings, LLC
with its primary place of business in Nevada.
THE UNDERLYING MILLER/TOMPKINS CONSOLIDATED CLASS ACTION SUIT
8.

On November 9, 2007, a lawsuit styled as Pamela Miller, Randy Howard and

Donna Patterson, et ah v. Basic Research, LLC, et al9 (the "Miller suit") was filed in the District
of Utah against Plaintiffs (herein). On May 23, 2008, the underlying claimants filed a First
Amended Class Action Complaint ("Miller Amended Complaint"), attached here as Exhibit "3."
9.

On December 6, 2007, a class action lawsuit styled as Mary Tompkins, et al v.

Basic Research, LLC, et al, (the "Tompkins suit") was filed in California State Superior Court
against Plaintiffs (herein). A copy of the Tompkins Complaint is attached here as Exhibit "4."
10.

Subsequently, the Tompkins suit was removed to the United States District Court,

Eastern District of California and then ordered transferred to the United States District Court,
District of Utah, Central Division. The "Notice of Transfer" order is attached as Exhibit "28."
11.

Thereafter, the Tompkins suit was ordered consolidated with the Miller suit, under

the case name and case number as the Miller suit ("Miller/Tompkins suit.") The Order granting
consolidation of the Miller and Tompkins suits is attached here as Exhibit "29."
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM FOR COVERAGE FOR THE
MILLEIVTOMPKINS SUIT AND ADMIRAL'S DENIAL
167928.7-10448-014-7/8/2010
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Basic Research gave notice to Admiral, its commercial general liability insurer, of

both the original complaint and the Miller Amended Complaint as early as January 31, 2008 and,
subsequently, the Tompkins Complaint. Basic Research's January 31, 2008 tender letter is
attached here as Exhibit "9." Admiral subsequently denied a defense for the Miller/Tompkins
suit on June 6,2008. Admiral's denial letter is attached here as Exhibit "10."
THE UNDERLYING FORLENZA SUIT
13.

On May 26, 2009, a class action law suit styled as Nicole Forlenza, et al v.

Dynakor Pharmacal, LLC, et al, (the "Forlenza suit") was filed against the Forlenza Insureds.
A copy of that complaint ("Forlenza Complaint") is attached as Exhibit "5."
14.

On June 11, 2009, Nicole Forlenza and Shaiden Monroe filed a first amended

complaint in the Forlenza suit, and is attached here as Exhibit "6."
15.

On August 10. 2009, a second amended class action complaint ("Forlenza second

amended complaint") was filed in the Forlenza suit, and is attached here as Exhibit "7."
16.

On October 28. 2009, a third amended class action complaint ("Forlenza third

amended complaint") was filed in the Forlenza suit, and is attached here as Exhibit "8."
17.

On January 4, 2010, a fourth amended class action complaint ("Forlenza fourth

amended complaint") was filed in the Forlenza suit, and is attached here as Exhibit "18.
NOTICE OF FORLENZA SUIT AND ADMIRAL'S RESPONSE
18.

Basic Research provided written notice of the Forlenza suit along with a copy of

the Forlenza Complaint to Admiral on or about June 4, 2009, and requested that Admiral
respond and defend the suit.
19.

By letter dated June 25, 2009, Admiral acknowledged notice of the Forlenza suit

and agreed to defend under a reservation of rights. A copy is attached here as Exhibit "11."
20.

By letter dated July 6, 2009, Admiral further acknowledged receiving notice of
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the Forhnm suit tod agreed to defend under a reservation of rights- A copy of the letter is
atiafj&i as Exhibit ^12,w
21.

By letter dated July 15, 2009, Basic Research gave Admiral notice of the

Forlenza first amended complaint, and thai the underlying defendants they had retained counsel
to defend them. Admiral did not respond, nor participate in the defense, A copy of the letter is
attached as Exhibit "13,"
22.

By letter dated August 11, 2009, Basic Research gave Admiral notice of the

Jw/e^tf 3 ^

confirmed it was proceeding with the defense. Admiral

#$*iot tt^iOitdjriofffi&&parUd|«te Sn the defense. A espy ofttoi^etier is attached as E&hibit

23.

To date, Plaintiffs have incurred significant expenses defending themselves and in

securing counsel to enforce their rights under the insurance policies issued by Admiral.
1 declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that, to
the best of my knowledge, information and belief, the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed^

,2tHQ.

RONALD F. PRICE
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As part of their pervasive pattern of wrongful conduct, during the Class Period

Defendants have utilized (and continue to utilize) the U.S. mail and interstate wire facilities,
including telephones, facsimile machines and Internet to receive consumer solicitations to
purchase Defendants' products, and Defendants' business activities have affected interstate
commerce.
JURISDICTION A N D V E N U E
9.

This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this nationwide class action

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, relating to federal question jurisdiction; Section 1964(c) of
RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c); and Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Venue is
properly laid in this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 and Section 1965 of RICO, 18
U.S.C § 1965.
PARTIES
Plaintiffs
10. Plaintiff, Pamela Miller, is a resident of Gilbert, Arizona. During the Summer of
2007, while conducting an Internet search on nutrition, Ms. Miller observed an
advertisement for Akavar which, upon information and belief, was designed, sponsored and
maintained by Defendants. This Internet advertisement, adorned with a picture of the
product box and prominent yellow and orange colors, represented that Akavar was
scientifically proven that it was a "EUROPEAN WEIGHT LOSS BREAKTHROUGH,"
and professed in bold print that the user could "EAT ALL YOU WANT & STILL LOSE
W E I G H T . . . " Based upon this advertising disseminated by Defendants, Ms. Miller
purchased a supply of Akavar through Defendants' Internet website, wwwA.kavar.net. After

#3846044

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law 5
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Cafitege02:-^S-e©MSBBOA(

05oDDiBBti43G3

M\Mm(3sM®08>ag&3gtf®G&

57

25 days of taking Akavar as directed on the package labeling, Ms. Miller gained 10 pounds,
and she ceased taking the product. Thereafter, Ms. Miller sent several e-mail inquiries
concerning Akavar to Defendant Dynakor and she also made several interstate telephone
calls, leaving messages on telephone answering machines maintained by Defendants, but she
received no response to her e-mail or voicemail messages:
11. Plaintiff, Randy Howard, is a resident of Morton, Illinois. In or around October
2007, Mr. Howard observed an Akavar cardboard point-of-purchase advertising display
while shopping at a Wal-Mart store located in Morton, Illinois. Upon information and belief,
the point-of-purchase display that Mr. Howard saw was designed and produced by
Defendants and supplied by Defendants to the Wal-Mart store. This display, which stood
about five feet tall and was approximately 30 inches wide, with a light-colored background
and the figure of a person on it, was positioned in the middle of an aisle. The advertising
display represented that users of Akavar could "Eat All You Want and Still Lose
Weight...," and stressed that users could lose weight without changing eating habits. The
advertising display also represented that the product was something new from Europe that
would work. (A copy of an advertisement similar to the advertisement observed by Mr.
Howard is attached hereto as Exhibit A). Based upon these representations made as part of
Defendants' in-store advertising materials, Plaintiff Howard purchased two bottles of Akavar
at the Wal-Mart store at a cost of approximately $40 per botde. After two weeks of taking
Akavar as directed on the package labeling, without changing his eating habits, Mr. Howard
had gained five or six pounds and he ceased taking Akavar.
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21. Defendant Western Holdings is a limited liability company established under the
laws of the State of Utah with its principal place of business located at 1821 Logan Avenue,
Cheyenne, Wyoming 82001.
22. Defendant Western Holdings, an affiliate of Defendant Basic Research, is used
by Basic Research and the other Defendants for the sole purpose of registering creative (or
trade) names with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office for licensing to Defendants in
furtherance of their collective illegal activity.
23. Western Holdings customarily licenses such trademarks or trade names to
Defendant Basic Research for the development and manufacturing of cosmetics, nutritional
supplements and dietary supplements. The phrases or slogans "Dynakor Pharmacal,'' "Basic
Research," "Eat All You Want & Still Lose Weight," "and we couldn't say it in print" and
"and we couldn't say it in print if it wasn't true" are registered trademarks of Western
Holdings. Defendant Western Holdings has licensed these various registered trademarks to
Defendants for use in Defendants' scheme or artifice to defraud Plaintiffs and Class
members.
Defendant Bydex
24. Bydex is a limited liability company established under the laws of the State of
Utah with its principal place of business located at 5742 Harold Gatty Drive, Salt Lake City,
Utah, 84116-3762.
25. Defendant Bydex serves as the employer of the principals and other employees
who operate Defendants Basic Research and Dynakor. Bydex shares the same business
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48. Previously, Defendant Friedlander has been the subject of "Cease and Desist"
Orders and "False Representation" Orders issued by the U.S. Postal Service in connection
with his activities concerning the marketing and sale of weight-loss dietary supplements
called "Intercal-SX" and "Metabolite-2050," both of which were falsely advertised as causing
weight loss in virtually all users, as causing weight loss without willpower or caloric
restricting diets or exercise, as preventing foods from being converted into stored fat, as
being supported by scientifically sound clinical studies, and as allowing obese persons to lose
weight while continuing to eat all the food that such persons wanted. In the Matter of the
Complaint Against W.G. Charles Company, Customer Service Distribution Center, Inc., Mitchell JL
Friedlander, Harris Friedlander, and Michael Meade, U.S. Postal Service Docket No. 19/10 (Sept.
10,1985) & In the Matter of the Complaint Against The Robertson-Taylor Company, Intra-Medic
Formulations, Inc., Customer Service Distribution Center, Inc., Mitchell K Friedlander, Harris
Friedlander, and Michael Meade, U.S. Postal Service Docket Nos. 19/104 and 19/162 (Sept. 10,
1985). (A copy of the September 10, 1985 Order is attached hereto as Exhibit D).
Doe Defendants
49. Doe Defendant Nos. 1-50 are other individuals and entities who are part of, or
have aided and abetted, the fraudulent activities and conspiracy alleged in this FAC. The
identities of Does Defendant Nos. 1-50 are unknown to Plaintiffs at this time.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
50. Fraudulent weight loss products are an enormous problem in the United States.
In an October 2007 Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") study entitled Consumer Fraud in the
United States: The Second FTC Survey (the "FTC Study"), the FTC stated that an estimated
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2.1% of all consumers nationwide - representing a total of 4.8 million U.S. adults - purchased
and used fraudulent weight-loss products during the preceding year. The FTC Study found
that "[m]ore consumers were victims of fraudulent weight-loss products than of any of the
other specific frauds covered in the survey." The FTC study describes the prototypical
fraudulent weight-loss claim as products that were promoted "as making it easy to lose
weight or allowing one to lose weight without diet or exercise." As alleged in this FAC, the
Akavar dietary supplement marketed, advertised and sold by Defendants during the Class
Period is a prototypical fraudulent wTeight-loss product.
History of Defendants' Enterprises
51. Defendants are all well experienced in the promotion, marketing and sale of
alleged weight-loss products through false and deceptive advertising. As alleged in ^[ 17 of
this FAC, Defendants Gay, Mowrey and Friedlander are each the subject of the FTC
Injunction. These Defendants' activities with regard to the marketing, advertising and sales
of Akavar during the class period constitute a violation of the FTC Injunction, and such
violation is evidence of Defendants' scheme or artifice to defraud Plaintiffs and Class
members. As a result, every act that each of the Defendants undertook, or caused the other
Defendants to undertake, to market, advertise and sell Akavar in the United States was part
of a scheme or artifice to defraud Plaintiffs and Class members.
52. At the center of Defendants' interrelated business enterprises lies Basic Research,
which was created to capitalize on the above-referenced obesity and overweight epidemic
and resulting interest in weight-loss products. It is reportedly one of the largest nutraceutical
companies in the U.S. with over $50 million in annual sales revenues. Basic Research
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throughout the United States. Such sales of the product to consumers have continued to
date.
72. Since May 2007, Defendants have caused false and misleading advertisements for
Akavar to be sent through the U.S. mail, published in national magazines, posted on the
Internet, displayed in retail stores across the country ("point-of-purchase"), and broadcast on
television. The acts and practices of Defendants as alleged have been in or affecting
interstate commerce. (Copies of certain of the print and Internet advertisements
disseminated by Defendants are attached hereto as Exhibit E.)
73. Defendants' marketing blitz, engineered by Defendant Friedlander and approved
and endorsed by Defendants Gay, Mowrey, Basic Research and Dynakor, was designed to
saturate television, Internet, point-of-purchase and print media with Defendants' false and
misleading claims concerning Akavar.
74. The core of Defendants' fraudulent representations regarding Akavar consists of
the following statements which were presented in most, if not all, of Defendants' television,
Internet, point-of-purchase and print advertisements, including those advertisements viewed
by Plaintiffs:
"Eat all you want & still lose weight."
"European Weight-Loss Breakthrough"
"Automatic Caloric Restriction"
75. Defendants' false and misleading advertising for Akavar also asserts a number of
other so-called "facts," including the following:
Akavar-20/50 literally causes excess fat to be pulled from bulging
parts of your body!
#3846044
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February 7, 2007, Defendants intentionally misled consumers as to the evaluation and testing
of the product, claiming that Defendant Mowrey (a psychologist) had "reviewed the
substantiation for [Akavar's claims]" on behalf of Defendant Dynakor. In the same
interview/press release for Business Wire, Defendants presented Mowrey as an "independent
reviewer" who was not involved with the development of the product. To falsely portray
Mowrey as "independent," Mowrey was even presented as questioning the "flamboyant"
advertising for Akavar, even though he personally approved the advertisement(s) in question.
In addition to falsely presenting Mowrey as an "independent reviewer" and someone "not
involved with the development of the product," Defendants purposefully misled consumers
who saw the interview/press release by presenting Mowrey as a "Doctor."
83. In fact, Defendant Mowrey is not a medical doctor. Nor is he even remotely
"independent." As previously alleged, Mowrey is a principal shareholder of Defendant Basic
Research, he is a paid "consultant" to Defendant Dynakor, and is a key figure in Defendants'
illegal enterprise.
84. The above-referenced interview/press release quoted Mowrey, who was speaking
on behalf of all Defendants, as saying:
Frankly I don't like the way the ad looks, either, and I certainly
wouldn't be as flamboyant with the headlines. . . . But forget about the way
the ad looks. The real question is whether or not a diet pill can really let you
eat all you want and still lose weight? In regards to Akavar-20/50, the facts are
the facts and scientific documentation has confirmed that virtually everyone in
the study who used Akavar's active compound — 23 out of 24 participants, to
be exact — lost weight. That's the bottom line."
85. The February 7, 2007 press release goes on to quote "Dr. Mowrey" as saying that
after the supposed first "study" of Akavar: "I suggested a second clinical trial, which has yet
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records maintained by, and in the possession and control of, Defendants, they have
acknowledged that as of January 25, 20008: (a) sales of Akavar in the State of California
exceeded $2 million; (b) more than $10 million of product inventory was located on retail
store shelves throughout the country; (c) Defendants had spent over $5 million on Akavar
print advertising; and (d) in California alone, Defendants had spent over $450,000 on
television advertising. Accordingly, the Class consists of many thousands of Class members.
90. The claims of the representative Plaintiffs are typical of the claims of the Class
because the representative Plaintiffs, like all Class members, purchased Akavar and have
suffered injury as a result.
91. Moreover, the factual bases of Defendants' misconduct are common to all Class
members, and Defendants' misrepresentations, omissions and acts of concealment resulted
in injury to all members of the Class.
92. There are numerous questions of law and fact common to all Class members and
those questions predominate over any questions that may affect only individual Class
members, including, but not limited to the following:
a. Whether Defendants engaged in a pattern of fraudulent, deceptive and
misleading conduct targeting the public through their marketing, advertising, promotion and
sale of Akavar;
b. Whether Defendants misrepresented the efficacy of Akavar;
c. Whether the acts and omissions of Defendants violated RICO;
d. Whether the acts and omissions of Defendants violated Section 76-10-1603(3)
and (4) of UPUAA,Utah Code Ann. § 76-10(3) and, (4);
e. Whether Defendants should be enjoined from the continued unlawful
marketing, advertising, promotion, distribution and sale of Akavar;
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were in a superior position than Plaintiffs and the members of the Class to know the material
facts.
177. In their marketing, advertising and promoting of Akavar and in making the
careless, unreasonable and negligent misrepresentations and omissions alleged herein,
including the representations made to Plaintiffs and the members of the Class, Defendants
should have reasonably foreseen that Plaintiffs and members of the Class were likely to rely
upon the misrepresentations.
178. Defendants' careless, unreasonable and negligent misrepresentations and
omissions, as set forth in this FAC, are material in that they relate to matters to which
reasonable persons, including Plaintiffs and the members of the Class, would attach
importance in their purchasing decisions or conduct regarding the purchase of Akavar.
179. Under the circumstances, Defendants had a duty to disclose material, truthful
information that they omitted in their careless, unreasonable and negligent
misrepresentations and omissions, as set forth in this FAC.
180. As alleged in this FAC, Plaintiffs and the members of the Class uniformly relied
on Defendants' careless, unreasonable and negligent misrepresentations and omissions, and
under the circumstances described above such reliance was reasonable and justifiable.
181. As a result of Defendants' careless, unreasonable and negligent statements and
omissions as described herein, Plaintiffs and the members of the Class have been injured and
have suffered loss of money and property, and they are entitled to recover damages from
Defendants.
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PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
pray for judgment against Defendants as follows:
A.

An order certifying a Class pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure, certifying Plaintiffs as the representatives of the Class, and designating their
counsel as counsel for the Class;
B.

On the First Cause of Action, against Defendants joindy and severally

in an amount equal to treble the amount of damages suffered by Plaintiffs and members of
the Class as proven at trial plus interest and attorneys' fees and expenses;
C.

On the Second Cause of Action, against Defendants joindy and

severally in an amount equal to treble the amount of damages suffered by Plaintiffs and
members of the Class as proven at trial plus interest and attorneys' fees and expenses;
D.

On the Third Cause of Action, against Defendants joindy and severally

in an amount equal to two times the amount of damages suffered by Plaintiffs and members
of the Class as proven at trial plus interest and attorneys' fees and expenses;
E.

On the Fourth Cause of Action, against Defendants joindy and

severally in an amount equal to two times the amount of damages suffered by Plaintiffs and
members of the Class as proven at trial plus interest and attorneys' fees and expenses;
F.

On the Fifth Cause of Action, against Defendants joindy and severally,

in an amount equal to the actual damages suffered by Plaintiffs and members of the Class as
proven at trial plus interest, as well as punitive damages in an amount sufficient to punish
Defendants and deter similar future conduct;
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On the Sixth Cause of Action, against Defendants jointly and severally,

in an amount equal to the actual damages suffered by Plaintiffs and members of the Class as
proven at trial plus interest, together with all allowable penalties and damage multipliers
available under the UCSPA and other state consumer protection laws, and attorneys' fees
and expenses;
H.

On the Seventh Cause of Action, against Defendants jointly and

severally, for disgorgement of Defendants' unjust enrichment and/or imposition of a
constructive trust upon Defendants' ill-gotten monies, freezing Defendants' assets, and
requiring Defendants to pay restitution to Plaintiffs and the Class and to restore all funds
acquired by means of any act or practice declared by this Court to be unlawful, deceptive,
fraudulent or unfair, and/or a violation of laws, statutes or regulations;
I.

On all Causes of Action, such other civil penalties and punitive

damages to the fullest extent permitted by applicable law;
J.

An order requiring Defendants to immediately cease their wrongful

conduct as set forth above, as well as enjoining Defendants from continuing to falsely market
and advertise, conceal material information and conduct business via the unlawful and unfair
business acts and practices complained of herein; an order requiring Defendants to engage in
a corrective notice campaign; and an order requiring Defendants to refund to Plaintiffs and
all members of the Class the funds paid to Defendants for their fraudulent, defective
product;
K.

For the reasonable attorneys' fees and the costs of prosecuting this

action;
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Defendants Basic Research, L.L.C. ("Basic Research"), Dynakor Pharmacal, L.L.C. ("Dynakor").
I Western Holdings, L.L.C. ("Western Holdings"), Dennis Gay ("Gay"), Daniel B. Mowrey

3 | | ("Mowrey") d/b/a American Phytotherapy Research Laboratory, and Mitchell K. Friedlander
411 ("Friedlander'*) (collectively, the "Defendants).

5
6

NATURE OF THE CLASS ACTION
1.

Defendants manufactured, advertised, marketed and sold the dietary supplement

7

Akavar 20150 ("Ak2varM) that is the subject of this action. During the Class Period, Defendants have

8

knowingly engaged in a deliberate campaign of widespread fraud and deception intended to dupe

9

unsuspecting consumers, including Plaintiff and the members of the Class, into purchasing millions

10 [J of dollars worth of Akavar, purportedly designed to cause weight loss and improve bodily
11

appearance, which is manufactured, marketed, advertisedand sold by Defendants. Plaintiff, on behalf!

12

of herself and the members of the Class (as defined in Paragraph 43 of this Complaint), assert claims

13

against Defendants for violations of California's Unfair Competition Act (Bus. & Prof. Code §

14

17200) ("UCL"); False Advertising Act (Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500) ("FAL"), and Consumer Legal

15

Remedies Act (Civil Code § 1780) ("CRLA").

16

2.

With regard to Akavar and numerous other alleged dietary supplements, Defendants

17

have perpetrated their schemes to defraud through a web of interrelated, closely-held limited liability

18

companies that oversee the "research," publication, manufacturing, marketing, sales and distribution!

19

of AkSvar. During the Class Period, Defendants have operated a common business enterprise while]

20

engaging in the deceptive acts and practices alleged in this Complaint and are, therefore, jointly and

21

severally liable for such acts and practices.

22

3.

Defendants have used television, the internet and national publications to advertise

23

AkSvar as a product that offers a "foolproof alternative to weight loss with "guaranteed success" and

24

"WITHOUT GRUELING DIET AND EXERCISE REGIMENS!" These advertisements also falsely

25
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I

state that'' Studies have proved a virtual 100% success rate among the participants,' * and that by using

2

the product the consumer will see excess fat "PULLED FROM BULGING PARTS OF YOUR
BODY. " Defendants also falsely allege that the results are "scientific fact, documented by published

4

medical findings" and that "a team of doctors working in a recognized medical university discovered]

5 the potent caloric-restricting qualities" of Akavar. However, in truth, Akavar is not a foolproof]

•I alternative to weight loss with guaranteed success, and the product has not been subjected to clinical
7

trials.

a
9

JURISDICTION AND VENUE
4.

This Complaint is filed, and these proceeding instituted, pursuant to California

10

Business and Professions Code §§ 17203 and 17204 and California Civil Code § 1780. Plaintiff]

1)

seeks to recover, inter alia, restitution of lost monies suffered by Plaintiff and members of the Class

12 due to Defendants' violations of UCL, the FAL, and the CLRA. Plaintiff also seeks injunctive relief.
13 The Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to Code of Civil Proc. § 410.10.
14|

5.

The Court may apply California law to all class members who are California residents.

15 Further, Defendants' false advertising and deceptive marketing partially occurred in California and
16
17

was directed toward California residents.
6.

Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 393, 395(a), and

18 395.5 and Civil Code § 1780(c), because (a) injuries to property described herein occurred in this
19 county; (b) acts and transactions described herein occurred within this county; and (c) Defendants did
20
21

business in this county by marketing, advertising and selling Akavar in this country.
7.

No portion of this Complaint is brought pursuant to federal law. Plaintiff states and]

22

intends to state causes of action solely under state law and expressly denies any attempt to state a

23

cause of action under federal law or a cause of action in excess of $74,999 for the Plaintiff and each]

24

individual Class member. The individual claims of Plaintiff and Class members are worth less thanl

25
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1

$75,000 and cannot possible exceed this amount given the cost of refunding individual purchases of

2

AkSvar; the proportionally limited amount of punitive damages allowable under controlling authority,

3

and the relatively modest individual value of other compensatory damages incurred and recoverable

4

by Plaintiff and each Class member.

5
6

PARTIES
8.

Plaintiff, Mary Tompkins, is a citizen of Sacramento, California.

Based on

7

Defendants' advertising, Ms. Tompkins purchased a supply of Akivar through a California retailer.

8

After approximately 2 weeks of taking Akavar as directed on the package labeling, Ms. Tompkins

9

had not lost any weight. She ceased taking the product.

10
1

Document 43-4

9.

'Defendant Basic Research is a limited liability company established under the laws of

1

the State of Utah with its principal place of business located at 5742 West Harold Gatty Drive, Salt

12

Lake City, Utah 84116. Basic Research is one of the largest nutraceutical companies in the United

13

States with annual sales revenues in excess of $50 million.

14

manufacturers scores of cosmetics, nutritional supplements and dietary supplements that are marketed!

15

under the names of nearly a dozen companies. Defendant Basic Research is the subject of a

16

permanent injunction by the United States Federal Trade Commission for the marketing and sale on

17

products promising weight loss without diet or exercise.

18

10.

Basic Research develops and

Defendant Dynakor is a limited liability company established under the laws of the]

19

State of Tfch with its principal place of business located at 5742 West Harold Gatty Drive, Salt Laka

20

City, Utah 84116. Dynakor, an affiliate of Defendant Basic Research, markets and sells certain th^

21

products developed by Defendant Basic Research, including Akavar.

22

j i,

Defendant Western Holdings is a limited liability company established under the lawi

23

of the State of Utah with its principal place of business located at 1821 Logan Avenue, Cheyenne

24

Wyoming 82001.

Western Holdings, an affiliate of Defendant Basic Research, licenses itfe
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Defendant Friedlander, the self-proclaimed marketing guru of Basic Research, is a

2

citizen and resident of the State of Utah with a place of business located at 5742 West Harold Gatty

3

Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah 84116. Defendant Friedlander is a marketing consultant to, among

4

others, Defendants Gay, Basic Research and Dynakor. Defendant Friedlander develops and endorses

5

products marketed by Defendants Basic Research and Dynakor. Although not an employee of either

6

Basic Research or Dynakor, Defendant Friedlander maintains his offices at Defendant Basic

7

Research. Defendant Friedlander is the subject of a permanent injunction by the United States

8

Federal Trade Commission for the marketing and sale of products promising weight loss without diet

9

or exercise.

10

15.

Akavar is advertised, marketed and sold in California. Each Defendant, through its

11 associations with the manufacture, marketing and sale of Akavar, is qualified to do and is doing
12

business in California.

13
14

STATEMENT OF FACTS
16.

Fraudulent weight loss products are an enormous problem in the United States. In an

15 October 2007 Federal Trade Commission study, "Consumer Fraud in the United States. The Second
16 FTC Survey," the FTC notes that an estimated 2.1%of all consumers nationwide — representing a
17 total of 4.8 million U.S. adults

purchased and used fraudulent weight-loss products during the

18 year prior to the survey. The Study found that "[M]ore consumers were victims of fraudulent weight
19 loss products man of any of the other specific frauds covered in the survey." The report describes the!
20 prototype fraudulent weight-loss claim as involving products that were promoted "as making it easy
21 to lose weight or allowing one to lose weight without diet or exercise."
22

17.

Basic Research was created to capitalize on the fraudulent weight loss product

23 epidemic. It is one of the largest nutraceutical companies in the U.S., with over $50 million in annual
24
25

sales revenues. Basic Research puts out scores of products, which are marketed under the names of
-6CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
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1 nearly a dozen companies a practice that Defendant Gay has stated is intended to confuse competitors
2

and "protect our brands in the Wild West atmosphere that exists today in the supplement industry."

3

18.

Defendant Dynakor was created by Defendants with the intent to mislead consumers

4

into believing there was a real, independent "lab" behind AkSvar 20/50. This fiction was openly

5

acknowledged in internal meetings by Basic Research and its management, including Gay, Mowrey,

6

and Friedlander.

7
8

19.

The web of interlocking entities created to "confuse competitors" is, not

coincidentally, equally confusing to consumers.

9

DEFENDANTS* FALSE AND MISLEADING ADVERTISING

10

20.

On December 12, 2006, the United States Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO")

21

listed an application for the trademark "Akavar 20/50" to Defendant Dynakor Pharmacal IP Holdings.

12

Subsequently, on May 3, 2007, the USPTO listed a trademark application for Akavar to Defendant

13

Dynakor. Starting on or about this date, Defendants began marketing Akavar throughout the United

14

States.

15

21.

In advertising, Defendants claim that AJc&var is the "European weight-loss

16 breakthrough." In fact, Akavar was not available in Europe prior to its U.S. introduction and was|
17 created by Defendants in Utah, at their headquarters,
18

22.

Defendants' marketing blitz, engineered by Friedlander, was designed to saturate thej!

19

television, internet, and print media with Defendants' claims - including "infomercials," created b ) |

20

Friedlander, used to promote Akavar to the public.

21

23.

The core of Defendants' fraudulent representations regarding Akavar is summarized iij

22

Defendants' slogan: "Eat all you want and still lose weight." The phrase "Eat all you want and stil

23

lose weight" is a registered trademark of Defendant Western Holdings.

24
25

-7
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In support of their claims that Akavar allows you to "Eat all you want and still lose*

weight," Defendants' advertising asserts a number of facts, including the following:

31

6II
7

AkSvar-20/50 literally causes excessfat to be pulledfrom bulging ports of your
body!

As AkSvar-20/50 restricts caloric intake to below your daily caloric requirement, you
literally pull excess fatfromall over your body, including your waist, hips, thighs and
buttocks, . . leaving your body thinner, trimmer and sexier than you ever thought
possible. Akavar-20/50 helps draw out bulging pockets dfat and prevents the
further conversion and storage d excessfat all over your body This remarkably
effective formula works so fast and is so easy to use that before you have time to be
discouraged you will have lost pounds and inches of ugly, hard-to-get-at, figuredestroying fat. (emphasis added).

8
Akavar-20/SO will produce an extraordinary, unparalleled loss of body weight!
Akavar-20/50 is the perfect weight-loss compound for tough weight-loss problems.
This zmixzmgformulation is the result of years 6 intensive research and scientific
evaluation. Not one, but a team d doctors working in a recognized medical

a
I

°

university discovered the potent caloric-restricting qualities of the Akavar-20/50

111

formulation, and the research team at Dynakor Pharraacal is proud to have played a
major role in bringing this new generation of fast-acting caloric restrictors to the
general public. . . at an affordable price, (emphasis added)

12
j3
14

15
16
J 7 J|
1

' I

18
j

Tests prove virtually 100% success.
That's right. While no diet pill can possibly work for everybody (that's why there's a
money-back guarantee), scientific documentation has confirmed that virtually
everyone in the study who used AkSvar-20/50's active compound (23 out of 24
participants, to be exact) lost weight. The research results are staggering. In a
controlled, randomized clinical trial (the only type of proof accepted by both
scientific and medical communities), doctors tested a group of overweight patients.
And among those who took the active, patented Akavar-20/50 compound, 23 out of 24
people lost a substantial amount of weight. But there's more! Not one of the subjects
who continued taking the active Ak^var-20/50 weight-loss compound for a period of
one full year experienced rebound weight gain. Not one! In other words, Aktivar20/50 caused easy, automatic weight loss without calorie counting and without diet
rebound (emphasis added).
An entirely new generation of "diet pills"

19

An entirely new generation d powerful, foolproof, bio-active weight-loss compounds
that automatically reduce caloric intake. . . eliminating traditional dieting, calorie

20 ]

counting, strenuous exercise, fad diets, supermarket• 'miracle" pills, Japanese wonder
diets, rubber suits, belts, creams or anything else you have ever tried before, (emphasis
added).

2j
^
I I

23
24 I
25

The only thing you haveto do is remember to takeyour easy-to-swaffowAkovar20/50 tablets each and every day That's it!

Akavar-20/50 is the only weight-loss compoundthat works automatically. There is
absolutely no need to count calories, no need to consciously lower your caloric intake,
no need for expensive, pre-measured meals. . . and no need to give up your favorite
8
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foods! Why? Because Akavar-20/50 reduces caloric intake. . .automatically,
(emphasis added).

2
3
4
5

II

6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

25.

Consumers can purchase Akavar directly from Defendants through Defendants'

websites: www.dynakorpharmacal.com and www.AKAVAR2050.com, or by calling 1-800-2358715.
26.

Through their websites and toll-free number, Defendants sell a "full 60-capsule|

supply" of Akavar for $39.99. Alternatively, consumers can purchase two bottles for $79.98 and
receive a third bottle free. Akavar is also available in stores and on-line through third-party|
distributors such as General Nutrition Center (GNC), Rite-Aide, Walgreens and WalMart.
27.

As part of their advertising campaign for Akavar, Defendants use the phrases' 'and wel

couldn't say it in print" and "and we couldn't say it in print if it wasn't true", both registered^
strademark phrases of Defendant Western Holdings.
28.

In fact, Defendants' advertising claims are false, misleading, deceptive and inaccurate

Contrary to Defendants' advertising claims, Akavar's formulation is not the result of years of
intensive research. Nor is Akavar a new generation of powerful, foolproof, bio-active weight-toss
compound.
29.

Although tbe ingredients of Akavar are npt listed in the advertising, and are not

available on the website, the product packaging claims that Akavar-20/50 is "A Proprietary Blend
Containing:"

19

D
D
D
0
0
D
0
D
0
0
D

20
21
22
23
24
251
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•

Yerba Mate (Leaf) SE
Trimethylxanthine(U-e. Caffeine)
Guarana (Seed) SE
Damiana (Leaf, Seed) SE
Green Tea (Leaf) SE
Ginger (Root)
Kola Nut SE
Schinsandra (Fruit)
Scutellaria (Root) SE
Tibetan Ginseng (Root) SE
Cocoa Nut SE
1

9-
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Whether the defendants should be declared financially responsible for

21

notifying all Class members of the true nature of Akavar and for the cpsts and

31

expenses of a recall or buy-back.

41

n.

5I

Whether plaintiff and Class members are entitled to compensatory damages,
and the amount of such damages; and

611

o.

Whether defendants should be ordered to disgorge, for the benefit of the Class

71

and the general public, all or part of their ill-gotten profits received firm the

81

sale of Akavar, and whether defendants should be ordered to make full

911

restitution to plaintiffs and Class members.

101|

47.

Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class

11II members. Plaintiff has retained California counsel who have substantial experience in prosecuting
12II consumer class actions under the laws of this state. Plaintiff and her counsel are committed to
131| ^vigorously prosecuting this action on behalf of the Class in this Court, and they have the financial
14II resources to do so. Neither plaintiffs nor her counsel have any interests adverse to those of the Class,
15

48.

Plaintiff and the members of the Class suffered, and will continue to suffer, harm as a|

16II result of Defendants' unlawfid and wrongful conduct. A class action brought by California plaintiff:
17II under California law in a California state court is superior to other available methods for the fair am
18] efficient adjudication of the controversy. Absent a class action, most members of the Class likelj
191| would find the cost of litigating their damages claims to be prohibitive, and will have no effectiv<
201| remedy at law. Because of the relatively small size of individual Class member's claims, few Class
21J members likely could afford to seek legal redress on ah individual basis for defendants' misconduct.
22

Absent a class action, Class members will continue to incur damages and be at risk of irreparable

231| harm and defendants' misconduct will proceed without remedy. Class action treatment of common
24
25
-14CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
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1II questions of law or fact is also superior to multiple individual actions or piecemeal litigation because
2 | | it conserves the resources of the litigants, and promotes consistency and efficiency of adjudication.
3|U

49.

Plaintiff and Class members have all suffered, and will continue to suffer, barm and

4

damages as a result of defendants' unlawful and wrongful conduct, and have been and are at risk ofj

5

irreparable harm. Additionally, the prosecution of separate actions by individual Class members!

6

against defendants would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to

7

individual members of the Class that would establish incompatible standards for defendants and

8

would create a risk of adjudications with respect to individual Class members that would, as a

9

practical matter, be dispositive of the interests of other Class members or substantially impair or

10
11

impede their ability lo protect their interests, thereby making class certification appropriate.
50.

Defendants have acted and failed to act on grounds generally applicable to plaintiffs

12

and Class members, thereby making appropriatefinalinjunctive, declaratory, or other equitable relief |

13

as to the Class as a whole.

14

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

15

Violations of the Unfair Competition Law, the Deceptive, False and
Misleading Advertising Statutes

16
17

51.

The preceding paragraphs of this Complaint are realleged and incorporated by

18

reference. This cause of action, which alleges violations of the UCL, FAL, and the CLRA, is asserted

19

against all of the defendants.

20
21

52.

Under Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17204 and 17535, and Civ. Code § 1780, plaintiffs have

standing to assert these claims on behalf of themselves, the members of the Class, and the genera*!

22
23
24
25

i
53.

In violation of the UCL, the FAL, and the CLRA, defendants committed and/or aided »

and abetted unlawful, unfair and deceptive business acts and practices, thereby obtaining unlawful
15
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profits and injuring plaintiffs, Class members and the general public, through the dissemination of

21 advertising other representations that consumption of Akavar according to its directions would cause
3

weight loss without diet and exercise.

41

54.

As a direct and proximate result of defendants' unlawful, unfair and deceptive business

5

acts or practices, pursuant to the UCL, the FAL, and the CLRA plaintiffs, Class members and the

6

general public are entided to (a) injunctive relief in the form of recall or buy-back of the Akavar; (b)

7

restitution of defendants' unjust enrichment and/or disgorgement of defendants' improperly gained

8 profits; (c) recovery of compensatory damages; and (d) recovery of punitive or exemplary damages as
9
16

provided by statute. Pursuant to Civ. Code § 1780 and Code Civ. Proc. § 1021.5, plaintiffs are also
entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees and the costs of bringing this action.

II

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

12

(Violation of Consumer Legal Remedies Act, Civil Code §§ 1750, eL seq.)

13
14

55.

Plaintiff incorporates each and every preceding paragraph stated above, inclusive, as

though the same were fully set forth hereafter.

15

56.

Defendants are "persons" as defined by Cal. Civil Code section 1761(c).

16

57.

Plaintiff and Class members are "consumers" as that terms is defined under the CLRA.

17

58.

Through their own actions, and those of their employees, agents and servants]

18

Defendants engaged in unlawful conduct in violation of the CLRA by engaging, inter alia, in the!

1<? following conduct, while actively concealing and failing to disclose the material information in itq
20 possession regarding the quality and characteristics of Akavar:
21

i.

representing that Akavar caused weight loss without diet and exercise,

22

ii.

representing that AkSvar caused weight loss while consumers could "eat all you want"

23

iii.

representing that AkSvar had been scientifically tested and proven to cause weight losl

24

in controlled, clinical trials,

25
-16CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
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representing that Defendants' could not make its representations concerning AkSvai

21| '"unless their were true" and that Akavar is a "European weight loss breakthrough."
31 plaintiff requests that this Court enter such orders and judgments as may be necessary to restore to
4 1 any person in interest any money and profits which may have been acquired by defendants by means
5II of aforementioned wrongful business practices and acts and to prevent future wrongdoing by
6
71|

^injunction, as provided by Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17203 and 17535 and Civ. Code § 1780.
59.

Plaintiffand the Class seek restitution in the full amount of the AkSvar purchased and/or

81| disgorgement of Defendants' profits reasonably attributable to its unjust enrichment as a result of the
9II imisconduct alleged herein, and any other relief which the court deems proper.
10

60.

Plaintiff and the Class further intend to seek compensatory damages and, in light of]

11 Defendants' willful and conscious disregard for therightsand safety of the Plaintiff, the Class and the
12 public, and Defendants' intentional and fraudulent concealment of material facts, Plaintiff and the
13 members of the Class also intend to seek an award of punitive damages. Pursuant to Civil Code
14 § 1782(a), Plaintiff sewed Defendants with notice of its alleged violations of the CLRA by certified mail
15 return receipt requested. Defendants have failed to provide appropriate relief for its violation of the
16 CLRA. Plaintiff seeks monetary (both compensatory and punitive) damages under the CLRA.
17

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs and the Class pray for relief as set forth below, including reasonable

18 attorneys'fees and costs of suit.
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

-17^
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1 company n entity of unknown origin;
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

JOSEPH BODE, an individual; SHEILA
ERICKSON, an individual; WALGREEN
COMPANY dba WALGREENS, an Illinois
corporation; GENERAL NUTRITION
CORPORATION, dba GNC, a
Pennsylvania corporation;
DRUGSTORE.COM, a Washington
corporation; WESTERN HOLDINGS,
LLC, a limited liability company of
unknown origin; DENNIS GAY, an
individual; DANIEL B. MOWREY dba
AMERICAN PHYTOTHERAPY
RESEARCH LABORATORY;
MITCHELL K. FRJJEDLANDER, an
individual; and DOE DEFENDANTS 1J0, Inclusive,

11

Defendants.

12
13
14
15

L

INTRODUCTION

16

Defendants are defrauding hundreds of thousands of unwary consumers by

17

selling a diet pill ("Akavar") with a simple (and absolutely false) tagline: "Eat all you

18

want and still lose weight We couldn't say it in print if it wasn't true." Defendants

19

also claim that, by using Akavar, consumers will experience "clinically proven weight

20

loss of up to 1603%" without changing eating or exercise habits."

21
22

These claims are absolutely false. Plaintiffs bring this lawsuit to enjoin these lies

23

and to recover the many millions of dollars generated by Defendants via the false and

24

misleading claims.

25
26
27
28
CALL, A N S I * *
FKVUKLL
A PROFESSIONAL
COKTOHATION

H.
1.

THE PARTIES

Plaintiffs Nicole Forlenza and Shaiden Monroe are residents of California

and have purchased Akavar from Walgreen's or GNC.
AKA01-M:S03448_I.DOC:5-26-<)9
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of the DOE Defendants is in some manner legally responsible for the damages suffered
by Plaintiffs and the members of the class as alleged herein. Plaintiffs will amend this
complaint to set forth the true names and capacities of these Defendants when they have
been ascertained, along with appropriate charging allegations, as may be necessary.
HI.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

16.

This Court has jurisdiction over all causes of action asserted herein.

17.

Venue is proper in this Court because Plaintiffs purchased Akavar in this

Judicial District and because Defendants received substantial compensation from sales
in this Judicial District.
18-

Defendants and other out-of-state participants can be brought before this

Court pursuant to state and federal law.
IV.
19.

FACTS

The weight-loss industry is a multi-billion-dollar industry in the United

States. Hundreds of new products appear on the market every year, many of them
claiming to be a quick and easy solution to the weight loss problem. In an effort to
promote real weight loss and to prevent Americans from being defrauded by "miracle
pills." The U.S. Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") instructs that "[a]ny claims
that you can lose weight effortlessly are false. The only proven way to lose weight is
either to reduce the number of calories you eat or to increase the number of calories you
bum off through exercise. Most experts recommend combination of both,"1

1

U.S. Food and Drug Administration, The Facts About Weight Loss Products and Programs, FDA/FTC/NAAG
Brochure*: 1992. Available at: htqF>://www.cf3an.fda^ov/--dms/wgtloss.htniI: See also Linda Bren, Losing Weight: Start By
Counting Calories^ FDA CONSUMER JanTFeb. 2002. Available at* http://www.fda.gDV/fdac/^
AKA01-01:503448 l.DOC:5-26-09
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Akavar is a dietary supplement marketed by Defendant as a weight loss

2

product Its key ingredients are yerba mat£, caffeine, and green tea.

3

Exhibit A hereto are true and correct copies of the false claims.

Attached as

4

21.

5

Akavar claims to be the "fastest, easiest weight loss ever." It purports to

6

allow consumers to "eat all you want and still lose weight." Defendants claim that

7

Akavar makes weight loss "effortless" by "automatically reduc[ing] caloric intake . , .

8

[and] eliminating traditional dieting, calorie counting, strenuous exercise, fad diets,

9

supermarket 'miracle' pills, Japanese wonder diets, rubber suits, belts, creams or

10

anything else you have ever tried before." However, Akavar is just one of those

11

"miracle pills" it derides. Defendants attempt to sell AkMvar by convincing consumers

12

that they can avoid the only proven and safe weight-loss method recognized by the

13

FDA.

14
15

22.

Defendants claim that Akavar "cause[s] easy, automatic, permanent weight

16

loss" all "within a few short weeks," To prove this assertion Defendants claim that a

17

group that used Akavar experienced 1603% more weight loss over a six-week period

18

than those who did not use their product—and that group never had to exercise or diet.

19

Defendants further claim ''thousands of men and women . . . [have] experienced a

20

fantastic and incredible loss of weight without ever dieting" by using Akavar, These

21

false claims mislead consumers to believe that they can achieve the same results.

22
23

23.

Defendants assert that Akavar "reduces caloric intake automatically" so

24

that you will never have to "consciously change your diet or exercise habits!"

25

Defendants promise that those who take AkSvar can eat what they want because it alters

26

your desire to overeat. Defendants' description of how this results in weight loss is false

27

and misleading to consumers. First, Akavar cannot automatically reduce caloric intake;

28

individuals may reduce the number of calories ingested by choosing to eat less or to eat

CALL, JKMEN A
nuutELL
A PftOmSIONAI.
ctmrOBAiiON
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Even if the stimulants in Zantrex-3 increased energy levels (and

2

presumably physical activity), such an increase would be vastly

3

insufficient to produce 546% more weight loss than the leading

4

ephedrine-based diet pill.

5

(d)

Any permanent weight loss program includes a long-term change in

6

eating and exercise habits, the very practices Zantrex-3 suggests can

7

be avoided

8
9

(e)
28.

Zantrex-3 Insta-Shot has no effect on male potency.

Plaintiffs Batiz and Winzen thus are informed and believe, in summary,

10 that Defendants' claims regarding Zantrex-3 are false because (A) permanent weight
11 loss cannot occur automatically without a change in caloric intake or increased physical
12 activity; (B) a short term decrease in appetite and increase in energy from ingesting
13 stimulants contained in Zantrex-3 does not correspond with the permanent weight loss
14 Defendants promise; and (C) the testing results advertised by Defendants are spurious
15 and of no practical significance.
16

29.

On information and belief, Defendants knew that Zantrex-3 did not have

17 the properties Defendants claimed, and that it was defective as set forth above, but
18 nevertheless manufactured and marketed the product as set forth above.
19

30.

Defendants sell Zantrex-3 at prices often exceeding $40.00 per package

20 based on the preceding false claims. As a result, Defendants have wrongfully made tens
21 of millions of dollars in profitsfromCalifornia consumers.
22
23

2.
31.

Akgvar 20/50 and Akavar Slimming Gel

Akavar 20/50, and AkSvar Slimming Gel are dietary supplements and

24 topical creams marketed by Defendants as weight loss products. Their key ingredients
25 are yerba mate, caffeine, and green tea7 Defendants make the following claims for the
26 Akavar products:
27

(a)

28
CALL, J E N S E N *
FEKRELL
A PROFESSIONAL
CORrORATION

"'Eat What You Want And Still Lose Weight'.... They're the eight
most provocative words in the English language (at least for those of
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1

us who've tried diet after diet and failed)." Effectively, Defendants

2

claim that no change in diet or behavior is required to lose weight

3

while taking Akavar 20/50. A true and correct copy of Defendants'

4

online claim on this point is attached hereto as Exhibit 6.

5

(b)

"Akavar 20/50 literally causes excess fet to be pulled from bulging

6

parts of your body! As AkSvar 20/50 restricts caloric intake to

7

below your daily caloric requirement, you literally pull excess fat

8

from all over your body, including your waist, hips, thighs and

9

buttocks (the body's natural fat storage sites) ... leaving your body

10

thinner, trimmer and sexier than you ever thought possible." A true

11

and correct copy of Defendants' online claim on this point is

12

attached hereto as Exhibit 7.

13

(c)

"Clinical trial shows success. That's right While no diet pill can

14

possibly work for everyone (that's why there's a money-back

15

guarantee), the peer-reviewed clinical trial revealed that virtually

16

everyone in the study who used AkSvar 20/50' s active compound

17

(23 out of 24 participants, to be exact) lost a significant amount of

18

weight." A true and correct copy of Defendants' online claim on

19

this point is included in Exhibit 7.

20

(d)

"It might sound too good to be true, but no less than the famed

21

Washington Post dubbed Akavar Slimming Gel's functional

22

compound "The Dream Cream.' Akavar Slimming Gel's remarkable

23

topical formula permits you to reduce the appearance of bulging

24

pockets of unsightly fat wherever they appear... including around

25

your behind. Got'saddlebags'? Wobbly thighs? Use Slimming Gel

26

to slim down the appearance of bulges where you don't want them

27

and accentuate the sexy curves where you do want them. Wherever

28

you've got those unsightly lumps and bumps, there's nothing better
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1

for bulges than topically applied Akavar Slimming Gel... *The

2

Dream Cream.'" A true and correct copy of Defendants' online

3

claim on this point is attached hereto as Exhibit 8.

4

32.

Plaintiffs Forlenza, Monroe and I. Bodor are informed and believe that

5 Defendants5 claims for Akavar 20/50 and AkSvar Slimming Gel are false and
6 misleading for the following reasons:
7

(a)

AkSvar 20/50 cannot automatically reduce caloric intake; individuals

8

may reduce the number of calories ingested by choosing to eat less

9

or to eat healthier foods. No supplement can ever control caloric

10

intake "automatically."

11

(b)

Even if AkSvar 20/50 could suppress appetite and reduce the number

12

of calories consumed, that decrease would have to be coupled with

13

an increase in physical activity in order to lose weight.

14

(c)

Even if the stimulants in Akavar 20/50 increased energy levels (and

15

presumably physical activity), such an increase would be vastly

16

insufficient to produce the drop in weight Defendants claim.

17

(d)

The Washington Post has not dubbed AkSvar Slimming Gel's

18

functional compound "The Dream Cream."

19

Slimming Gel does not permit a user to "reduce the appearance of

20

bulging pockets of unsightly fat wherever they appear," nor does it

21

"slim down the appearance of bulges where you don't want them

22

and accentuate the sexy curves where you do want them."

23

33.

Moreover, Akavar

Plaintiffs Forlenza, Monroe and I. Bodor are informed and believe, in

24 summary, that Defendants' claims regarding AkSvar 20/50 and AkSvar Slimming Gel
25 are false because (A) permanent weight loss cannot occur "automatically" without a
26 change in caloric intake or increased physical activity; (B) a short term decrease in
27 appetite and increase in energy from ingesting stimulants contained in Akavar 20/50
28 does not correspond with the permanent weight loss Defendants promise; (C) the testing
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1 results advertised by Defendants are spurious and of no practical significance because
2 the sample population (twenty-four subjects) tested was insufficient to create a basis
3 upon which to reject the null hypothesis; and (D) Akavar Slimming Gel has no
4 pharmaceutical value.

34.

5

On information and belief, Defendants knew that Akavar 20/50 and

6 Akavar Slimming Gel did not have the properties Defendants claimed, and that it, was
7 defective as set forth above, but nevertheless manufactured and marketed the product as
8 set forth above.
9

35.

Defendants sell Akavar 20/50 and AkSvar Slimming Gel at prices up to

10 $40.00 per package based on the preceding false claims. As a result, Defendants have
11 wrongfully made tens of millions of dollars in profitsfromCalifornia consumers.
12

3*

13

36.

Relacore

Defendants Carter-Reed and Basic Research manufacture Relacore under

14 the names "Relacore Extra," "Relacore PM," "Relacore Stress Reducer/Mood
15 Elevator," "Relacore Cortisol Control," and other names.

Defendants make the

16 following claims for Relacore products:
17

(a)

18

Relacore is an agent that targets "belly fat" and controls nervous
binge eating and anxiety.

19

(b)

Relacore "...reduce[s] tummy bulge by controlling the Cortisol

20

increase generated by diet-related stress and anxiety that can lead to

21

stubborn belly fat retention ... not to mention ... that all time diet

22

killer 'Nervous Binge Eating.'"

23

Defendants9 online claims on these points is attached hereto as

24

Exhibits

25

37.

A true and correct copy of

Plaintiff M. Bodor is informed and believes that the claims for Relacore

26 are false and misleading for the following reasons:
27 / / /
28 / / /
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Relacore in fact does not reduce or eliminate "belly fat" or cause the

2

"thinner waist and "flatter tummy" that Defendants contend it

3

produces.

4

(b)

5

Relacore in fact does not reduce nervous anxiety or the "nervous
binge eating" that such anxiety engenders.

6

38.

Plaintiff M Bodor is informed and believes that Defendants make each of

7 these spurious claims to entice Plaintiff M. Bodor and others to purchase Relacore in its
8 various incarnations with the hope that the fat around their waists will be reduced and
9 their diet-related fears and anxieties will be alleviated.
10

39.

On information and belief, Defendants knew that Relacore did not have the

11 properties Defendants claimed, and that it was defective as set forth above, but
12 nevertheless manufactured and marketed the product as set forth above.
13

40.

Defendants sell Relacore at prices up to about $35.00 per package based on

14 the preceding false claims. As a result, Defendants have wrongfully made tens of
15 millions of dollars in profitsfromCalifornia consumers.
16

D.

17

Plaintiffs' Purchase Of Defendants5 Products In Reliance On
Defendants' Claims

18

41.

Prior to the filing of this action, on numerous occasions since 2008, and

19 continuing through June or July of 2009, Plaintiff Forlenza purchased AkSvar 20/50
20 from Walgreens and/or GNC in the Central District of California for her own personal
21 use.

In so doing, Plaintiff Forlenza believed and relied specifically on the

22 representations contained in the marketing materials for the product, which were present
23 at and displayed by the Walgreens and/or GNC where she purchased the product.
24 Those representations explicitly state that a consumer heed not change his or her diet
25 and exercise routine in order to lose weight because the product produces weight loss
26 "automatically." Plaintiff Forlenza has consumed Akfivar 20/50, but the product has not
27 worked as advertised. Specifically, Plaintiff Forlenza has found that she has not lost
28 any weight as a consequence of using the product, and in fact has not lost any weight
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l

without changing diet or exercise. Plaintiff Forlenza has thus suffered injury and

2

damage because she purchased a product based on false advertising and because the

3

product has not woriced as advertised.
42.

4

Prior to the filing of this action, on numerous occasions since 2008, and

5

continuing through June or July of 2009, Plaintiff Monroe purchased Akavar 20/50

6

from Walgreens and/or GNC in the Central District of California for her own personal

7

use.

8

representations contained in the marketing materials for the product, which were present

9

at and displayed by the Walgreens and/or GNC where she purchased the product

10

Those representations explicitly state that a consumer need not change his or her diet

11

and exercise routine in order to lose weight because the product produces weight loss

12

"automatically." Plaintiff Monroe has consumed Akavar 20/50, but the product has not

13

worked as advertised. Specifically, Plaintiff Monroe has found that she has not lost any

14

weight as a consequence of using the product, and in fact has not lost any weight

15

without changing diet or exercise. Plaintiff Monroe has thus suffered injury and

16

damage because she purchased a product based on false advertising and because the

17

product has not worked as advertised.

18

In so doing, Plaintiff Monroe believed and relied specifically on the

43.

Prior to the filing of this action, on numerous occasions since 2008, and

19

continuing through June or July of 2009, Plaintiff Batiz purchased Zantrex-3 and/or

20

Zantrex-3 Insta-Shot from Walgreens, GNC, Wal-Mart, CVS, and/or Target in the

21

Central District of California for her own personal use. In so doing, Plaintiff Batiz

22

believed and relied specifically on the representations contained in the marketing

23

materials for the product, which were present at and displayed by the Walgreens, GNC,

24

Wal-Mart, CVS, and/or Target where she purchased the product Those representations

25

explicitly state that Zantrex-3 will cause 546% more weight loss than the leading

26

ephedrine-based diet pill, that the weight loss will berapiddue to the fast acting product

27

and would also be long lasting, and that the product would cause a very high energy

28

boost Plaintiff Batiz has consumed Zantrex-3, but the product has not woriced as

CALL. JENSEN A
A PROFESSIONAL
CORPORATION

537280 UX)C:S-10-09
-15Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
SECOND
AMENDED
CLASS
ACTION COMPLAINT
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

i #v I rr~

8Wc
Case 2:09-cv-0087TT-CW
Document 43-7
Case 2:09-cv-03730-AG-SS

Document 78

Filed 07/08/W Page 27 of 67
Filed 08/10/2009

Page 26 of 66

1

representations concerning Akavar products and purchased the product based on those

2

representations.

3

72.

Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the

4

Class. Plaintiff has retained counsel with substantial experience in handling complex

5

class action litigation, as detailed above.

6
7

73.

Plaintiff and the members of the Class suffered, and will continue to suffer,

harm as a result of Defendants' unlawful and wrongful conduct A class action is
superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the present

9
10

controversy for the reasons stated above.
74.

Adjudication of individual class members' claims with respect to the

11

Defendants would, as a practical matter, be dispositive of the interests of other members

12

not parties to the adjudication, and could substantially impair or impede the ability of

13

other class members to protect their interests.

14

VL

15

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

16

VIOLATION OF CALIFORNIA CONSUMERS LEGAL REMEDIES ACT

17

(By Plaintiffs Forlenza and Monroe, and On Behalf of the

18

Zantrex-3, Relacore, and Akavar Classes)

19
20
21

75.

CAUSES OF ACTION

Plaintiffs incorporate by this reference the preceding allegations as if fully

set forth herein and, to the extent necessary, plead this cause of action in the alternative.
76.

As alleged hereinabove, Plaintiffs have standing to pursue this claim as

22

Plaintiffs have suffered injury in fact and have lost money or property as a result of

23

Defendants' actions as set forth herein. Specifically:

24

(a)

Prior to the filing of this action, Plaintiffs Forlenza, Monroe and I.

25

Bodor purchased Akavar products for their own personal use. In so

26

doing, Plaintiffs Forlenza, Monroe and I. Bodor believed and relied

27

specifically on the representations contained in the marketing

28

materials for the products, which they had viewed on television, on
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l

the Internet, and in the premises of the Retailer Defendants where

2

they purchased the product, and which explicitly state that a

3

consumer need not change his or her diet and exercise routine in

4

order to lose weight with the product, and that Akavar 20/50

5

automatically reduces caloric intake and causes weight loss

6

accordingly. Plaintiffs Forlenza, Monroe and I. Bodor have used

7

Akavar 20/50 and Akavar Slimming Gel, but the products have not

8

worked as advertised.

9

weight loss without the need for change in diet and exercise routines,

10

Akavar 20/50 did not automatically reduce their caloric intake and

11

cause weight loss, and Akavar Slimming Gel did not make them

12

appear thinner. Plaintiffs Forlenza, Monroe and I. Bodor thus have

13

suffered significant injury and damage because they purchased a

14

product based on false advertising and because the product has not

15

worked as advertised,

16

(b)

Specifically, they have not experienced

Prior to the filing of this action, Plaintiffs Batiz and Winzen

17

purchased Zantrex-3 products for their own personal use. In so

18

doing, Plaintiffs Batiz and Winzen believed and relied specifically

19

on the representations contained in the marketing materials for the

20

products, which they had viewed on television, on the Internet, and

21

in the premises of the Retailer Defendants where they purchased the

22

product, and which explicitly state that Zantrex-3 will cause 546%

23

more weight loss than the leading ephedrine-based diet pill, that the

24

weight loss will be rapid due to the fast acting product and would

25

also be long lasting, and that the product would cause a very high

26

energy boost and increase potency. Plaintiffs Batiz and Winzen

27

have consumed Zantrex-3, but the product has not worked as

28

advertised.
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1 rights of Plaintiffs and the Classes, and did so with fraud, oppression, and malice.
2 Therefore, Plaintiffs and the Classes are also entitled to punitive damages against
3 Defendants in an amount that will be shown by proof at-trial.
4

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

5

VIOLATION OF CALIFORNIA BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONS

6

CODE SECTIONS 17200 ET SEQ.

7

(By Plaintiffs Forleiaza and Monroe, and On Behalf of the

8

Zantrex-3, Relacore, and Akavar Classes)

9

92.

Plaintiffs incorporate by this reference the preceding allegations as if fully

10 set forth herein and, to the extent necessary, plead this cause of action in the alternative.
11

93.

As alleged hereinabove, Plaintiffs have standing to pursue this claim as

12 Plaintiffs have suffered injury in fact and have lost money or property as a result of
13 Defendants' actions as set forth herein. Specifically:
14

(a)

Prior to the filing of this action, Plaintiffs Forlenza, Monroe and I.

15

Bodor purchased Akavar products for their own personal use. In so

16

doing, Plaintiffs Forlenza, Monroe and I. Bodor believed and relied

17

specifically on the representations contained in the marketing

18

materials for the products, which they had viewed on television, on

19

the Internet, and in the premises of the Retailer Defendants where

20

they purchased the product, and which explicitly state that a

21

consumer need not change his or her diet and exercise routine in

22

order to lose weight with the product, and that Ak&var 20/50

23

automatically reduces caloric intake and causes weight loss

24

accordingly.

25

consumed Akavar 20/50, but the product has not worked as

26

advertised.

27

without the need for change in diet and exercise routines, and the

28

Akavar products did not automatically reduce their caloric intake
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and cause weight loss, nor did it create any of the "slimming" results
claimed.

Plaintiffs Forlenza, Monroe and I. Bodor thus have

suffered significant injury and damage because they purchased a
product based on false advertising and because the product has not
worked as advertised,
(b)

Prior to the filing of this action, Plaintiffs Batiz and Winzen
purchased Zantrex-3 products for their own personal use. In so
doing, Plaintiffs Batiz and Winzen believed and relied specifically
on the representations contained in the marketing materials for the
products, which they had viewed on television, on the Internet, and
in the premises of the Retailer Defendants where they purchased the
product, and which explicitly state that Zantrex-3 products will
cause 546% more weight loss than the leading ephedrine-based diet
pill, that the weight loss will be rapid due to the fast acting product
and would also be long lasting, and that the product would cause a
very high energy boost and increase potency. Plaintiffs Batiz and
Winzen have consumed Zantrex-3 products, but they have not
worked as advertised. Specifically, Plaintiffs have not experienced
rapid weight loss, or any weight loss at all as a consequence of
consuming Zantrex-3 products, and have experienced no energy
boost or any of the other results claimed for the product Plaintiffs
Batiz and Winzen thus have suffered significant injury and damage
because they purchased a product based on false advertising and
because the product has not worked as advertised,

(c)

Prior to the filing of this action, Plaintiff M. Bodor purchased
Relacore for her own personal use. In so doing, Plaintiff M. Bodor
believed andreliedspecifically on the representations contained in
the marketing materials for the products, which she had viewed on
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Defendants' wrongful business practices constituted, and constitute, a

2

continuing course of conduct of unfair competition since Defendants are marketing and

3

selling their products in a manner likely to deceive the public.

4

99.

5

and the Classes.

Defendants' wrongful business practices have caused injury to Plaintiffs

6

100. Pursuant to section 17203 of the California Business and Professions Code,

7

Plaintiffs and the Classes seek an order of this court enjoining Defendants from

8

continuing to engage in unlawful, unfair, or deceptive business practices and any other

9

act prohibited by law, including those set forth in the complaint. Plaintiffs and the

10

Classes also seek an order requiring Defendants to make full restitution of all moneys it

11

wrongfully obtainedfromPlaintiffs and the Classes.

12

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION

13

BREACH OF WARRANTY

14

(By Plaintiffs Forlenza and Monroe, and On Behalf of the

15

Zantrex-3, Relacore, and Akavar Classes)

16

101. Plaintiffs incorporate by this reference the preceding allegations as if fully

17

set forth herein and, to the extent necessary, plead this cause of action in the alternative.

18

102. As alleged hereinabove, Plaintiffs have standing to pursue this claim as

19

Plaintiffs have suffered injury in fact and have lost money or property as a result of

20

Defendants' actions as set forth herein. Specifically:

21

(a)

Prior to the filing of this action, Plaintiffs Forlenza, Monroe and I.

'22

Bodor purchased Akavar products for their own personal use. In so

23

doing, Plaintiffs Forlenza, Monroe and I. Bodor believed and relied

24

specifically on the representations contained in the marketing

25

materials for the products, which they had viewed on television, on

26

the Internet, and in the premises of the Retailer Defendants where

27

they purchased the product, and which explicitly state that a

28

consumer need not change his or her diet and exercise routine in
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1

order to lose weight with the product, and that Akavar 20/50

2

automatically reduces caloric intake and causes weight loss

3

accordingly.

4

consumed Akavar 20/50 and applied Akavar Slimming Gel, but the

5

products have not worked as advertised. Specifically, they have not

6

experienced weight loss without the need for change in diet and

7

exercise routines, and Akavar 20/50 did not automatically reduce

8

their caloric intake and cause weight loss.

9

Monroe and I. Bodor thus have suffered significant injury and

10

damage because they purchased a product based on false advertising

11

and because the product has not worked as advertised.

12

(b)

Plaintiffs Forlenza, Monroe and I. Bodor have

Plaintiffs Forlenza,

Prior to the filing of this action, Plaintiffs Batiz and Winzen

13

purchased Zantrex-3 products for their own personal use. In so

14

doing, Plaintiffs Batiz and Winzen believed and relied specifically

15

on the representations contained in the marketing materials for the

16

products, which they had viewed on television, on the Internet, and

17

in the premises of the Retailer Defendants where they purchased the

18

product, and which explicitly state that Zantrex-3 products will

19

cause 546% more weight loss than the leading ephedrine-based diet

20

pill, that the weight loss will be rapid due to the fast acting product

21

and would also be long lasting, and that the product would cause a

22

very high energy boost and increase potency. Plaintiffs Batiz and

23

Winzen have consumed Zantrex-3 products, but the products have

24

not worked as advertised

25

experienced rapid weight loss, or any weight loss at all as a

26

consequence of

27

experienced no energy boost or any of the other results claimed for

28

the product

Specifically, Plaintiffs have not

consuming Zantrex-3 products, and have

Plaintiffs Batiz and Winzen thus have suffered
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Adjudge and decree that Defendants have engaged in the conduct alleged
herein;

2
3

3.

For restitution and disgorgement on certain causes of action;

4

4.

For an injunction ordering Defendants to cease and desistfromengaging in

5

the unfair, unlawful, and/or fraudulent practices alleged in the Second

6

Amended Complaint;

7

5.

8
9

For compensatory and general damages according to proof on certain
causes of action;

6.

10

For both pre and post-judgment interest at the maximum allowable rate on
any amounts awarded;

11

7.

Costs of the proceedings herein;

12

8.

Reasonable attorneys' fees as allowed by statute; and

13

9.

Any and all such other and further relief that this Court may deem just and

14.

proper, including but not limited to punitive damages.

15
16

Dated: August 10,2009

17
18
19

CALL. JENSEN & FERRELL
A Professional Corporation
Scott J, Ferrell
Lisa A. Wegner
Scot D.Wilson
Rog<g

20

Scrft J. Ferrell
21

Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the Classes

22
23
24
25
26
27
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BASIC
RESEARCH'
5742 West Harold Gaily Owe
5AltlaktCily.UT84n6
phone (8011517-7000
fax
(8011517-7001
website wwwBasicResearch.org

January 31, 2008
(VIA FEDERAL EXPRESS AND ELECTRONIC MAIL)
Admiral Insurance Company
1255 Caldwell Road
Cherry Hill, NJ 08034
Attn: Claims Department
E-Mail: admclaifn5@admiranns.com
Re: Tender of Claims - Admiral Insurance Company Policy No. CA00OO1165-O1
Insured: Covarix. LLC D/B/A: Basic Research, LLC; Covarix, LLC and Subsidiaries;
Western Holdings. LLC and Subsidiaries, etc.
To Whom It May Concern:
Covarix, LLC dba Basic Research, LLC ("Basic Research") and Subsidiaries, and Western
Holdings, LLC and Subsidiaries, among others (collectively the "Insureds"), are the named
Insureds under Admiral Insurance Company Police No. CA00001165-01. The Insureds hereby
provide notice, and tender the defense, of the following lawsuits and claims asserted against,
inter olio, Basic Research, LLC, Dynakor Pharmacal, LLC, and Western Holdings, LLC:
1.

2.

Miller v. Basic Research LLC, et a/., United States District Court, District of Utah, Civil
No. 2:07-CV-00872; and
Tompkins v. Basic Research, LLC. et o/., Superior Court of the State of California,
Sacramento
County, Civil No. 34-2007-000882591.

For your reference, copies of the complaints filed in both cases are enclosed herewith,
together with copies of all other papers which have been filed in each case as of the date of this
letter. The Insureds first received a copy of the complaint in the Miller case on about November
10,2007. The Insureds first received a copy of the complaint in the Tompkins case on about
December 10,2007, The named plaintiff in the Tompkins case is Mary Tompkins. The named
plaintiffs in the Miller case are; Pamela Miller, Randy Howard, and Donna Patterson.
Each of these cases purports to be brought as class actions, and purports to assert false
advertising claims relating to the marketing and sales of a product known as Akavar*-20/50
("AkavBr"). In essence, the plaintiffs in both cases assert that the named defendants made false
advertising claims concerning, Inter alia, the efficacy of the Ak3var product. In the Miller case,
the plaintiffs seek class certification for a purported nationwide class of consumers who have,
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WALSH & FURCOLO LLP
SYMPHONY TOWERS
750 B STREET, S U T E 2740

PARTNERS

NEVADA O m c i

iSSSJ^S^

SAN DIEGO, CA 92101-8129

i645\^GECejiE*ciRcie

CHnshMcKwn

TfetEPHONK

Sure 271

FostorFuicofeJr.

(B19) 232-8486

www.wamiiw.com

FACSWHC

{7fC)3a2-7S1B

E-maik j wtdsh@wqfulaw.com

June 6„ 2008
DENIAL OF COVERAGE

VIA CERTIFIED MAIL/
RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED
Ronald F. Price, Esq.
BASIC RESEARCH. LLC
5742 West Harold Gatty Drive
Salt Lake City, UT 84116
Re:

PAMELA MILLER, et aL v. BASIC RESEARCH, LLC, et aL
US. District Cowl District of Utah Civil No. 2:07^CV^00872;
MARY TOMPKINS v. BASIC RESEARCH, LLC, et al.
US District Court. District of Utah Civil No. 2:08*CV-00313
Insureds
Claim No.
Policy No.
Our File No.

:
:
:
:

Covarix, LLC dba Basic Research, LLC, et al.
C129036
CA000011665-01 (8/20/07 - 8/20/08)
ADM:087QU1/I7

Dear Mr. Price:
As you know from our previous correspondence, this office has been retained by Admiral
Insurance Company ("Admirer) to investigate and evaluate the coverage issues present in this
matter under the above referenced policy issued to Covarix, LLC dba Basic Research, LLC, et
aL ("Basic Research" and/or "insured**). This letter shall serve as a response to your tenders to
Admiral ofdefense and indemnity ofthe above-referenced lawsuits on behalf of Basic Research.
Western Holdings, LLC ("Western Holdings" and/or "Insured^) and Dynakor Phaimacal, LLC
("Dynakor").1 We have carcftilly considered all ofthe information and coverage arguments
1

Your initial lender was on behalf of Basic Research and Western Holdings, bin was ambiguous regarding the
individuals named as defendants or Dynakor and clarification was requested. Inresponse,you indicaied lender was
made for Dynakor and Basic Research.

AU001462
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1255 Caldwell Road
P.O. Box 5725
d e n y HJIL NJ 08034-3220
Fax (856) 429-3*30
Phone (B56) 429-9200

ADMIRAL
DATE:

06/25/2009

COVAR1XLLC
5742 W HAROLD CATTY DRIVE
SALT LAKE CITY, UTS4I16
Alt: Douglas Carp

INSURED:

COVARIX LLC DBA BASIC RESEARCH LLC

POLICY NO:

CA000011665-02

CLAIM NOr

C137310

CLMTNAME:

Nicole Forleaza

EVE;

05/29/2009

Dear Mr. Carp:

We are in receipt of the lawsuit you forwarded entitled Nicole Forienza and Shaideo Monroe, Indfviduairy and on
behalf of all others similarly situated vs Dynakor PharmacaJ, LLC, et ai, which is pending hi United Stales District
Court, Central District of California under case number CV09-3730 MMM (Ssx).
The complaint served as Admiral's first notice of this loss. The complaint contains counts for Violation of California
Legal Remedies Act (wrongful business practices), unjmi cmichmem
Violation of CA business and Professions code 17200 and Breach of Warmly. ^
as a class action suit, a ruling of the court thai the alleged conduce dW o c w , ratitirtforj,
and general damages, pre and post judgment interest, costs and fees as well as punitive damages.
Basically the complaint alleges thattoedefendants, who include Basic Research, LLC, knowingly made raise
representations In their advertisement of the product Akavar.
This letter shall serve as a Reservation of Rights available to Admiral pursuant to the terms of the relevant Admiral
policies as wflj be discussed m rtahcr detail below. Please mite
u^iis,rh« reservation is subject to change as additional mfonnadon is received
Admiral Insurance Company provides Claims-Made Commercial General Liability coverage (CGL) to Covarix dba
Baste Research, IXC under policy CAOOOOI1665-02, which has liability limits of S imillkm, an aggregate limit of
$2miUk>n and a $ 100,000 deductible. Coverage applies In the following I
8ECT1DNI -COVERAGES
COVERAGE A BODILY 1MJURY AND PROPERTY DAMAGE LIABILITY

CL0130 0J02
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1255 Caldwell Road
PjQ* BW 5725
Cherry Hill, KT 08034-3220
Fax (856) 42Sh3&Q
PkoTie <85$) 429-9200

ADMIRAL!1^*"'*\NY
Date:

(T7/Oi$ft0(#

CQVARJXLLC
5742 W HAROLD G M T * DRIVE

SALT L^KEcrry, irr

&i te

AtC Douglas Carp
•R£:

Insured:

COVARIX LLC D*A BASIC RESEARCH LLC

Claimant

Nicole Forlenza

Ad^lr^yNo:

CA0OOM1665-02

AdnriraJ Claim No:

ClXftlO

Dear Mr. Carp;
We arc m receipt of the lawsuit youforwardedentitled Nicole Forleuza and Sbaiden Monroe, individually and
on behaif of all others similarly situated vs Dynakor Pbarmacalr LLC, et ai, which is pending in United States
District Court/Cental Dttfcrict of California under case number CV09-3736 MMM (Ssx).
The complaint scrvcjd as Admiral'sfirstnotice of this loss. The complaint contains counts for Violation of
California Legal Remedies Act (wrongful business practices), unjust enrichment (profit from alleged
misrepresentation), Fraud, Violation of GA business and Professions code 1720Q and Breach of Warranty. The
coinjjaaint seeks a certification as a class action suit, a ruling of Che court that the alleged conduct did occur,
restitution, injunction, oompensatory and general damages, pre and post judgment interest, costs and fees as
well as punkive damages.
Basically die complaint alleges that die defendants, who include Basic Research, LLC, knowingly made false
representations in their advertisement ofroeproduct Akavar.
This letter shall serve as a Reservation of Rights available to Admiral pursuant to the terms of the relevant
Admiral policies as will be discussed m Ivrmer detail helowl Please note dial Admiral's investigation remains
origc4ngatkiU%9, Ibis reserve
Admiral rhsttrimce Company provides Claims-Made Commercial QeneTd'liah'aity coverage (CGL) to
CoVatxfedba Ba&c Research, LLC urjder policy CAOOOOi1665-02, which has liabfltty limits of SJmiBkm, an
aggregate limit of S2rmHkm and a $UX);QG0deductible. Coverage appHes^in m following manner:
SECnON I-COVERAGES
COVERAGE A B00JI.Y INJURY AND WOPfcRTY DAMAGE LIABILITY

CL03 000*02
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GAUNTLETT & ASSOCIATES
ATTORNEYS AT

LAW

18400 Von Karman, Suite 300
Irvine, California 92612
Phone: (949)553-1010 •Facsimile: (949)553-2050
Email: lnfo@gauntiettJaw.com
Website: wwvw.gauntlettlaw.com
Our File Number.
10448-014

July 15,2009
VIA EMAIL & UPS OVERNIGHT
dkagen@achniralins. com
DawnKagen
ADMIRAL INSURANCE COMPANY •

Claims Superintendent
1255 Caldwell Road
P.O. Box5725
Cherry Hill, NJ 08034-3220
Re:

Forlenza, et al v, Basic Research, LLC, etal
U.S.D.C., Central District of California, Southern Division (Santa Ana),
Case No. CV 09-03730-AG (SSx) (the "Forlenza suit9")
Insured:
Covarix, LLC dba Basic Research, LLC
Claimant:
Nicole Forlenza, Shaiden Monroe, E. Batiz and J, Boschen
Admiral Policy Nos.:
CA000011665-01 and CA000011665-02
Admiral Claim No/.
C137310

Dear Ms. Kagem
We are counsel along with Howrey, LLP for Admiral's insured, Covarix, LLC, dba Basic
Research, LLC in the above-captioned lawsuit We write to update Admiral about certain
developments in the litigation that your July 6, 2009 letter does not mention.
On June H, 2009 the First Amended Complaint was filed in the Forlenza suit and
previously sent to Admiral. The FAC differs from the Complaiiit previously tendered for
defense in that: (1) Plaintiffs Nicole Forlenza and Shaiden Monroe have abandoned their class
action allegations and now sue as individuals, alleging defendants* false advertising of weightloss supplement Ak&var in violation of California's Unfair Competition Law ("UCL") and
California Legal Remedies Act ("CLRA"); (2) new Plaintiff WE. Batiz" alleges class claims
based on defendants' purported misleading advertising of Zantrex-3, a different weight loss
supplement; and (3) new Plaintiff "J. Boschen" alleges class claims based on defendants'
purported misleading advertising of Relacore, a different weight loss supplement Admiral's
insureds request coverage and a defense of these additional claims as well as those of Forlenza
and Monroe.
Defendants have retained both ourfirmand Howrey, LLP as co-counsel in this case.
165570.1-10448^14-7/15/2009 12:52 PM
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DECLARATION OF ANDREW M. SUSSMAN
I, ANDREW M. SUSSMAN, declare:
1.

The facts set forth herein are within my personal knowledge and, if sworn as a

witness, I could and would testify competently thereto under oath.
2.

I am an attorney with Gauntlett & Associates and one of the attorneys for Basic

Research, LLC ("Basic Research"), the Plaintiff in this insurance coverage lawsuit against
Admiral Insurance Company ("Admiral").
3.

On or about November 19, 2009, I sent an email to Admiral Claims

Superintendent Dawn Kagan. This email followed up on a letter I sent to Ms. Kagan on
September 30, 2009. Attached hereto as Exhibit "19" is a true and correct copy of my
November 19,2009 email.
4.

On or about November 19, 2009,1 received an email from Ms. Kagan responding

to my email of the same date. Attached hereto as part of Exhibit "19" is a true and correct copy
of the email I receivedfromMs. Kagan.
5.

On or about December 8, 2009,1 sent an another email to Ms. Kagan following

up on my September 30, 2009 letter. Attached hereto as Exhibit "20" is a true and correct copy
of my December 8, 2009 email.
6.

On or about December 8, 2009,1 received an email from Ms. Kagan responding

to my email of the same date. Attached hereto as part of Exhibit "20" is a true and correct copy
of the email I receivedfromMs. Kagan.
7.

On or about January 11, 2010, Ms. Kagan sent a letter and email to my colleague

at Gauntlett & Associates, James A. Lowe, advising Basic Research that Admiral had appointed
"an associated counsel" for Basic Research who would also serve as "panel counsel" for Admiral
in the Forlenza suit. Attached hereto as Exhibit "21" is a true and correct copy of Ms. Kagan's
January 11,2010 communication.

SUSSMAN DECLARATION
168359.1-10448-014-7/8/2010
1
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The associated/panel counsel Admiral identified in its January 11, 2010

communication did not participate in the defense of Basic Research in the Forlenza suit.
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the
foregoing is true and correct.
Executed at Irvine, California on this 6th day of July, 2010.

ANDREW M. SUSSMAN

168359.1-10448-014-7/6/2010
SUSSMAN DECLARATION
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Murray, Peggy A.
From:

Sussman, Andrew M.

Sent:

Thursday, November 19,2009 11:07 AM

To:

dkagan@admiralins.com

Cc:

Karen A. Knokey; Murray, Peggy A.; Lowe, James A.

Subject:

Admiral Insurance Claim No. C137310 on Behalf of Insured Covarix, Inc., dba Basic Research,
LLC

Attachments: 09-09-30 Itr to D.Kagan (request for pymt of Forlenza suit defense expenses).PDF
Dear Ms. Kagan:
We have had no response to our letter to you of September 30,2009 (a copy of which Is attached) which:
(1) confirmed your representation on Admiral Insurance's behalf that Admiral would defend its insureds in
the Forlenza, et al v. Basic Research, LLC et al lawsuit; (2) provided copies of the insureds' defense
counsels1 invoices for legal fees and expenses incurred in the defense as of the invoices' dates; and (3)
explained why the expenses were reasonable and necessary to the defense and therefore immediately
due and payable by Admiral.
Since then, the insureds have accrued additional defense expenses. The invoices reflecting them will be
provided to you in the very near future. Meanwhile, Admirers insureds are being seriously prejudiced by
its ongoing failure to honor its acknowledged defense obligations and to communicate.
I phoned you yesterday and today to inquire but there has been no response. Please contact me today to
advise when the insureds will be reimbursed for their previously-submitted defense expenses, and to
confirm that Admiral will promptly reimburse their additional Forlenza suit defense expenses as they are
incurred.

Very truly yours,

Andrew M. Sussman, Esq.
Gauntlett & Associates
(949) 553-1010
(949) 553-2050 FAX
This information is intended for use by the individuals or entity to which it is addressed, and may contain
information that is privileged, confidential, and exempt from disclosure under applicable law. If the reader
of this message is not the intended recipient, or employee or agent responsible for delivering the
m e s s a g e to the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution, or copying
of this communication is strictly prohibited, if you have received this communication in error, please notify
us immediately by telephone and return the original message to us.
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Murray, Peggy A.
From:

Sussman, Andrew M.

Sent:

Thursday, November 19, 2009 11:15 AM

To:

Karen A. Knokey; Murray, Peggy A.; Lowe, James A.

Subject: FW: Admiral Insurance Claim No. C137310 on Behalf of Insured Covarix, Inc., dba Basic Research,
LLC
David and Jim;
FYI-AMS

From: DKagan@admiralins.com [mailto:DKagan@admiralins.com]
Sent: Thursday, November 19, 2009 11:09 AM
To: Sussman, Andrew M.
Subject: Re: Admiral Insurance Claim No. C137310 on Behalf of Insured Covarix, Inc., dba Basic
Research, LLC

Dear Mr. SussmanI apologize for the delay. We are having the rates and legal bills reviewed by counsel. I followed up with
them yesterday and hope to hear from them in the immediate future.
Dawn Kagan
Claims Superintendent
Admiral Insurance Company
1255 Caldwell Road
PO Box 5725
Cherry Hill, NJ 08034-3320
Phone: 856-429-9200 ext360
Fax: 856-429-3630
E-mail: dkagan@admiralins.com

"Sussman, Andrew M.H <AM$@gauntlett!aw.com>

TQ
<dkagan@admiralins.com>

11/19/2009 0206 P M

cc

" K a r e n A- Knokey" <KAK@gauntlettlaw.com>, "Murray, Peggy A."
<PAM@gauntlettIaw.com>f "Lowe, James A." <JAL@gauntlettlaw.com>

Subject Admiral Insurance Claim No. C137310 on Behalf of Insured Covarix,
Inc., dba Basic Research, L L C

Dear Ms. Kagan:
We have had no response to our letter to you of September 30, 2009 (a copy of which is attached) which:
(1) confirmed your representation on Admiral Insurance's behalf that Admiral would defend its insureds In
the Fortenza, et al v. Basic Research, LLC et al lawsuit; (2) provided copies of the insureds' defense
counsels' invoices for legal fees and expenses incurred in the defense as of the invoices* dates; and (3)

11/19/2009
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Murray, Peggy A.
From:

Sussman, Andrew M.

Sent:

Tuesday, December 08, 2009 9:42 AM

To:

dkagan@admiralins.com

Cc:

Lowe, James A.; Karen A. Knokey; Murray, Peggy A.

Subject:

Admiral Insurance Claim No. C137310 On Behalf of Insured Covarix, Inc., dba Basic Research,
Inc.

Importance: High
Dear Ms. Kagan:
On November 19,2009 we spoke by telephone about Admiral's failure to substantively respond to our
correspondence to you of September 30,2009 and November 19,2009. You acknowledged your
previous representations on admiral's behalf that Admiral would defend its insureds in the Fortenza, etal
v. Basic Research, LLC et al lawsuit. You also represented that the previously-submitted attorney billing
statements for the defense up to the invoice dates had been turned over to outside counsel for review and
that you expected to be able to respond shortly.
Since then we have not heard from you. More importantly, Admiral has not yet paid a dime of its
insureds' defense expenses. The insureds are being seriously prejudiced by Admiral's ongoing dishonor
of its promise and failure to pay its defense expenses as incurred - or at all - and by Admiral's failure to
communicate.
Please contact me today to advise when the expenses will be paid, and to confirm that the ongoing
defense expenses will be paid as they continue to be incurred.

Very truly yours,

Andrew M. Sussman, Esq.
Gauntlett & Associates
(949) 553-1010
(949) 553-2050 FAX
This information is intended for use by the individuals or entity to which it is addressed, and may contain
information that is privileged, confidential, and exempt from disclosure under applicable law. If the reader
of this message is not the intended recipient, or employee or agent responsible for delivering the
message to the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution, or copying
of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this communication in error, please notify
us immediately by telephone and return the original message to us.
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Murray, Peggy A.
From:

Sussman, Andrew M.

Sent:

Tuesday, December 08, 2009 11:11 AM

To:

Murray, Peggy A.

Subject: FW: Admiral Insurance Claim No. C137310 On Behalf of Insured Covarix, Inc., dba Basic Research,
Inc.

From: DKagan@admiralins.com [mailto:DKagan@admiralins.com]
Sent: Tuesday, December 08, 2009 11:07 AM
To: Sussman, Andrew M.
Subject: Re: Admiral Insurance Claim No. C137310 On Behalf of Insured Covarix, Inc., dba Basic
Research, Inc

Dear Mr. SussmanAs you are aware, Admiral has accepted the defense of Basic Research under a Reservation of Rights.
We are still awaiting counsel's review of your voluminous legal bills and will advise, as soon as possible,
as to what will be paid.
Dawn Kagan
Claims Superintendent
Admiral Insurance Company
1255 Caldwell Road
PO Box 5725
Cherry Hill, NJ 08034-3320
Phone: 856-429-9200 ext360
Fax: 856-429-3630
E-mail: dkagan@admiralins.com

"Sussman, Andrew M.w
<AMS@gauntlettlaw.com>

TD
<dkagan@admiralins.com>
cc "Lowe, James A." <JAL@gauntlettlaw.com>, "Karen A . Knokey"

12/08/2009 12:41 P M

<KAK@gauntlettlaw.com>, "Murray, Peggy A." <PAM@gauntlettlaw.com>
Subject Admiral Insurance Claim No. C137310 On Behalf of Insured Covarix, Inc.,
dba Basic Research, Inc.

Dear Ms. Kagan:
On November 19, 2009 we spoke by telephone about Admiral's failure to substantively respond to our
correspondence to you of September 30, 2009 and November 19, 2009. You acknowledged your
previous representations on admiral's behalf that Admiral would defend its insureds in the Forlenza, etal
v. Basic Research, LLC et a/lawsuit. You also represented that the previously-submitted attorney billing
statements for the defense up to the invoice dates had been turned over to outside counsel for review and
that you expected to be able to respond shortly.
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1255 Caldwell Road
P.O. Box 5725
Cherry HiU, NJ 08034-3220
Fax (856) 429-3630
Phone (856) 429-9200

"

1

ADMIRAL im.im

Date:

01/11/2010

CERTIFIED MAIL RRR & REGULAR MAIL
Gauntlett & Associates
Att: James A Lowe, Esq.
18400 Von Kannan Suite 300
Irvine, CA 92612
RE:

Insured:

COVARDE LLC DBA BASIC RESEARCH LLC

Claimant

Nicole Forlenza

Admiral Policy No:

CA000011665-02

Admiral Claim No;

C137310

Dear Mr. Lowe:
PJeas^'fefe advisetfthat Admiral Insurance. Company has assigned the following attorney as an associated counsel for the insured,
as ^ariel^blinsel for Admiral Insurance Company, pursuant to Admiral's right to do so under Civil Code 2860.

•

(•

Alan Frederick, Esq.
Marrone, Robinson, Frederick & Foster
111 North l*Sfreet
Burbank, CA 99984
818-841-1144

Mr. Frederick will need immediate and complete access to your file, in order to bring Admiral up to date on this matter, due to
the lack of reporting from either your office or The Howrey firm, thus far.
We wish to remind you that Admiral is providing a defense under a complete Reservation of Rights under all of thetermsand
conditions of the policy, including therightto withdraw from the defense and seek reimbursement for monies paid.
Should you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact the undersigned.

Very truly yours,

^OJ^SK!\U)U^
Dawn Kagan
Claims Superintendent

.......
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GAUNTLETT & ASSOCIATES
David A. Gauntlett [Pro Hac Vice]
Andrew M. Sussman [Pro Hac Vice]
18400 Von Karman, Suite 300
Irvine, California 92612
Telephone: (949)553-1010
Facsimile:
(949) 553-2050
info(S),gauntlettlaw.com
ams@gauntlettlaw.com
MANNING, CURTIS, BRADSHAW & BEDNAR LLC
Alan C.Bradshaw (4801)
Tyson Snow (10747)
170 South Main Street, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1655
Telephone: (801)363-5678
Facsimile: (801) 364-5678
abradshaw(o),mc2b .com
tsnow@mc2b.com
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Counterdefendants
Basic Research, LLC, Dynakor Pharmacal, LLC, The Carter-Reed Company, LLC,
Zoller Laboratories, LLC, Dennis Gay, Daniel B. Mowrey and Mitchell K. Friedlander
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF UTAH
BASIC RESEARCH, LLC, et al.,
Plaintiffs and Counterdefendants,

Civil No. 2:09-cv-00878 CW
Judge: Clark Waddoups

vs.
ADMIRAL INSURANCE COMPANY, a
Delaware corporation,
Defendant and Counterclaimant.

PLAINTD7FS' REQUEST FOR
JUDICIAL NOTICE IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AS TO LIABILITY
ON ADMIRAL INSURANCE
COMPANY'S DUTY TO DEFEND
MILLEIVTOMPKINS AND
FORLENZA LAWSUITS

AND RELATED COUNTERCLAIM

167933.2-10448-014-7/8/2010

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
Case No. 2:09-cv-00878-CW
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Case 2:09-cv-^P78-CW

Document 45

Sib

Filed 07/OSPD Page 2 of 7

Pursuant to Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and in support of its concurrentlyfiled motion for partial summary judgment, Plaintiffs respectfully request the Court take judicial
notice of each of the following documents:
1. United States Trademark (Serial #77160070): "EAT ALL YOU WANT AND STILL
LOSE WEIGHT;" Registered to Western Holdings, LLC (Registration # 3441872).
2. United States Trademark (Serial #77167925): "AND WE COULDN'T SAY IT IN
PRINT IF IT WASN'T TRUE;" Registered to Western Holdings, LLC (Registration
#3441894).
True and correct copies of the trademark certificates are attached hereto as Group Exhibit "23,"
3. Federal Trade Commission Complaint regarding Bio Trim Product ("FTC Bio Trim
Complaint") filed November 3, 2004 (United States District Court, Central District of
California; Federal Trade Commission v. Natural Products, LLC, et al\ Case Number
SACV04-1279 AHS (MLGx)).
A true and correct copy of the FTC Bio Trim Complaint is attached hereto as Exhibit "24."
4. Federal Trade Commission Press Release regarding Bio Trim Product ("FTC Bio Trim
Press Release") dated November 7, 2005 ("FTC Stops Bogus Ads for 'Bio Trim' and
Other Weight-loss Products").
A true and correct copy of the Bio Trim Press Release is attached hereto as Exhibit "25."
5. Federal Trade Commission Red Flag Web Page ("FTC Red Flag Web Page") ("Red Flag
Claim 2: Eat what you want! The more you eat, the more you lose and we'll show you
how.").
A true and correct copy of the FTC Red Flag Web Page is attached hereto as Exhibit "26."
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WESTERN HOLDINGS, LLC TRADEMARK CERTIFICATES
Under Rule 201(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, a court may take judicial notice of a

fact "not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is... (2) capable of accurate and ready
determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." A certified
and sealed copy of United States trademark falls squarely within Rule 201(b). Such documents
are produced by the United States Patent and Trademark Office, the United States governmental
entity charged with the production, granting and maintenance of such documents.
Federal courts have held that the USPTO's accuracy as a source of trademark
information cannot reasonably be questioned. In Metro Pub., Ltd v. San Jose Mercury News,
987 F.2d 637, 641 (9th Cir. (Cal) 1993) (rev'd on other grounds) judicial notice was taken
certified copies of trademark registrations. In doing so, the court reasoned: "Rule 201(b)(2) of
the Federal Rules of Evidence permits a federal court to take judicial notice of a fact that is not
subject to 'reasonable dispute' because it is 'capable of accurate and ready determination by
resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.'

Certified copies of

trademark registrationsfromthe principal register fall within this category." Id. at 641 n.3.
This court should also take judicial notice of the proffered trademark registrations as
admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8), which excepts from the Hearsay Rule
"[r]ecords, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of public offices or agencies,
setting forth ... (b) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there
was a duty to report" are not excluded by the hearsay rule. As held in Fresenius Medical Care
Holdings, Inc. v. Baxter Intern, Inc., 2006 WL 1330003 (N.D. Cal. 2006), the United States
Patent and Trademark Office is a "public agency" that falls within the Rule: "[t]he United States
Patent and Trademark Office ('PTO') is an agency of the United States, within the Department
of Commerce, and thus falls squarely within the 'public offices or agencies' requirement of Rule
803(8)." Id. at *3. In rejecting a party's challenge to the admissibility of PTO documents related
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to patents, the court noted that "courts regularly consider such documents." Id. As the United
States Patent and Trademark Office is equally responsible for the issuance of patents and
trademarks, the holding of Fresenius applies with equal force to the admissibility of trademarks.
Similarly, the trademarks fall under an exception to the hearsay rule as records of
regularly-conducted activity by the PTO. Fed. R. Evid. 803(6).
These documents are also self-authenticating as domestic public documents not under
seal (Fed. R. Evid. 902(2)) and as official publications (Fed. R. Evid. 902(5)).
The proffered trademarks contain evidence directly relevant to a dispositive issue in the
case: whether the advertising idea at issue is that of "another" pursuant to the Admiral Insurance
Policies at issue here. Accordingly, Plaintiffs respectfully request the Court take notice of the
above-identified trademarks.
II.

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION BIO TRIM COMPLAINT
This Court may take judicial notice of the FTC Bio Trim Complaint because it is a court

record. Fortune v. Patterson, No. 04-377, 2009 WL 3166274, at *3 n.3 (W.D. Pa., September
28, 2009) ("[T]his Court examined the docket sheet for that case on the PACER system

This

Court hereby takes judicial notice of those documents, as well as that civil action's docket
sheet"); Deluna v. Curry, No. l:08-cv-00574, 2009 WL 2922990 (E.D.Cal., September 08,
2009) ("The record of state court proceeding is a source whose accuracy cannot reasonably be
questioned, and judicial notice may be taken of court records. . . . As such, the PACER website
for the Ninth Circuit, containing that court's case management docket system, is subject to
judicial notice."); DCR Fundi L.L.C. v. Tal Technologies, Inc., No. CIV-03-772-L, 2008 WL
2003798, at *1 n.2 (W.D.Okla., May 07, 2008) ("The court takes judicial notice of the Court of
Appeals' docket sheets for the appeals in this case as well as those documents filed in the Court
of Appeals that are accessible on PACER."); Purdom v. Gettleman, No. 08-CV-7-JMH, 2008
WL 695258, at *2 (E.D. Ky. March 12, 2008) ("[T]he Court has accessed the trial court docket
167933.2-10448-014-7/8/2010
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sheet by use of the PACER electronic system. The Court takes judicial notice of the information
contained in the trial court docket sheet.").
The attached copy of the FTC Bio Trim Complaint is self-authenticating as a domestic
public document not under seal (Fed. R. Evid. 902(2)) and an official publication (Fed. R. Evid.
902(5)). It also falls under exceptions to the hearsay rule as a record of regularly-conducted
activity (Fed. R. Evid. 803(6)) and as a public record (Fed. R. Evid. 803(8)).
III.

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRESS RELEASE AND RED FLAG PAGE
First, the Court may take judicial notice of the FTC Bio Trim Press Release and FTC Bio

Trim Red Flag Web Page as records of regularly-conducted activity (Fed. R. Evid. 803(6) and as
public records and reports (Fed. R. Evid. 803(8)). The documents also are self-authenticating as
either domestic public documents not under seal (Fed. R. Evid. 902(2)) and as official
publications (Fed. R. Evid. 902(5)).
Second, both the FTC Bio Trim Press Release and FTC Red Flag Web Page come from
the FTC's website at www.ftc.gov. A court may take judicial notice of a public website and
excerpts from the website. Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1084 n.2 (CD. Cal.
2001) (stating that "[t]o the extent some of the descriptions about eBay's website are not in the
record, the Court takes judicial notice of www.eBay.com and the information contained therein
pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201"); id. (noting that "eBay's own website describes itself
as 'the world's largest online auction service' "); Rearden LLC v. Rearden Commerce, Inc., 597
F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1014 n.3 (N.D. Cal. 2009) ("The court takes judicial notice of contents of this
website and other websites cited herein pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201."); Energy
Automation Systems, Inc. v. Saxton, 618 F. Supp. 2d 807, 810 n.l (M.D. Tenn. 2009) ("A court
may take judicial notice of the contents of an Internet website."); Wang v. Pataki, 396 F. Supp.
2d 446, 458 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) ("The Court may take judicial notice of such internet
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material.")- Judicial notice is therefore proper and should be taken.

Dated:

July 8,2010
By: /s/ Andrew M. Sussman

MANNING, CURTIS, BRADSHAW &
BEDNARLLC
Alan C. Bradshaw (#4801)
Tyson Snow (#10747)
170 South Main Street, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1655
Telephone: (801) 363-5678
Facsimile: (801) 364-5678
abradshaw@mc2b.com
tsnow@mc2b.com

GAUNTLETT & ASSOCIATES
David A. Gauntlett (Pro Hac Vice)
Andrew M. Sussman (Pro HacVice)
18400 Von Karman, Suite 300
Irvine, California 92612
Telephone: (949) 553-1010
Facsimile:
(949) 553-2050
info@gauntlettlaw.com
ams@gauntlettlaw.com

Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Counterdefendants
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Int. a.: 5
Prior U.S. Us.: 6,18, 44,46, 51, and 52

^ M „A „ o m
Reg. No. 3,441,872

United States Patent and Trademark Office

Registered June 3.2008

TRADEMARK
PRINCIPAL REGETIER

EAT ALL f0€ WANT AND STILL
LOSE WEIGHT

WESTERN HOLDINGS, LLC. (WYOMING LTD
LIAB CO)
1821 LOGAN AVENUE
CHEYENNE, WY 89701
FOR: DIETARY SUPPLEMENTS, IN CLASS 5 (U.S.
CLS. 6,18,44, 46, 51 AND 52).
FIRST USE 1-26-2007; IN COMMERCE 1-26-2007.

THE MARK CONSISTS OF STANDARD CHARACTERS WITHOUT CLAIM TO ANY PARTICULAR
FONT, STYLE, SIZE, OR COLOR.
SN 77-160,070, FILED 4-18-2007.
J^L PRATER, EXAMINING ATTORNEY
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Int. CI.: 5
Prior U.S. CIs.: 6,18,44,46, 51, and 52
United States Patent and Trademark Office

Reg. No. 3,441,894
Registered June 3,2008

TRADEMARK
PRINCIPAL REGISTER

AMD WE COULDN'T SAY IT M
PRINT IF IT WASN'T TRUE,

WESTERN HOLDINGS, LLC (WYOMING LTD
LIAB CO)
1821 LOGAN AVENUE
CHEYENNE, WY 82001
FOR: DIETARY SUPPLEMENTS, IN CLASS 5 (U.S.
CLS. 6,18,44,46, 51 AND 52).
FIRST USE 1-26-2007; IN COMMERCE 1-26-2007.

THE MARK CONSISTS OF STANDARD CHARACTERS WITHOUT CLAIM TO ANY PARTICULAR
FONT, STYLE, SIZE, OR COLOR.
SN 77-167,925, FILED 4-27-2007.
JILL PRATER, EXAMINING ATTORNEY
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PILED
I WILLIAM E. KOVACIC
General Counsel
BARBARA Y.K. CHUN (Cal Bar No. 186907)
Federal Trade Commission
10877 Wilshire Blvd., Ste. 700
Los Angeles, CA 90024
(310) 824-4312; Pax (310) B24-4380
Attorneys for Plaintiff
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

'20MNQV-3 AKIf-59
<Cl£R*. U.S. CSI'THICT COURT
CENTRAL OlSr. OF CALIF.
' LOS AKfELSS
PY

.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,
Plaintiff,

1*

SfiCVOA-1279 ^HS
COMPLAINT FOR PERMANENT
INJUNCTION AND OTHER EQUITABLE
RELIEF

v.
NATURAL PRODUCTS, LLC;
ALL NATURAL 4.U, LLC; and '
ANA M. SOLKAMANS,
Defendants.

Plaintiff/ the Federal Trade Commission (nFTC" or
"Commission''), through its undersigned attorneys, for its
Complaint alleges:
1.

;. •

Plaintiff FTC brings this action under Section 13 (b) of

the Federal Trade Commission Act (nFTC Act")/ 15 U.S.C. § 53(b),
to secure a permanent injunction, rescission of contracts and
restitution, disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, and other equitable
relief against the Defendants for engaging in deceptive acts or
practices and false advertisements for food, drugs, devices,
services or cosmetics, in or affecting commerce in connection with
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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compound so powerful, so effective, so relentless in its
awesome attack on bulging fatty deposits that it has
virtually eliminated the need to diet. . . The product
is called Bio Trim and it's dynamite!

In fact thousands

of people are now trying Bio Trim and losing weight
faster than ever before! FLUSHES CALORIES RIGHT OUT OF
YOUR BODY!" Id. (capitalization in original). Adjacent
to these statements are what purport to be before and
after photos of Kelly B. The before picture has the
caption "BEFORE 140 lbs." The after picture has the
caption "AFTER 6 weeks - 103 lbs." Id.
"When a person ate a small amount of this unique plant
extract they would miraculously lose weight! The
researchers investigated this phenomenon discovered
through sophisticated testing, that the plant extract
did indeed cause the human body to bring about rapid
weight-loss."

Id.

"EAT ALL YOU WANT AND STILL LOSE WEIGHT (PILL DOES ALL
THE WORK)"

Id. (capitalization in original).

"You can continue to enjoy all those foods you love to
eat.

Bio Trim simply does not allow your body to

consume and absorb excess calories . . . Period!"

Id.

"Each day you'll notice absolute visible results as your
unwanted pounds of fat flab and cellulite completely
disappear. . . . Natural Products . . . [has] examined
the clinical proof conducted on the Bio Trim ingredients
thoroughly and [is] convinced that with Bio Trim you can
achieve the body of your dreams. They don't care if
5
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Federal Trade Commission
Protecting America's Consumers
For Release: November 7,2005

FTC Stops Bogus Ads for Bio Trim" and Other Weight-loss Products
Under the terms of a consent agreement approved by the Federal Trade Commission and announced today, Tustiri. California
based Natural Products, LLC, All Natural 4 U, LLC and their owner, Ana M. Solkamans, are permanently prohibited from
making false and misleading claims about weight-loss products, including a dietary supplement they marketed as "Bio Trim,"
"Body-Trim/Bio-Trim,' and "Body-Trim."
In a complaintfiledin November 2004, the FTC alleged that the defendants made false and unsubstantiated claims in
advertising on their Web sites and in magazines and newspapers around the country. They claimed, for example, that Bio Trim
"guarantee^] rapid weight loss" and its users could "eat all [they] want and still lose weight (pill does all the work)."
"If you see an ad for a weight-loss product making fantastic claims, keep your money in your pocket" said Lydia Pames,
Director of the FTC's Bureau of Consumer Protection. "If s just that - a fantasy. The claims made for Bio Trim were simply not
possible. There is no pill that lets you eat all you want and still lose weight."
The Commission's complaint alleged that the defendants' sales pitches were false, unsubstantiated, and in violation of the
FTC Act Under the terms of the stipulated order settling the Commission's charges, the defendants can no longer claim that
any weight-loss product: 1} causes users to lose substantial weight while eating unlimited amounts of food, 2) causes
substantial weight loss by blocking the absorption of fat or calories, or 3) works for all overweight users.
The order also prohibits the defendants from making any claims that any health-related service or program, weight-loss
product, dietary supplement food, drug or device causes weight loss, or about their health benefits, performance, efficacy,
safety, or side effects, unless, at the time a claim is made, the defendants have competent and reliable sdentific evidence that
substantiates the truth of the claim. They are also prohibitedfromprofiting from, or disclosing, personal information about their
customers or prospective customers in connection with commerce in weight-loss products.
A judgment of more than $2.1 million, representing the amount of consumer injury, will be suspended due to defendants'
inability to pay. The judgment will be imposed if they are found to have misrepresented their financial condition.
The stipulatedfinalorder stopping the defendants' allegedly illegal conduct was a result of "Operation Big Fat Lie," the
Commission's November 2004, multi-agency crackdown on false weight-loss advertising. The Commission vote approving the
consent agreement was 4*0. The FTCfiledthe proposed stipulatedfinalorder in the U. S. District Court for the Central District
of California, Southern Division, on October 28,2005. The order was signed andfiledon November 2,2005 by District Judge
Alicemarie H. Stotler.
"Operation Big Fat Lie" identified "Seven Red Flag Bogus Weight-Loss Claims" that the FTC has advised publications and
broadcasters to avoid. These "red flags" include the following: a claim Is too good to be true If it says the product will 1) cause
weight loss of two pounds or more a week for a month or more without dieting or exercise; 2) cause substantial weight loss no
matter what or how much you eat; 3) cause permanent weight loss (even when you stop using the product); 4) block the
absorption of fat or calories to enable you to lose substantial weight 5) safely enable you to lose more than three pounds per
week for more than four weeks; 6) cause substantial weight loss for all users; or 7) cause substantial weight loss by wearing it
on the body or rubbing it into the skin.
Challenged ads in the "Operation Big Fat Lie" sweep ran in nationally-known publications. For example, ads for defendants'
products ran in national magazines, including Woman's Own magazine. The Red Flag Reference Guide for Media on Bogus
Weight Loss Claim Detection is available to assist media in detecting false weight-loss claims. The FTC also uses "teaser"
websites such as http://wemarket4u.net/fatfoe/ to educate consumers about weight loss scams.
NOTE: The stipulated final order is for settlement purposes only and does not constitute an admission by the defendants of a
law violation. A stipulated final order requires approval by the court and has the force of law when signed by the judge.
Copies of the complaint and stipulatedfinalorder are available from the FTC's Web site at http://www.ftc.gov and also from
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the FTC's Consumer Response Center, Room 130,600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20580, The FTC
works for the consumer to prevent fraudulent, deceptive, and unfair business practices in the marketplace and to provide
information to help consumers spot, stop, and avoid them. To file a complaint in English or Spanish (bilingual counselors are
available to take complaints), or to get free information on any of 150 consumer topics, call toll-free, 1-877-FTC-HELP (1-877382-4357), or use the complaint form at http://Www-.ftc.gov. The FTC enters Internet, telemarketing, identity theft, and other
fraud-related complaints into Consumer Sentinel, a secure, online database available to hundreds of civil and criminal law
enforcement agencies in the U.S. and abroad.
Media Contact:
Mitch Katz
Office of Public Affairs
202-326-2161
Frank Dorman
Office of Public Affairs
202-326-2674
Staff Contact:
Barbara Chun
Attorney
310-824-4343
(FTC File No. X050005)

E-mail this News Release
If you send this link to someone else, the FTC will not collect any personal information about you or the recipient

Related Documents:
Federal Trade Commission, Plaintiff, V. Natural Products, LLC; All Natural 4 U, LLC; and Ana M. Solkamans,
United States District Court, Central District of California
FTC File No.: 032 3238
Civil Action No. SACV04-1279 AHS MLGx
The Red Flag Reference Guide for Media on Bogus Weight Loss Claim Detection
Last Modified: Monday, November 10, 2008
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RED FLAG CLAIM 2
Eat what y o u want!
The more y o u eat, the more y o u lose and we'll show y o u how.
Realty Check
It is impossible to eat unlimited amounts of food - any kind of food - and still lose
weight. Any claim to that effect in an ad or commercial is false. Some products may
help curb appetite or cravings. For these products, Its okay to say people can eat
what they want so long as K is dear from the ad or commercial that people will not
want to eat as much food as before they started using the product.

Variations
This breakthrough ingredient has patients losing one full pound every 12
hours, two pounds or more each day, and ail without counting calories,
without missing a single meal and without giving up those delicious,
mouthwatering foods they love the most*
'My formula for living/ lets you eat: hamburgers, hot dogs, fries, steak, ice
cream, sausage, bacon, eggs and cheeses! And STILL LOSE WEIGHT!"
"Eat ail the foods you love, and still lose weight (pill does all the work}."
1 lost nine pounds during my first week eating just as I always do — going to
parties, even eating gobs of vacation goodies, including my favorite food: ice
cream. Four weeks later, I've lost another 27 pounds.*
"Eat any mouthwatering food you want, and still blast away dress sizes and
belt notches lightning fast.'

Horn* | Resourcvs | Site Map | Federal Trade Commission | Search | False Claims
What You Can Do { Beyond the Red Flag | Red Flag Promotions | En Esparto!
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David J. Garthe [Pro Hac Vice]
Boornazian Jensen & Garthe
555 12th Street, Suite 1800
Oakland, California 94607
Telephone: (510)834-4350(130)
Facsimile: (510)839-1897
Email: dgarthe@,big.com
Phillip S. Ferguson, No. 1063
Rebecca L.Hill, No. 6246
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.
15 West South Temple, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 323.5000
Facsimile: (801) 355.3472
Email: phillip.ferguson(5),chrisien.corn
rebecca.hill@,chrisien.com
Attorneysfor Admiral Insurance Company
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
BASIC RESEARCH, LLC, a Utah limited
liability company; DYNAKOR PHRMACAL,
LLC, a Utah limited liability company; THE
CARTER-REED COMPANY, LLC, a Utah
limited liability company; ZOLLER
LABORATORIES, LLC, a Utah limited
liability company; DENNIS GAY, an
individual; DANIEL B. MOWREY, an
individual; and MITCHELL K.
FRIEDLANDER, an individual,
Plaintiffs,

ADMIRAL'S MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN
SUPPORT OF ITS CROSS-MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Civ.No.09-CV-00878CW

v.

Judge Clark Waddoups

ADMIRAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
.

Defendant.
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Admiral does not dispute that the Tompkins Suit alleges

that Basic Research made misleading claims to promote Akavar as a product that enabled one to
lose weight without diet or exercise. Admiral also does not dispute that such claims, according
to Tompkins Plaintiffs, were a widespread problem, nor that others have made similar claims to
advertise weight loss products. However, as with the Miller Complaint, Basic Research
mischaracterizes the Tompkins Plaintiffs' statements. The Tompkins Plaintiffs' statement that
fraudulent weight loss products are a widespread problem sets up its allegation that Basic
Research took part in an "epidemic" of consumer fraud in the weight loss industry. Id. at ff 1617. Basic Research misconstrues this statement as support for its contention that the Tompkins
Plaintiffs have sued Basic Research in connection with its use of another's advertising ideas.
However, the Tompkins Plaintiffs are suing Basic Research not for injury due to use of
another's advertising ideas, but for consumer fraud. The Tompkins Complaint states:
Fraudulent weight loss products are an enormous problem in the United States....
Basic Research was created to capitalize on the fraudulent weight loss product
epidemic.
Tompkins Class Action Compl., fflf 16-17. The Tompkins Plaintiffs point to the "widespread
problem" of misleading claims about easy weight loss products as background for its allegations
of fraud by Basic Research. They allege neither that Basic Research used another's advertising
ideas, nor that they suffered any injury because of it.
BASIC RESEARCH'S FACT NOS. 25-26.

For the purposes of this Motion, Admiral

does not controvert the statements of fact in paragraphs 25-26.
(3)

The Forlenza Suit
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Admiral does not dispute that the Tompkins Suit alleges

that Basic Research made misleading claims to promote Akavar as a product that enabled one to
lose weight without diet or exercise. Admiral also does not dispute that such claims, according
to Tompkins Plaintiffs, were a widespread problem, nor that others have made similar claims to
advertise weight loss products. However, as with the Miller Complaint, Basic Research
mischaracterizes the Tompkins Plaintiffs' statements. The Tompkins Plaintiffs' statement that
fraudulent weight loss products are a widespread problem sets up its allegation that Basic
Research took part in an "epidemic" of consumer fraud in the weight loss industry. Id at <|ffi 1617. Basic Research misconstrues this statement as support for its contention that the Tompkins
Plaintiffs have sued Basic Research in connection with its use of another's advertising ideas.
However, the Tompkins Plaintiffs are suing Basic Research not for injury due to use of
another's advertising ideas, but for consumer fraud. The Tompkins Complaint states:
Fraudulent weight loss products are an enormous problem in the United States..,.
Basic Research was created to capitalize on thefraudulentweight loss product
epidemic.
Tompkins Class Action Compl., f^f 16-17. The Tompkins Plaintiffs point to the "widespread
problem" of misleading claims about easy weight loss products as background for its allegations
of fraud by Basic Research. They allege neither that Basic Research used another's advertising
ideas, nor that they suffered any injury because of it.
BASIC RESEARCH'S FACT NOS. 25-26.

For the purposes of this Motion, Admiral

does not controvert the statements of fact in paragraphs 25-26.
(3)

The Forlenza Suit
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The Forlenza Suit further alleges Basic Research

made misleading claims in its advertisements that Akdvar enables one to lose weight without diet
or exercise.
Defendants claim that Akdvar "cause[s] easy, automatic, permanent weight loss"
all "within a few short weeks. " To prove this assertion Defendants claim that a
group that used Akdvar experienced 1604% more weight loss over a six-week
period than those who did not use their product - and that group never had to
exercise or diet. ... These false claims mislead consumers to believe that they
can achieve the same results. [Id. at f 13, Exh. " 5 " (Forlenza Complaint), f 22.]
Defendants make the following claims for the Akdvar products: Eat What You
Want And Still Lose Weight ... Effectively, Defendants claim that no change in
diet or behavior is required to lose weight while taking Akdvar 20/50. A true and
correct copy of Defendants' online claim on this point is attached hereto as
Exhibit 6. [Id. at f 15, Exh. "7" (Forlenza Second Amended Complaint), f
31(a).]
ADMIRAL'S RESPONSE:

Admiral does not dispute the fact that the Forlenza

plaintiffs alleged that Basic Research made misleading claims in its advertisements as set forth in
this paragraph.
BASIC RESEARCH'S FACT NOS. 31 -32.

31.

The Forlenza Suit also alleges that others have made similar claims to advertise

weight loss products or "miracle pills."
The weight-loss industry is a multi-billion-dollar industry in the United States.
Hundreds of new products appear on the market every year, many of them
claiming to be a quick and easy solution to the weight loss problem. In an effort to
promote real weight loss and to prevent Americans from being defrauded by
"miracle pills. " The U.S. Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") instructs that
"[a]ny claims that you can lose weight effortlessly are false. The only proven way
to lose weight is either to reduce the number of calories you eat or to increase the
number of calories you burn off through exercise. ... " [Id. at ^ 13, Exh. " 5 "
(Forlenza Complaint), f 19J
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Admiral does not controvert the statements of fact in

paragraph 35. It notes, however, that the two phrases to which Basic Research points were each
trademarked on June 2, 2008 - which is after the Tompkins and Miller complaints were filed.
The Tompkins Complaint was filed on December 6, 2007, in California state court.

{See

Tompkins Class Action Cbmpl.) The original Miller Complaint was filed in U.S District Court in
Utah on November 9, 2007. {See Miller Proposed Class Action.) Nearly seven months later the
trademark was registered with the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office. (PL's Exh. "23".) The
registration date also post-dates the inception date of the first of the two Admiral policies. {See
PL's Material Fact 1 and PL's Exh. 1.)
Furthermore, while Western Holdings, LLC may be a separate and distinct entity from
Basic Research, it is an affiliate and is a named insured along with Basic Research on the
Admiral insurance policy at issue in this case. {See PL's Exh. 10.)
BASIC RESEARCH'S FACT No. 36.

Others have previously used an almost identical

slogan to advertise weight loss products. For example, in 2004, the Federal Trade Commission
filed an action against Natural Products, LLC, All Natural 4 U, LLC, and Ana M. Solkamans for
using the slogan "Eat All You Want and Still Lose Weight (Pill Does All the Work) " to advertise
Bio Trim™, a weight loss product See FTC v. Natural Products, LLC et al (CD. Cal Case no.
SACV 04-1279), Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief (filed
11/3/2004), p.5<h 12(d). [RJN, Exh "24" thereto]
ADMIRAL'S RESPONSE:

Admiral does not dispute the statements of fact in

paragraph 36. The Federal Trade Commission Action (FTC) demonstrates that the problem of
consumer fraud in the weight loss industry is widespread (as alleged in the underlying lawsuits)

18
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and not new. Furthermore, while other entities may have used similar slogans and statements
which Basic Research is using, those entities are not the Underlying Plaintiffs in the Miller,
Tompkins and Forlenza Suits, and neither they nor the Underlying Plaintiffs have alleged injury
for the use of their advertising ideas.
BASIC RESEARCH'S FACT Nos. 37-38

Admiral does not dispute the statements of

fact in paragraphs 37-38.
D.

Admiral's Denial of Defense

BASIC RESEARCH'S FACT Nos.

39-41.

Admiral does not dispute the statements of

fact in Paragraphs 39-41 but would note that the terms of the letters speak for themselves.
BASIC RESEARCH'S FACT NOS.

42.

42.-44.

By letters dated June 25, 2009 and July 6, 2009 Admiral acknowledged notice of

the Forlenza Suit and agreed to defend Basic Research in the Forlenza Suit subject to a
reservation of rights under the second Admiral Policy [Id. At f f 19 & 20, and Exhibits "11" &
"12. 7
43.

On November 19, 2009, counsel for Basic Research e-mailed Admiral to express

concern over Admiral's ongoing failure to honor its acknowledged defense obligations and to
communicate with basic Research. In its response, Admiral apologizedfor the delay and stated
it was having invoices for the incurred defense costs reviewed by counsel [Declaration of
Andrew Sussman CSussman Decl). ^\3&4 & Exh. "19"]
44

On December 8, 2009 counsel for Basic Research again emailed Admiral to

request that it honor its acknowledged defense obligations. In its response, Admiral confirmed
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and not the covered offense of the use of another's advertising ideas in Basic Research's
advertisements. The alleged use of Western Holdings's taglines15 is merely factual background
in the Underlying Complaints and does not trigger Admiral's duty to defend Basic Research
against claims of advertising injury.
E.

No Reasonable Interpretation of the Underlying Actions Leads to the
Conclusion that Any of The Underlying Plaintiffs Assert the "Personal and
Advertising Injury" Offense of "Use of Another's Advertising Idea."
1.

The Only Reasonable Interpretation

The foundational premise of Basic Research's argument is that the policy covers false
advertising so long as the insured employs false claims that were the brainchild of someone other
than the insured. Accordingly, the argument goes, so long as the insured uses some straw-man
as the "owner" of the false statement, there is coverage. There is no reasonable rationale for
such a conclusion. What is the sense of covering false advertising that the insured paid for
someone else to provide versus false advertising that the insured dreamed up? The answer is
"none." What the policy clearly covers is the unauthorized taking and use of someone else's
advertising idea.
2. Case Law Interprets Policy Language to Fall Outside of the Personal
and Advertismg Injury Coverage.
The case law is not prolific with respect to the particular offense in question. However,
that which does exist views the coverage from the common sense perspective advocated by
Admiral.
15

Indeed, the facts of this case show that Western Holdings, the company that is supposedly the
originator of the incriminated taglines, is actually a named insured under the Admiral policy.
Moreover, as the trademark registrations offered into evidence by Basic Research are dated June
2, 2008. This registration post-dates 1) the filing of the Miller Suit; 2) thefilingof the Tompkins
Suit; and 3) the inception of thefirstAdmiral policy.
37
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In Superformance Intern, v. Hartford Cas. Ins., 203 F.Supp.2d 587 (E.D.Va. 2002), the
insured produced replica models of the Ford Cobra. The insured was sued by Carroll Shelby and
Ford on various legal theories. From the bevy of allegations, the insured claimed that its insurer,
Hartford, provided coverage under the "Personal and Advertising Injury" Coverage, and more
particularly under the offense of "Copying, in your 'advertisement1, a person's or organization's
'advertising idea' or style of 'advertisement'...." Id
The Court held that while there were allegations in the underlying case that supported a
claim for false advertising, "[t]he Policy does not explicitly provide coverage for false
advertising and the claim cannot be read into any of the covered offenses. Thus, there is no
coverage for false advertisement based on the plain meaning of the Policy's terms." Id. at 598.
In Applied Bolting Tech. Prods, v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 942 F. Supp. 1029 (E.D. Pa.,
1996), the insured's "Personal and Advertising Injury" coverage provided coverage for the
covered offense of "misappropriation of advertising ideas."

The insured was sued by a

competitor who claimed that the insured's advertising falsely claimed that the insured's
advertisements met a particular industry standard when they did not and that consumers,
believing the false advertising, purchased the insured's inferior product to the detriment of the
competitor. Id. at 1031:
Applying Vermont law with respect to policy interpretation and duty to defend,16 the
Court held that the use of the standard by the insured was not an "advertising idea." Id. at 1033.
The court also noted that misappropriation of an advertising idea was the wrongful taking of the

16

Vermont law is materially the same as that of Utah and California , with respect to the
concepts of insurance contract interpretation and duty to defend. See Applied Bolting Tech
Prods., 942 F.Supp.2d at 1032.
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manner by which another advertises its goods or services or the wrongful taking of another's
manner of advertising. Id.
In Edwards Theatres, Inc. v. United National Ins. Co., 126 Fed.Appx. 831 (9th Cir. Cal.
2005), n the Underlying Plaintiff IMAX claimed that the insured Edwards Theatres used its
trademark "IMAX" to apply to conventional films and that such use damaged IMAX's
reputation. Id. at 832. The Court held that there was a duty to defend under the United National
policy for "use of another's advertising idea" because a trademark is an advertising idea. Id. at
833. The case illustrates what Admiral contends is the proper interpretation of the offense: the
insured has used the injured plaintiffs advertising idea and that plaintiff alleges that it sustained
damage arising out of such use.
In the very recent opinion of Champion Laboratories, Inc. v. American Home Assurance
Company, No. 09C7251, 2010 WL 2649848 (N.D. 111. June 30, 2010) (slip opinion), the court
addressed the scope of the coverage for "use of another's advertising idea." District Judge Amy
J. St. Eve held:
Under Illinois law, the use of another's advertising idea "occurs when a business
wrongfully takes a competitor's idea about the solicitation of business." Put
differently, the use of another's advertising idea concerns "the wrongful taking of
the manner by which another advertises its goods or services."
Id. at *4 (internal citations omitted). Judge St. Eve got it right. The essence of the coverage is to
address the insured's liability for wrongfully taking a competitor's advertising idea or the
wrongful taking of the manner by which another advertises its goods or services.
The Underlying Plaintiffs, here, make no claim that they were injured by an "advertising
idea". Their claims do not "arise out o f the use of an "advertising idea." Their claim is that
17

Cited by Basic Research. See Basic Research's Initial Memorandum at 20, n. 68.
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they were injured because the representations in the advertising were misleading andfalse. They
have no concern as to whether the false advertising was the brain child of Basic Research,
Western Holdings or someone else. Their alleged injury arises out of the content of the
advertising, not the manner of advertising.
In light of the foregoing, it is clear that none of the Complaints filed in the Miller,
Tompkins or Forlenza Suits allege facts that constitute the offense of "use of an another's
advertising idea in your advertisement". Accordingly, the two-part test for establishing an
advertising injury claim is not satisfied, and Admiral requests the Court to rule as a matter of law
that it owes no duty to defend Basic Research in the Miller, Tompkins or Forlenza Suits.
F.

Coverage is Precluded by Exclusion "g"

Basic Research goes to great lengths to avoid Exclusion "g", which provides a second
and additional basis for the Court to rule that Admiral owes no duty to defend Basic Research in
the Miller, Tompkins or Forlenza Suits. See Basic Research's Initial Memorandum at 16-25.
Exclusion "g" provides that there is no coverage for personal or advertising injury "arising out of
the failure of goods, products or services to conform with any statement of quality or
performance made in [the insured's] 'advertisement'." Admiral Policy, Basic Research Exhibit
1; Documents 43-1, page 12 of 59; Basic Research Exhibit 2, Document 43-2, Page 12 of 65.
None of the arguments made by Basic Research address the plain context of the Underlying
Plaintiffs' claims: that each relied on false advertising that told him or her in no uncertain terms
("we couldn't say it if it wasn't true") that Akavar 20/50 worked such that a purchaser could "eat
all you want and still lose weight." These statements go to the heart of the product's quality and
performance and the alleged failure to conform to the advertised statement.
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Statements of Quality or Performance

Basic Research asserts: "The Florenza claimants allege, in the disjunctive, damages
arising out of their "purchase[s of] a product based on false advertising and because the product
has not worked as advertised'' Basic Research's Initial Memorandum at 17 (emphasis in the
original). Basic Research argues that while the second claim that the product has not worked as
advertised could trigger the exclusion, the first claim of false advertising is not limited to claim
of quality and performance and therefore does not trigger the exclusion . See id.
Perhaps we are missing something but each of the Underlying Plaintiffs' claim that the
advertising is false in that Akavar 20/50 does not work as advertised. Clearly this claim arises
out of the alleged failure of the product to conform with a statement of quality or performance
and is, therefore, precludedfromcoverage.
2.

Definitions of the Exclusion's Terms

Basic Research resorts to the familiar tactic of finding a dictionary definition of a word
that, when substituted for the word in the policy, theoretically creates a meaning that supports the
claim for coverage. From that exercise, Basic Research concludes that the exclusion applies only
to statements about how the product fulfills its purpose of enabling users to "eat all you want and
still lose weight." As Basic Research puts it: "But although this accused slogan indicates a
result if the product is used, it does not say anything about how the product achieves the result."
Basic Research's Initial Memorandum at 18.
There is nothing in the plain language of the exclusion or any reasonable interpretation
thereof that indicates that the exclusion is limited as Basic Research suggests. Clearly the
exclusion is designed to make the insured assume and endure the foreseeable risk of making
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statements in advertisements which misrepresent what the product can be expected to do and/or
how it will perform. That is precisely what the Underlying Plaintiffs claim: Akavar 20/50 does
not allow one to eat all one wants and still lose weight.
Exclusion "g" is analogous to the category of exclusions contained in Coverage A's
property damage exclusions 2 0 through 2(n),18 known as the business risk exclusions. These
exclusions are designed to preclude liability coverage for defective workmanship or services
which are a foreseeable risk that the business needs to address. See Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance
Co. v. Lynne, 686 N.W.2d 118,123-24 (N.D. 2004) (The purpose of business risk exclusions is "to
prevent policyholders from converting liability insurance into protection from foreseeable business
risks.... Insurance companies theorize that a business risk, such as a cost resultingfromimproper
performance of contract, should be built into the price of the product"). Courts explain the
business risk doctrine in the following manner:
The business risk doctrine is the expression of a public policy applied to insurance
coverage provided under commercial general policies. Reduced to its simplest
terms, the risk that insured's product will not meet contractual standards is
a business risk not covered by a general liability policy. To ensure predictable
. and affordable insurance rates, the business risk doctrine limits an insurer's
assumption of risk to those risks that are beyond the "effective control" of the
insured.
Business risks, then, are:

The Admiral Policy contains the Coverage A business risk exclusions and they are found at
CG 00 02 12 04 at p. 4 of 16. See Basic Research Exhibit 1; Documents 43-1, Page 10-11 of 59;
Basic Research Exhibit 2, Document 43-2, Pages 10-11 of 65. For instance Exclusion (2)(k)
provides:
2. Exclusions
This insurance does not apply to:
*

*

*

*

k. Damage To Your Product
"Property damage" to "your product" arising out of it or any part of it.
42
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Finally, in Superperformance Intern, v. Hartford Cas. Ins. (E.D. Va. 2002) 203
F.Supp.2d 587, 589-590, a manufacturer of sports cars and related products sued
the insured for marketing similar products improperly bearing the manufacturer's
name. After the insurer declined to provide a defense in the action, the federal
district court concluded that the nonconformity exclusion precluded coverage for
the manufacturers false advertising claims. (Id. at p. 598)
TCI contends that the nonconformity exclusion is ambiguous, and can be
reasonably understood as operating to bar coverage for claims by consumers, but
not claims by competitors. Pointing to Aragon-Haas v. Family Security Ins.
Services, Inc. (1991) 231 Cal App.3d 232 [282 Ca. Rptr. 233. (Aragon-Haas),
TCI argues that we are obliged to accept its proffered interpretation of the
exclusion for purposes of assessing Peerless's demurrer, (fn omitted) As the
nonconformity exclusion is not ambiguous, we reject TCI's contention.
Total Calllnt'l, 181 Cal.App.4th at 172-173. As one can see, the foregoing cases and the
courts' analyses of Exclusion "g" are persuasive and show that in the present case, the
Underlying Plaintiffs' claims rely entirely on the allegation that Akavar 20/50 "[did] not
live up to the promise o f being able to eat everything and still lose weight.

Thus

coverage for the claims is precluded under Exclusion "g."
5.

Exclusion "g" Can Only Bar Indemnity But Not Defense

Basic Research claims that Exclusion "g" only operates to bar the duty to
indemnify and not the duty to defend because ultimately Plaintiffs may not be able to
prove their claim that Akavar 20/50 fails to conform to the advertised statements of
quality and performance. See Basic Research's Initial Memorandum at 23. Basic
Research ignores a fundamental tenet of insurance law, that the duty to defend is
determined by a comparison of the allegations of the complaint, if proven true, with the
insurance policy. If the allegations fall within a policy exclusion, there is no duty to
defend. See Deseret Fed. Co., 714 P.2d at 1147 (Utah 1986) ("Conversely, where there
is no potential liability [due to the fact that the allegations fall within the scope of an
46
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Pursuant to Rule 201 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, ("Plaintiffs")1 respectfully request
that the Court take judicial notice of the "Memorandum Decision And Order Granting Plaintiffs'
Motion For Approval Of Nationwide Class Notice Program And Denying Defendants' Motion
For Stay" (the "Order"), entered on March 2, 2011 (the "Miller suit").2 A copy of the Order is
attached as Exhibit "27." Judicial notice of orders entered in courts is appropriate3 and is
particularly appropriate here to refute Admiral's argument that the remedies sought by the Miller
suit plaintiff class are restitutionary in character rather than damages4 - an argument Admiral
first raised at oral argument.
Plaintiffs had no prior opportunity or ability to bring this Order to this Court's attention.5
The Order should be considered by this Court in connection with Plaintiffs' pending Motion For
Partial summary Judgment on the same grounds asserted by Admiral in support of its March 21,
2011 "Notice of Supplemental Authority" in opposition to Plaintiffs Motion.
As now defined by the Miller Court, the Miller class includes all persons who purchased
Akavar after seeing or hearing the "advertisement" at issue in this insurance coverage lawsuit
l

Basic Research, LLC; Dynakor Pharmacal, LLC; The Carter-Reed Company, LLC; PC MGMT,
Inc.; Joseph Bode; Sheila Erickson; Dennis Gay; Daniel B. Mowrey; Mitchell K. Friedlander;
and Zoller Laboratories, LLC.
1
Pamela Miller, et al v. Basic Research LLC, et al9 United States District Court, District of
Utah, Case No. 2:07-CV-871 TS.
3
State ex rel A.S., 2008 UT App. 71, 2008 WL 601267, at *2 (Utah Ct. App. March 6, 2008)
(court may take judicial notice of "legal documents . . . generated through court
proceedings
").
*Limelight Productions, Inc. v. Limelite Studios, 60 F.3d 767, 769 (11th Cir. (Fla.) 1995) held
that measuring a plaintiffs monetary remedy as the amount of defendant's profits from alleged
wrongdoing (in Limelight, for trademark infringement; here, for false advertising) does not
change the remedy's character from "damages" to "restitution." Limelight's logic is
underscored here because any damages that ultimately may be awarded to the Miller plaintiff
class would not be measured by adding up the individualized amounts paid by each class
member for Akavar. The Miller complaint's damage claims (Exhibit "3," p. 54) are not so
limited.
5
The Order was entered on March 2, 2011 - the same date on which (pursuant to this Court's
order entered February 18, 2011) Plaintiffs and Defendant Admiral Insurance Company
("Admiral") filed their moving, opposition and reply papers in support of and in opposition to
Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment which was argued herein on March 24,2011.
1 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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now before this Court, without regard to whether or not they lost weight, and whose injury would
depend on the content of the first "advertisement."6
Contrary to Admiral's arguments at the March 24, 2011 hearing of Plaintiffs' motion,
whether a person used Akavar but did not lose weight is irrelevant to whether that person is a
member of the class as defined by the Miller Court. Although persons who claim that they
purchased and used Akavar but failed to lose weight are members of the Miller class if, but only
if they heard or saw the slogan "eat all you want and still lose weight" before purchasing the
product, the Miller class as defined by the Miller Court also includes persons who purchased
Akavar and lost weight, so long as they saw or heard the "eat all you want and still lose weight"
slogan before purchasing the product.7
Admiral abandoned its argument that the "f. use of another's advertising idea in your
'advertisement'" offense could never encompass false/misleading advertising claims8 at oral
argument. Yet it urges that these claims must be limited to allegations analogous to trademark
infringement9 or breach of warranty,10 thereby assuring that coverage (f) would be eviscerated by
express policy exclusions, rendering its coverage illusory and contrary to settled law, rejecting
analogous arguments.11 Admiral's policy construction "rests on an overly restrictive reading of

At page 2 of the Order, the Miller Court defined the certified plaintiff class in the underlying
Miller class action lawsuit as: "Persons who purchased Akavar after seeing or hearing the
marketing slogan: 'Eat all you want and still lose weight' during the relevant damages period."
[Emphasis added.]
7

Nowhere in the Miller First Amended Complaint do the Miller plaintiffs allege that the Akavar
product is completely ineffective for causing weight loss, or that all of the members of the class
used the product and did not lose weight. Whether a consumer "used" Akavar is irrelevant to
whether he or she is a member of the class defined by the Miller Court.
8

Admiral's Opposition/Summary Judgment Motion [Docket 51 in District Court action, filed
Aug. 9,2010 ("Admiral OppVMSJ")], p. 34 and n. 12.
9
Admiral Opp./MSJ, p. 39.
l0
Id. at p. 44.
11
McCormack Baron Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 989 S.W.2d 168,
171-72 (Mo. 1999).
2 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the complaint"12 and is at odds with settled Utah law.13
The monetary damages sought by the Miller plaintiff class are alleged to be owed
because the class members allegedly saw or heard advertisements before purchasing the product
- not because they tried the product and it allegedly did not work.14
Miller's Sixth Cause of Action seeks monetary damages, not restitution, under the Utah
Consumer Sales Practices Act (U.C.A. §13-11-1 et seq.).15 These provisions mean a single
consumer may seek "actual damages"16 and "money damages" in a class action,17 as here.
Dated: March 28, 2011
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BEDNAR L L C _
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By:

&£<^

BRADSHAW
y

& GAUNTLETT & ASSOCIATES
David A. Gauntlett

~

AndteWMSuSSman

'

Alan C. Bradshaw
Aaron C. Garrett
Attorneys for Plaintiffs,
Basic Research, LLC; Dynakor Pharmacal, LLC; The Carter-Reed Company, LLC; PC MGMT,
Inc.; Joseph Bode; Sheila Erickson; Dennis Gay; Daniel B. Mowrey; Mitchell K. Friedlander;
and Zoller Laboratories, LLC
u

Michael Taylor Designs, Inc. v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am.,
F. Supp. 2d
, 2011
WL 221658, at *6 (N.D. Cal. (S.F. Div.) 2011).
^Harris v. Zurich Holding Co. of Am., Wo. 2:05-CV-482 TC, 2006 WL 120258, at *2 (D. Utah
Jan. 17,2006) (" c[T]he insured need only show that the underlying claim may fall within policy
coverage; the insurer must prove that it cannot' ").
l4
See Miller suit's First Amended Class Action Complaint (Exhibit "3" to Plaintiffs' Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment herein), Prayer For Relief, pp. 53-54, f "F" ("On the Sixth Cause of
Action, against Defendants jointly and severally, in an amount equal to actual damages suffered
by Plaintiffs and members of the Class as proven at trial plus interest
").
15
U.C.A. § 13-ll-19(4)(a) ("A consumer who suffers a loss as a result of a violation of this
chapter may bring a class action for the actual damages caused by an act or practice specified
as violating this chapter
" (emphasis added)).
l6
Andreason v. Felsted, 137 P.3d 1,4 (Utah Ct. App. 2006) ("Under... 13-11-19 . . . a consumer
who is able to prove actual damages . . . also proves that he has suffered a loss and . . . entitled
to recover the value of his 'actual damages or $2,000, whichever is greater.' " (emphasis added)).
X1
Miller v. Corinthian Colleges, Inc., No. 2:10-CV-999 TS, 2011 WL 652478 (D. Utah Feb. 15,
2011) ("Plaintiffs' claims for money damages may also be cognizable under the class action
provision of the Act." (emphasis added)).
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Pamela MILLER; Randy Howard; and Donna Patterson; on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
v.
BASIC RESEARCH, LLC; Dynakor Pharmacal, LLC; Western
Holdings, LLC; Dennis Gay; Daniel B. Mowrey, Ph.D; Mitchell K.
Friedlander; and Does l through 50, Defendants.
No. 2:07-CV-87i TS.

March 2.201 x.

Opinion
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
APPROVAL OF NATIONWIDE C U S S NOTICE PROGRAM AND DENYING
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR STAY
TED STEWART, District Judge.
*1 Before the Court is Plaintiffs Pamela Miller, Randy Howard, and Donna Patterson's
("Plaintiffs") Motion for Approval of Nationwide Class Notice Program1 and Defendants
Basic Research, LLC, Dynakor Pharmacal, LLC, Dennis Gray, Daneii B. Morey, and
Mitchell K. Friedlander's (collectively, "Basic Research" or "Defendants") Motion to
Stay. 2 A hearing was held on these Motions on February 28,2011. The Court took the
Motions under advisement and now enters the following Order.
I. MOTION FOR APPROVAL OF CLASS NOTICE
On September 2,2010, in the Court's Order certifying the class in this action, the Court
"ORDERED that the parties meet and confer regarding notice and submit a proposed
order within 60 days."3 Although the parties met and conferred as ordered, the parties
were unable to come to an agreement as to how to notify the class. On November 12,
2010, Plaintiff submitted to the Court the present Motion for Approval of Nationwide
Class Notice Program, which seeks approval of Plaintiffs' proposed class notice
program over Basic Research's objections.
Plaintiffs' proposed notice plan is allegedly based on the class definition provided by the
Court in its September 2,2010 Order, where the Court held that the class shall comprise
-those persons who purchased Akdvar in reliance of the slogan 'Eat ail you want and
still lose weight.' "4 In Plaintiffs' proposed notice, under the heading of "Who is
Included?", the notice states: "The Court decided that the Class includes: Everyone who
purchased Akdvar after seeing the marketing slogan 'Eat all you want and still iose
weight.'"* Plaintiffs' notice plan proposes to disseminate this notice via the internet,
radio, print, and television.
In Basic Research's opposition to this Motion, Basic Research notes that its objection
stems not from the proposed notice plan per se, but rather this Court's definition of the
certified class. Basic Research argues that the inclusion of the word 'reliance" in the
class definition renders it unworkable. As Basic Research explains, since a notified
individual's class membership (s generally presumed unless the notified Individual optsout, determining reliance at the class membership stage would necessarily rely upon
either this Court making an individual assessment as to class membership, or leaving to
the individual the determination of reliance before opting-out
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Basic Research's concerns were echoed by Judge Hartz of the Tenth Circuit, who
noted in dissent of the Tenth Circuit's denial of Defendants' Petition for Panel
Rehearing:
It seems to me that there is a class-action issue in this case that should be explored
on an interlocutory appeal. The district court's definition of the class is peculiar. The
court's order granting certification of the class defines the class as "limited to those
persons who purchased Akavar in reliance on the slogan 'Eat all you want and still
lose weight.'" This is not the definition sought by Plaintiffs. They sought a class
defined as "All persons in the United States who purchased, for consumption and not
for resale or assignment, Akavar 50/50froma retail sales establishment directly from
Defendants, or from a website controlled or operated by Defendants." They made
good arguments justifying such a class, and it is not clear to me why the district court
rejected that definition of the class and chose what it did. Indeed, the court said it
would leave the issues of Individual reliance for determination during the damages
stage of the case If Plaintiffs established a violation during the class proceedings. But
there would be no need to establish.individual reliance for members of the class if one
had to prove reliance even to be a member of the class. 5
*2 Of course, Basic Research is careful not to endorse Judge Hartz's proposal to
reconsider Plaintiffs' broader class definition. Instead, Basic Research merely
suggested that the issue be discussed at a hearing.
Prior to the February 28,2011 hearing, the Court ordered that the parties come
prepared to propose alternate definitions to the certified class at the February 28,2011
hearing. At the hearing, Plaintiffs renewed their request for the broader definition it
initially requested in its motion for class certification. Basic Research declined to
provide a specific alternative for the Court to consider. Instead, Basic Research
requested the Court de-certify the class.
After reviewing the parties' respective arguments, Judge Hartz's dissent, and the case
law concerning class definition and notificatbn, the Court finds it necessary to modify its
definition of the class. By including the word "reliance" in the class definition, the Court
inadvertently created an ascertainability issue that it previously did not anticipate. In its
own review of the case law, the Court finds the class definition provided by In re New
England Mutual Life Insurance Company Sales Practices Litigation instructive and
persuasive.7 There, the district court faced claims by various Plaintiffs that the New
England Life Insurance Company had used deceptive and manipulative sales tactics to
encourage new and existing policyholders to purchase certain life insurance products.
Like the present action, the plaintiffs argued that the class should be defined as all
purchasers during the relevant damage period,6 while the defendant argued, among
other things, that a class should not be certified because of the need for individualized
findings of reliance.9 After considering several class definitions, the court decided to
certify a class of persons who were "presented" with the allegedly deceptive and
manipulative Information and purchased certain life Insurance products thereafter ,1.°
The court found that this avoided the overly broad definition proposed by the plaintiffs,
while avoiding the defendants concerns regarding reliance at the class notification
stage.
The Court finds this reasoning instructive and applicable to the instant dispute. The
Court therefore modifies its definition of the certified class to the following:
Persons who purchased Ak&var after seeing or hearing the marketing slogan 'Eat all
you want and still lose weight' during the relevant damages period.
In reviewing Plaintiffs' proposed class notification, the Court notes that Plaintiffs have
presented several variations of this language, including "if you purchased AkSvar either
partially or wholly because of the slogan 'Eat all you want and still lose weight,' you are
a member of the Class." 11 Now that the Court has modified its definition, the Court
expects all such references to the class definition in the class notification to conform to
the specific language presented by the Court
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*3 The Court, therefore, approves Plaintiffs' class notification program-with the above
stated modifications-and will grant Plaintiffs' Motion.
H. MOTION TO STAY
Basic Research moves the Court to stay these proceedings pending the outcome of an
enforcement action which the Federal Trade Commission f F T C ) has filed against
Basic Research, captioned United States v. Basic Research, LLC et al.t Case No.
2:09-CV-972 DB (the "FTC Action").
A. L E G A L STANDARD
As this Court has set forth previously,,2 the Court has inherent power to grant a stay
pending the result of other proceedings.13 The Supreme Court has described this power
as "incidental to the power Inherent in every court to control the disposition of the
causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for
litigants."14 To make this determination "calls for the exercise of judgment, which must
weigh competing interests and maintain an even balance."15 'Factors relevant to the
court's decision are: (1) whether a stay would promote judicial economy; (2) whether a
stay would avoid confusion and inconsistent results; and (3) whether a stay would
unduly prejudice the parties or create undue hardship."1B
The party seeking a Landis stay carries a heavy burden:
[A party seeking] a stay must make out a dear case of hardship or
Inequity in being required to go forward, If there is even a fair possibility
that the stay for which he prays will work damage to some one else.
Only in rare circumstances will a litigant In one cause be compelled to
stand aside while a litigant in another settles the rule of law that will
define the rights of both.17
B. RELEVANT BACKGROUND
In 2006, the FTC and Basic Research entered into a global settlement that resolved an
administrative action filed against Basic Research by the FTC and a 2004 lawsuit filed
in this District by a Basic Research entity challenging aspects of the FTC's scientific
substantiation standards for advertising claims. As part of this settlement, the FTC and
Basic Research entered into a Consent Agreement containing a provision that Basic
Research alleges explicitly permits Basic Research to make weight-loss and fat-loss
claims in its advertisements, so long as Basic Research has "competent and reliable
scientific evidence" for such claims.
In September of 2006, Basic Research provided copies of advertisements for certain of
Its products, including AkSvar 20/50 at issue in this case, along with scientific
substantiation supporting its advertisement claims for these products. Basic Research
alleges that over the next two years, it and the FTC engaged In extensive discussions
concerning these materials.
In 2009, Basic Research brought a declaratory action against the FTC in this Court
captioned Basic Research, LLC, et al. v. Federal Trade Commission, et §L, Case No.
2:09-CV-779 CW. Two months later, the FTC filed in this Court the FTC Action against
Basic Research. Basic Research alleges that the FTC action challenges the adequacy
of the scientific substantiation Basic Research possesses in support of its advertising
claims for AkSvar. Basic Research has moved to consolidate these cases and the
motion is currently under advisement with Judge Waddoups of this Court.
C . SUMMARY OF PARTIES 5 ARGUMENTS
M Basic Research argues the present action should be stayed pending resolution of
the F T C Action. Basic Research argues that all three of the factors typically weighed by
courts in determining a stay weigh in its favor.
1, Judicial Efficiency
As to judicial efficiency, Basic Research argues that the FTC litigation will necessarily
resolve a key issue in this case. Here, in certifying the class, the Court noted that "the
existence of a sufficient scientific basis [for Basic Research's advertisements] is a
dispositive issue, a determination on that Issue will resolve one way or another all of
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Plaintiffs' claims,"18 Basic Research alleges that the FTC litigation will address this
very issue-namely, the interpretation of the "competent and reliable scientific evidence"
term from the Consent Agreement and whether Basis Research had such reliable
scientific evidence to substantiate its advertising claims for AkSvar.
Basic Research argues that staying this case while the FTC Action resolves these
Issues will reduce unnecessary duplicative discovery requests, duplicative dispositive
motions, and avoid wasting scarce judicial resources.
Plaintiffs argue that requiring Basic Research to defend a suit, in and of itself, is
insufficient to warrant a stay.t9 Moreover, Plaintiffs note that Defendants are still
proceeding in two cases related to the FTC Action concerning another Basic Research
product, Relacore.20 Thus, Plaintiffs argue that there Is no hardship on Defendants in
proceeding on the merits in this case as well.
2. Risk of Inconsistent Result* and/or Conclusions
Basic Research argues that as the issue of whether Basic Research had adequate
science to substantiate Its advertising claims is a dispositive issue in both cases,
proceeding with this action raises a significant risk of inconsistent or contradictory
rulings.
Plaintiffs argue that any risk of Inconsistent rulings is overstated by Basic Research.
Plaintiffs assert that any ruling in the FTC Action will have no preclusive effect in the
present matter. Moreover, Plaintiffs argue that its claims here-RiCO, UPUAA, and state
consumer fraud-are distinct from the claims involved in the FTC Action-the FTC Act and
the Consent Decree. Thus, Plaintiffs argue that Basic Research couid prevail in the
FTC Action yet still befoundliable here.
3. Prejudice to the Parties
Basic Research further argues that Plaintiffs will not be harmed by a stay of these
proceedings. Basic Research asserts that should the FTC prevail in the FTC Action,
Plaintiffs will likely be entitled to the benefit of that ruling here. On the other hand, if
Basic Research prevails, then there is no violation of the Consent Agreement and
Plaintiffs are spared the effort of proceeding on the merits with their claims. Basic
Research also notes that the FTC seeks the same injunctive relief in the FTC Action as
Plaintiffs do in the present action.
Finally, Basic Research notes that delay of these proceedings will not prejudice
Plaintiffs. Basic Research notes that it is under a continuing obligation to preserve
documents, therefore Plaintiffs' discovery efforts will not be harmed. Further, Basic
Research alleges that the evidence in this matter Is largely documentary, so there is
little danger that Plaintiffs' case wiil be harmed by faded memories.
*5 Plaintiffs argue that Basic Research has severely understated the prejudice running
to Plaintiffs in the event the Court awards the requested stay. Plaintiffs note that this
case has already been proceeding for nearly three years, and predates the FTC Action
by nearly two years. Plaintiffs argue that a stay would delay for years the prosecution of
Plaintiffs' claims, including Plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief. Related to this concern.
Plaintiffs argue that a stay would prevent Plaintiffs from conducting discovery on this
matter, which raises a risk that witnesses' memories may fade or otherwise become
unavailable and evidence may be lost. Moreover, Plaintiffs argue that a stay of these
proceedings may eliminate its ability to recover on its claims should it prevail in this
litigation.
D. DISCUSSION
In weighing the above stated arguments, the Court finds that Basic Research has failed
to carry its heavy burden of justifying a stay. Although simultaneously pursuing litigation
related to the same subject is inconvenient, this hardship does not outweigh the severe
prejudice to Plaintiffs' claims in staying these proceedings. Plaintiffs' ability to gather
evidence would be limited, If not eviscerated, by a stay of these proceedings. During the
time the proposed stay would be in effect, there remains a highriskthat evidence will be
jost and witnesses' memories wiil fade or they may become unavailable. This risk is
magnified by the fact that the FTC Action is in its early stages, and may take years to
resolve.
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Additionally, any supposed benefit of awaiting the outcome of the FTC Action is
marginal at best. Even if Basic Research prevails In the FTC Action, Plaintiffs could still
proceed on their claims because the FTC Action would likely have no preclusive effect
upon Plaintiffs. And even If the FTC prevails in the FTC Action, whether that decision
would have preclusive effect against Basic Research in this action is a question of law
which need not be decided at this juncture. Thus, Basic Research's requested stay
would require Plaintiffs to stand idle on their claims for years, based on the mere
possibility that a decision against Basic Research could be used preclusively in this
action. Such a possibility is Insufficient to warrant a stay in these circumstances.
The Court, therefore, finds the requested stay unwarranted and will deny Basic
Research's Motion to Stay.
III. CONCLUSION
It is therefore
ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion for Approval of Nationwide Class Notice Program
(Docket No. 158) is GRANTED. It is further
ORDERED that Defendants' Motion to Stay (Docket No. 166) is DENIED.

Footnotes

1

Docket No. 158.

2

Docket No. 173.

3

Docket No. 151.

4

Docket No. 151, at 25-28.

5

Docket No. 161, Ex. 1, at Attachment A

6

Docket No. 159, at 10 n. 8.

7

183F.R.D.33(D.Mass.1998).

8

Id. at 37.

9

Id. at 43-44.

10

Id. at 37.

11

Docket No. 160-1 at 5,14.

12

Gale v. Blinker Int'l Payroll Co., LP., 20
29,2010).

13

Nederiandse ERTS-Tankersmaatchappij, N.V. v. Isbamdtsen Co., 339 F.2d
440,441 (2dCir.1964).

14

Landis v. North American Co.. 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936).

15

Id. at 254-55.

16

Evergreen Holdings, Inc. v. Sequoia Global, Inc., 2008 WL 4723008, *2
<W.D.Okla.2008).

17

lafld/s, 299U.S.at255.

18

Docket No. 151, at 16.

19

See Docket No. 173, at 6 (quoting Lockyer v. Mirant Corp ., 398 F.3d 1098,
1112 (9th Cir.2005)).

20

See Docket No. 173, at 6.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR,Ie08ac6a0el
may contain errors.
https://a.next.westlawxoni/Document/I5e6fcb474b701
1 ld7a898/View/FxillTe... 3/25/2011

TOt]
Miller v. Basic Research, LLC - WestlawNext

End Of Document
Preferences

j

My Contact* j

^P

Page 6 of 6

Q 2011 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
Getting Started

j

Help

•

Sign Off
\ THOMSON flWTERS

WestlawNext. ©2011 Thomson Reuters i Privacy I Accessibility I Contact Us j 1-800-REF-ATTY (1-IW0-733-2Q69) j improve WaatfawNext

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
J. Reuben Clark
Law School, BYU.
3/25/2011
https://a.next.westlaw.com/Document/I5e6fcb474b701
Ie08ac6a0el
1 ld7a898/View/FullTe...
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

